*;:;'"; 


SELECTIONS    FROM  THE 
FEDERALIST 

EDITED,  WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION 
BY 

WILLIAM   BENNETT  MUNRO 

PROFESSOR  OF  MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT 
IN  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 


CAMBRIDGE 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1914 


t"^ 


N^"^ 


V'W 


^V 


COPYRIGHT,  I914 
BY  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


PREFACE 

Too  little  use  has  been  made  of  The  Federalist  as  a  means  of 
affording  instruction  both  in  the  foundations  of  American 
government  and  in  the  principles  of  English  composition. 
In  clearness  both  of  thought  and  expression  these  letters  of 
Alexander  Hamilton,  James  Madison,  and  John  Jay  are 
not  surpassed  in  the  whole  range  of  American  political 
literature.  In  order  that  some  of  them  may  be  more  con- 
veniently used  in  the  training  of  young  men  for  clear-headed 
citizenship,  this  volume  of  selections  has  been  arranged. 

For  several  years  the  editor  has  been  using  The  Federalist 
in  his  class-room.  Students  have  made  their  approach  to 
the  study  of  federal  government  through  its  pages.  On 
the  whole  the  results  have  been  very  satisfactory,  although 
some  of  the  letters  have  proved  much  better  than  others 
as  starting-points  for  class-room  discussion.  In  determin- 
ing what  should  go  into  the  present  volume  and  what  should 
not,  this  experience  has  been  the  sole  guide.  It  happens, 
however,  that  all  the  selections  have  come  from  among  the 
first  fifty  of  the  original  letters. 

The  text  of  The  Federalist  from  which  these  selections 
have  been  taken  is  that  of  the  first  collected  edition,  pub- 
lished by  McLean  (New  York,  1788).  It  differs  only  in 
some  minor  matters  of  form  from  the  texts  of  the  original 
letters  printed  in  the  newspapers  of  that  year  and  the  year 
before,  and  is  said  to  have  received  the  benefit  of  Madison's 
revision  in  preparation  for  the  press.     The  importance  of 


iv  PREFACE 

using  the  original  text  is  obvious  in  the  case  of  articles 
written  for  such  a  special  and  immediate  purpose;  yet  most 
editors  have  followed  either  the  revised  text  of  1802,  or  the 
amended  "  original  text "  which  Dawson  prepared  for  his 
edition  of  1863.  The  only  foot-notes  included  in  the  pre- 
sent Selections  are  those  which  appeared  in  the  edition  of 
1788,  and  which  were  put  there  by  the  authors  themselves. 

W.B.M. 

Cambridge,  December  28,  1913. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface iii 

Introduction 

1.  The  Making  of  the  Constitution i 

2.  The  Campaign  for  its  Adoption 9 

3.  Why  the  Federalist  was  written 11 

4.  The  Federalist  as  a  Treatise  on  Government 14 

5.  Bibliographical  Note 17 

Selections  from  the  Federalist 

I.  The  Dangers  of  Dismiion 

(a)  Dangers  from  Abroad  (Articles  2-5) 19 

(b)  Dangers  at  Home  (Articles  6-8) 37 

II.  The  Need  of  a  Strong  Federation 

(a)  To  Prevent  Internal  Strife  (Articles  9-10) 56 

(b)  To  Develop  and  Protect  Commerce  (Article  11)  ...    .  70 

(c)  To  Provide  an  Adequate  Revenue  (Articles  12-13)      •    •  77 

III.  The  Inadequacy  of  the  Old  Confederation 

(a)  General  Features  of  Weakness  (Article  14) 87 

(b)  The  Lack  of  Power  to  Compel  Obedience  (Article  21)     .       93 

(c)  The  Lack  of  Power  to  Regulate  Commerce  (Article  22)         98 

IV.  Difl&culties  Encountered  in  Framing  the  New  Constitution 

(a)  Inherent  Difficulties  of  the  Undertaking  (Article  37)  .    .     109 

(b)  Differences  of  Opinion  concerning  Details  (Article  38)    .     117 

V.  The  Conformity  of  the  New  Constitution  to  Republican  Prin- 
ciples. Estabhshes  a  Government  both  Republican  and 
Federal  (Article  39)      126 

VI.  Justification  of  the  Powers  Conferred  by  the  New  Constitution 
upon  the  Federal  Government 

(a)  Military  Powers  (Article  41) 134 

(b)  Diplomatic  and  Commercial  Powers  (Article  42)      ...  144 

(c)  Other  Powers  (Articles  43-44)      152 

(d)  The  Powers  of  the  Federal  and  the  State  Governments  ~    " 
Compared  (Articles  45-46) 170 

V 


vi  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

VII.  The  System  of  Checks  and  Balances 

(a)  An  Examination  of  Montesquieu's  Doctrine  (Article  47)     184 
(&)  The  Objection  to  a  Complete   Separation  of    Powers 

(Article  48)     192 

(c)   Separation  of  Powers  Necessary  to  Prevent  Frequent 

Constitutional  Amendments  (Article  49)      197 


SELECTIONS    FROM  THE 
FEDERALIST 


INTRODUCTION 

I.    THE  MAKING  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION 

In  the  early  summer  of  1787  a  group  of  fifty-five  men,  represent- 
ing all  the  states  except  Rhode  Island,  met  in  Philadelphia  to 
work  out  some  plan  of  union  which  would  better  serve  their 
common  interests  than  the  one  provided  by  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation. These  Articles  had  been  adopted  in  1777  by  the 
delegates  of  the  various  states  in  the  Continental  Congress,  and 
this  action  was  subsequently  ratified  by  the  states  themselves. 
But  the  Confederation  which  was  thereby  established  amounted 
to  Httle  more  than  a  league  of  friendship  among  the  states,  for 
each  state  retained  nearly  all  its  sovereign  powers,  and  very  Httle 
authority  was  handed  over  to  the  congress  of  delegates  which 
was  the  official  organ  of  the  Confederation. 

The  Critical  Period 

It  was  under  this  makeshift  arrangement  that  the  thirteen 
states  managed  to  make  a  formal  treaty  of  peace  with  England 
in  1783  and  to  wrestle  somewhat  ineffectively  with  various  other 
difficult  problems  during  the  next  few  years.  These  years 
formed  a  very  critical  period  in  American  history.  The  states 
were  growing  jealous  of  each  other,  and  some  of  them  were 
already  endeavoring  by  restrictive  trade  regulations  to  gain 
prosperity  at  the  expense  of  their  neighbcTrs.  In  some  cases, 
again,  the  boimdaries  between  states  had  never  been  authorita- 
tively fixed;  rival  claims  were  being  pressed,  and  it  looked  as 
though  some  of  the  states  would  soon  come  to  blows  over  such 
matters.  As  for  the  Congress  of  the  Confederation,  it  had  no 
power  to  CO-  pel  a  .-ia.c;  to  do  anything;  it  had  no  revenues 
except  such  -rants  of  money  as  the  various  states  might  make; 


'ij  :-':.,.',   INTRODUCTION 

and  it  had  no  authority  to  regulate  commerce  in  the  common 
interest.  It  did  not  even  possess  power  to  make  the  states  fulfill 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  with  England  which  it  had  made  on  their 
behalf  in  1783. 

The  Need  of  a  Stronger  Union 

Under  these  circumstances  it  soon  became  apparent  to 
thoughtful  men  that  the  Confederation  must  be  either  strength- 
ened or  dissolved;  that  no  useful  purpose  would  be  served  by 
continuing  it  in  impotence.  To  abandon  it  altogether  was 
something  hardly  to  be  considered,  for  that  would  have  opened 
wide  the  door  to  interstate  quarrels  and  this,  in  turn,  would  have 
invited  foreign  intervention.  The  only  alternative  was  to  make 
the  union  a  real  one  with  a  central  authority  strong  enough  to 
insure  united  action  in  all  matters  of  common  interest.  To  be 
efficient  in  this  direction  it  was  felt  that  the  central  government 
would  require  three  powers  not  given  to  it  by  the  Articles  of 
Confederation:  (i)  the  power  to  raise  revenue  and  to  borrow 
money  without  recourse  to  the  states;  (2)  the  power  to  regulate 
foreign  and  interstate  commerce;  (3)  the  exclusive  power  of 
making  and  enforcing  treaties.  It  was  well  realized  that  the 
several  states  were  likely  to  surrender  any  such  powers  very 
grudgingly,  if  at  all;  but  in  1787  twelve  of  them  were  finally 
induced  to  send  delegates  to  Philadelphia  in  order  that  the  whole 
problem  should  be  carefully  considered. 

The  Constitutional  Convention  of  1787 

Among  the  delegates  who  came  to  this  convention  were  many 
men  of  great  influence  in  their  own  communities.  Washington, 
Madison  and  Randolph  were  on  hand  as  representatives  of 
Virginia.  Jefferson  could  not  be  a  delegate  as  he  was  at  the 
time  on  a  diplomatic  mission  to  France.  Pennsylvania  sent  Ben- 
jamin Franklin,  James  Wilson,  John  Dickinson,  Robert  Morris, 
Gouverneur  Morris  and  others.  New  York  looked  askance  at 
the  whole  proceeding  but  had  among  her  three  delegates  an  able 


INTRODUCTION  3 

representative  in  Alexander  Hamilton.  Other  men  of  almost 
equal  power  and  personality  were  there:  Roger  Sherman  and 
Oliver  Ellsworth  from  Connecticut;  Elbridge  Gerry  and  Rufus 
King  from  Massachusetts;  William  Paterson  from  New  Jersey; 
and  Luther  Martin  from  Maryland.  After  some  delay,  due  to 
the  tardy  arrival  of  delegates  from  several  of  the  states,  the  con- 
vention organized,  chose  Washington  as  its  presiding  officer,  and 
set  to  work  on  its  great  task. 

Work  of  the  Convention 

For  over  three  months  during  the  discomforts  of  an  unusually 
hot  summer  the  convention  met  almost  every  week  day.  Its 
sessions  were  not  open  to  the  public  and  the  delegates  were 
enjoined  to  secrecy.  All  observed  this  rule  faithfully  and  nothing 
reached  the  public  ear  concerning  the  deliberations  until  the 
whole  work  was  finished.  A  formal  record  of  the  convention's 
proceedings  was  kept  by  the  secretary;  but  this  official  per- 
formed his  duty  rather  poorly,  and  our  best  accoimt  of  what 
went  on  during  the  sessions  has  come  down  to  us  in  the  form  of 
notes  taken  day  by  day  for  his  own  use  by  James  Madison,  who 
was  the  most  regular  attendant  and  the  most  3^&ve  figure  of  the 
entire  convention.  A  few  other  members  of  the  convention 
made  fragmentary  notes  or  memoranda,  so  that  posterity,  by 
piecing  ever)rthing  together,  has  managed  to  get  a  fairly  com- 
prehensive and  accurate  account  of  the  day-to-day  proceedings. 

The  Randolph  and  Paterson  Plans 

It  did  not  take  the  convention  long  to  discover  that  widely 
divergent  views  concerning  what  ought  to  be  done  were  held  by 
dijfferent  delegates.  Some  of  them,  including  Hamilton  and 
Madison,  wanted  a  strong  central  government  with  plenty  of 
coercive  power  lodged  in  its  hands.  Others,  like  Paterson  and 
Martin,  desired  that  the  convention  should  proceed  no  further 
than  to  a  slight  strengthening  of  the  powers  given  to  the  central 
government  by  the  Articles  of  Confederation.     Two  outlines, 


4  INTRODUCTION 

known  respectively  as  the  Randolph  and  Paterson  plans,  were 
presented  to  the  convention  embodying  these  divergent  views. 
The  Randolph  plan  contemplated  a  reorganized  union  with  a 
strong  central  government  which  should  include  legislative, 
executive  and  judicial  departments.  It  proposed,  moreover, 
that  the  central  congress  should  be  made  up  of  representatives 
from  the  various  states  in  proportion  to  their  population,  thereby 
setting  aside  the  principle  of  equal  state  representation  which 
had  beeh  recognized  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  The 
Paterson  plan  proposed  no  more  than  a  revision  of  these  Articles 
with  a  view  chiefly  to  some  enlargement  in  the  powers  of  the 
Congress  which  shouy.- continue  to  give  the  states  equality  of 
representation  de^fc^geir  great  differences  in  area  and  popula- 

The  Baskof  State  Representation 

Much  of  their  time  was  spent  by  the  members  of  the  conven- 
tion in  discussing  this  fundamental  question  as  to  whether  the 
central  legislative  authority  of  the  union  should  be  made  up  of 
representatives  imm  the  states  in  numbers  proportioned  to  their 
population  or  ^^^er  each  state  should  have  the  same  quota  of 
representativ^JHpr  a  time  it  looked  as  if  the  work  of  the  con- 
vention wouldcome  to  naught  through  the  failure  of  delegates 
to  reach  any  agreement  on  this  issue.  The  delegates  from  the 
larger  states  saw  no  good  reason  why  Virginia,  Pennsylvania  and 
those  states  which  would  naturally  furnish  most  of  the  common 
revenue  should  not  have  a  controUing  voice  in  the  raising  and 
spending  of  money.  The  delegates  from  Maryland,  New 
Jersey  and  other  small  states  were  just  as  fully  convinced  that 
unless  all  were  given  equal  representation  the  union  would  pass 
imder  the  complete  control  of  their  more  populous  neighbors. 

The  Great  Coaipromise 

This  diffculty  was  finally  overcome,  however,  by  the  conven- 
tion's acceptance  of  the  Great  Compromise.  In  brief,  this 
compromise,  which  was  brought  before  the  convention  by  the 


INTRODUCTION  5 

delegates  from  Connecticut,  provided  for  a  Congress  of  two 
chambers,  the  upper  chamber  affording  equal  representation 
to  all  the  states,  the  lower  chamber  representing  the  states 
according  to  their  respective  populations.  It  was  further  pro- 
vided that  all  bills  for  raising  and  appropriating  money  should 
originate  in  the  lower  chamber  and  should  not  be  subject  to  al- 
teration or  amendment  in  the  upper  house  of  Congress.  Before 
the  convention  finished  its  work,  however,  this  last  provision  was 
somewhat  modified  and  the  final  draft  of  the  new  Constitution 
gave  the  lower  house  considerably  less  power  in  regard  to  finan- 
cial matters  than  was  contemplated  by  the  terms  of  this  com- 
promise. 

The  Commerce  Power 

Having  settled  this  crucial  problem  of  representation  the 
convention  made  better  progress.  But  other  difficult  questions 
soon  arose.  One  of  these  concerned  the  power  which  it  was  pro- 
posed to  give  Congress  in  the  matter  of  customs  taxes.  The 
interests  of  the  Northern  and  the  Southern  states  seemed  to 
diverge  on  this  point,  the  former  being  wiUing  to  give  Congress  a 
large  range  of  power,  the  latter  desiring  that  its  authority  in  the 
matter  of  taxing  imports  and  exports  should  be  limited.  In  the 
end  it  was  agreed  that  Congress  should  be  left  free  in  its  power  to 
tax  imports  (except  slaves)  but  that  no  tax  should  ever  be  laid  on 
exports  from  any  state. 

Slavery 

Then  there  were  the  difficult  questions  concerning  slavery. 
In  the  first  place  there  was  opposition  to  the  adoption  of  any 
arrangement  which  would  make  necessary  for  all  time  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  African  slave  traffic,  and  this  opposition  came 
not  only  from  some  of  the  Northern  states  but  from  Virginia 
as  well.  On  the  other  hand  the  extreme  Southern  states,  such 
as  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia,  were  rigid  in  their  refusal  to  con- 
cede to  Congress  any  power  which  would  enable  that  body  to 
prohibit  at  once  the  further  importation  of  slaves.  This  con- 
flict of  interests  was  finally  adjusted  by.  withholding   from 


6  INTRODUCTION 

Congress  the  right  to  prohibit  the  importation  of  slaves  during 
the  first  two  decades  after  the  Constitution  went  into  force.  In 
the  meantime  no  import  tax  of  more  than  ten  dollars  per  slave 
was  to  be  imposed. 

The  Three-Fifths  Compromise 

Another  question  connected  with  the  institution  of  slavery 
likewise  gave  the  convention  some  difficulty,  although  not  so 
much  as  later  writers  on  the  subject  seem  to  have  imagined. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  by  the  terms  of  the  Great  Compro- 
mise, it  had  been  arranged  to  have  representation  in  the  lower 
house  of  Congress  apportioned  among  the  states  according  to 
their  respective  populations.  But  were  slaves  to  be  counted  in 
determining  a  state's  population  ?  Delegates  from  the  states 
of  the  North,  where  slaves  were  few,  held  that  slaves  should  not 
be  coimted  as  a  basis  of  representation;  delegates  from  the  states 
of  the  South,  where  slaves  formed  a  very  considerable  part  of 
the  entire  population,  insisted  that  they  should  be  counted.  A 
somewhat  illogical  settlement  of  this  point  was  made  by  the 
Three-Fifths  Compromise.  It  was  agreed  that  slaves  should  be 
counted  in  determining  the  quota  of  representatives  which  a 
state  should  have  in  Congress,  but  at  three  fifths  of  their  numeri- 
cal strength  only.  In  other  words,  one  hundred  slaves  were  to 
be  counted,  for  purposes  of  representation,  as  the  equivalent  of 
sixty  free  men.  There  was  little  logic,  of  course,  in  this  com- 
promise. If  slaves  were  citizens  they  should  have  been  coimted 
at  their  full  numerical  value;  if  they  were  mere  chattels,  they 
should  not  have  been  counted  at  all.  The  terms  of  the  Three- 
Fifths  Compromise  were  arranged  on  the  idea  that  they  were 
neither  the  one  thing  nor  the  other.  Nevertheless,  the  fact 
that  the  members  of  the  convention  were  willing  to  accept  this 
arrangement,  illogical  as  it  was,  is  a  tribute  to  their  sound  politi- 
cal sense.  They  were  not  wedded  to  logic  or  theory  in  govern- 
ment. They  realized  that  their  first  task  was  to  put  some  sort 
of  central  government  on  its  feet  and  to  desire  the  end  was  to 
tolerate  the  means. 


INTRODUCTION 


The  Chief  Executive 

Various  other  matters  made  heavy  demands  upon  the  time 
and  patience  of  the  delegates.  The  proper  position  and  authority 
of  the  executive  head  of  the  new  federation  was  one  of  these. 
It  was  desired  to  provide  for  a  president  who  would  have  dignity 
and  powers  commensurate  with  his  position  as  the  first  citizen 
of  a  great  nation;  on  the  other  hand  it  was  just  as  strongly  felt 
that  the  safety  of  a  repubUcan  government  required  a  due  restric- 
tion of  executive  authority.  The  president  was  accordingly 
given  great  powers  (e.g.,  the  appointing  and  veto  powers),  but 
effective  provision  was  made  to  forestall  any  future  abuse  of  his 
authority.  To  do  all  this  required  the  working  out  of  wholly 
new  details  of  government.  When  it  came  to  providing  poten- 
tial legislative  checks  upon  a  powerful  executive  there  were  no 
foreign  precedents  to  follow.  The  convention  had  to  break  new 
ground.  James  Madison  had  drawn  up  for  his  own  use  a  set  of 
"  Notes  on  Ancient  and  Modem  Confederacies  "  which  covered 
the  whole  historical  range  of  European  experiments  in  federal 
government  from  the  Achaean  League  to  the  Helvetic  Republic. 
But  these  notes  were  more  useful  in  showing  what  to  avoid  than 
in  pointing  safe  routes  to  be  followed.  We  have  had  many 
successful  experiments  in  federalism  during  the  last  hundred 
years  —  in  Canada,  Germany,  Australia,  South  Africa,  and  else- 
where; but  in  1787  the  history  of  federal  government  was  on  the 
whole  a  chronicle  of  failures,  partial  or  complete.  It  took  cour- 
age to  plan  as  boldly  as  the  men  of  the  Philadelphia  convention 
planned;  but  the  quality  of  courage  was  not  lacking  among  the 
members  of  this  body,  some  of  whom  had,  eleven  years  before, 
put  their  signatures  to  the  most  daring  document  of  their  time. 

Influence  of  Montesquieu 

When  one  looks  at  the  work  of  the  constitutional  convention 
in  a  broad  way,  there  are  two  fimdamental  motives  which 
appear  to  have  guided  the  members.     In  the  first  place  they 


8  INTRODUCTION 

agreed  with  the  French  philosopher,  Montesquieu,  that  no  parti- 
cular frame  of  government  is  suited  to  all  men  in  all  ages  and  in 
all  places.  That  form  of  government  is  best  which  best  suits  its 
environment.  If  the  delegates  were  not,  as  a  body,  proficient 
in  political  theory  they  were  thoroughly  conversant  with  the 
New  World's  problems  and  with  the  political  psychology  of  its 
people.  Most  of  them  had  been  in  public  life  either  as  members 
of  the  Continental  Congress,  as  governors  of  states,  or  as  state 
officers.  No  one  can  read  the  records  of  the  convention  without 
realizing  that  it  contained  among  its  members  many  politicians 
of  a  very  shrewd  and  practical  type.  They  set  out  to  draft  a 
frame  of  government  which  would  suit  the  genius  of  the  Ameri- 
can people,  and  this  latter  test  was,  for  the  most  part,  the  only 
one  that  they  applied.  The  constitutional  history  of  the  United 
States  during  the  last  hundred  and  twenty-five  years  is  a  suffi- 
cient testimony  to  their  sagacity  in  this  regard. 

Attitude  of  Delegates  towards  the  New  Constitution 

In  the  second  place  the  convention  was  actuated  by  a  desire  to 
plan  a  scheme  of  government  to  which,  in  the  words  of  Wash- 
ington, "  the  wise  and  honest  might  repair,"  even  though  all  its 
arrangements  might  not  command  the  whole-hearted  approval 
of  any  single  delegate  among  its  members.  On  great  and  small 
issues  alike  it  was  ready  to  compromise  at  all  times,  provided  a 
safe  and  fair  arrangement,  duly  regardful  of  every  interest 
concerned,  could  be  secured  thereby.  But  it  was  not  ready  to 
adopt  compromises  for  the  sole  purpose  of  drawing  support  to 
the  new  Constitution  from  the  selfish  and  capricious  elements  in 
the  national  population.  In  other  words,  the  members  of  the 
,  convention  desired  to  frame  a  constitution  that  would  gain 
[acceptance  at  the  hands  of  the  pfeople;  but  they  also  wanted  to 
create  a  government  that  would  endure.  It  is  doubtful,  there- 
fore, whether  the  finished  work  of  the  convention  commanded 
the  unqualified  approval  of  any  one  among  the  fifty-five  who  had 
a  hand  in  making  it.  Only  thirty-nine  signed  it;  the  other 
twenty-six   had   either  left   the   convention   before   the  new 


INTRODUCTION  9 

Constitution  was  finished  or  declined  to  put  their  signatures  to  it 
at  the  convention's  final  session.  Even  among  the  thirty-nine 
who  signed  there  were  many  serious  doubters.  Alexander  Hamil- 
ton gave  his  signature  gladly;  but  at  the  same  time  took  occasion 
to  remind  the  convention  that  no  man's  ideas  were  more  remoc^ 
from  the  new  Constitution  than  his  own.  He  realized  that  the 
new  plan  of  government  was  Hkely  to  prove  vastly  superior  to 
the  old,  and  this  seemed  a  sufficient  reason  for  ranging  himself 
with  its  supporters.  Benjamin  Franklin  also  had  his  misgivings ; 
but  after  remarking  that  the  experience  of  a  long  life  had  taught 
him  to  doubt  the  infallibility  of  his  own  opinions,  he  placed  his 
name  at  the  head  pf  the  Pennsylvania  delegation.  So  it  was  with 
James  Madison,  who  had  done  more  than  any  other  man  to  bring 
the  work  of  the  convention  to  a  fruitful  end.  The  final  draft  of 
the  Constitution  was  not  a  mirror  of  his  own  political  theories, 
but  he  was  ready  to  shoulder  his  share  of  responsibility  for  it. 
There  was  a  willingness  to  sink  personal  prejudices  in  a  common 
effort  to  get  what  seemed  to  be  the  only  scheme  of  central  govern- 
ment on  which  there  had  been  any  approach  to  agreement.  All 
those  who  signed  the  Constitution  felt  that  it  promised  at  least 
some  improvement  over  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  but  with 
several  members  of  the  convention  that  was  the  limit  of  their 
enthusiasm  for  it.  To  men  of  strong  native  convictions  this 
action  required  both  patriotism  and  courage,  and  in  neither  of 
these  qualities  was  the  constitutional  convention  foimd  wanting. 

II.    THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  ITS  ADOPTION 

J  The  Constitution  before  the  States 

When  the  convention  completed  its  work  on  September  17, 
1787,  the  real  campaign  for  the  establishment  of  the  new  govern- 
ment was  still  aheadi  for  the  convention  had  no  final  powers; 
the  new  Constitution  required  the  indorsement  of  at  least  nine 
states  before  it  could  go  into  force.  So  the  document  was  sent 
to  the  Congress  of  the  Confederation,  which  in  turn  transmitted 
copies  of  it  without  comment  to  the  legislatures  of  the  thirteen 


lO  INTRODUCTION 

states  in  order  that  these  might  submit  it  for  ratification.  In 
none  of  the  states  was  the  Constitution  submitted  to  popular 
vote,  although  several  of  the  states  had  adopted  their  own  state 
constitutions  in  that  way.  Instead,  the  people  of  each  state 
were  asked  to  choose  delegates  to  a  state  convention,  and  to  these 
conventions  the  Constitution  ^as  turned  over  for  acceptance  or 
rejection.  Thereupon  the  whole  country  fairly  seethed  with 
warm  discussion,  the  friends  and  foes  of  the  new  Constitution 
quickly  ranging  themselves  into  opposite  camps.  Letters 
poured  into  the  newspapers;  broadsides  and  pamphlets  attack- 
ing the  new  scheme  of  government  began  to  appear  in  profusion. 
It  looked  as  though  the  Constitution  stood  Httle  chance  of 
acceptance  unless  some  of  the  criticisms  that  were  coming  from 
all  sides  could  be  promptly  and  effectively  answered. 

J  Importance  of  New  York 

The  pivotal  point  in  the  struggle  was  New  York;  for  unless 
that  state  should  accept  the  Constitution  the  new  union  would  be 
split  in  twain.  New  York  was  not  only  one  of  the  largest,  most 
populous  and  most  influential  of  the  thirteen  states,  but  geo- 
graphically lay  right  athwart  the  country.  Four  states  were 
to  the  north  of  her  and  eight  to  the  south.  No  union  could  be 
solid  without  New  York.  It  was  in  this  state,  rather  ominously, 
that  the  most  determined  and  best  organized  opposition  to  the 
new  arrangements  came  forward,  and  it  was  here  that  regular 
newspapers  afforded  the  largest  opportunity  for  impressing  the 
defects  of  the  proposed  Constitution  on  the  public  mind. 

^  The  Fault-Finders   {K 

It  has  been  mentioned  that  the  convention  of  1787  met 
behind  closed  doors  and  that  nothing  was  allowed  to  reach  the 
public  ear  until  its  entire  work  was  done.  Naturally  enough  the 
new  Constitution  contained  many  surprises  and  its  pubHcation, 
as  might  have  been  expected,  let  loose  an  avalanche  of  criticism, 
mostly  ill-tempered.     Some  critics  complained  that  it  gave  the 


INTRODUCTION  li 

federal  government  too  much  power;  others  that  it  did  not  give 
enough.  From  all  sides  came  the  very  serious  and  well-founded 
complaint  that  the  Constitution  contained  no  bill  of  rights;  in 
other  words  that  it  afforded  no  securities  for  freedom  of  speech, 
for  the  freedom  of  the  press,  for  trial  by  jury,  and  for  the  other 
so-termed  natural  rights  of  men  and  citizens.  Clergymen  through- 
out the  land  stigmatized  the  new  Constitution  as  a  sacrilegious 
document  because  it  contained  no  mention  of  the  Deity;  others 
rebelled  against  the  compromise  with  slavery;  while  many  took 
the  extreme  ground  that  the  convention  had  far  exceeded  its 
powers  in  framing  a  new  Constitution,  since  it  had  been  author- 
ized only  to  suggest  alterations  in  the  old  Articles  of  Confedera- 
tion. 


III.  WHY  THE  FEDERALIST  WAS  WRITTEN 

•/  Hamilton's  Plan^^L. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  became  necessary  for  the  friends  of 
the  Constitution  to  get  together,  and  especially  to  see  that  the 
critics  of  the  convention  did  not  have  things  all  their  own  way  in 
the  newspapers..  This  they  did  under  the  leadership  of  Alex- 
ander Hamilton  who  mapped  out  for  them  a  vigorous  publicity 
campaign.  Hamilton  planned  a  series  of  newspaper  letters  which 
would  take  up  the  Constitution  point  by  point,  and  would  form, 
when  completed,  both  an  exposition  of  the  whole  document  and 
a  defence  of  its  fundamental  principles.  This  project  he  com- 
municated to  James  Madison  and  John  Jay  with  the  request 
that  they  should  help  him  to  write  the  letters.  Both  agreed, 
and  during  the  winter  and  spring  of  1 787-1788,  eighty-five  letters 
on  the  subject  were  printed,  sometimes  three  or  four  a  week,  in 
the  New  York  Independent  Journal,  the  New  York  Packet,  the 
New  York  Daily  Advertiser,  and  the  Daily  Patriotic  Register. 
Each  letter  dealt  with  some  phase  of  the  subject  in  logical  order, 
explaining,  defending  and  appealing  to  the  public  spirit  of 
readers.  ^.  jy 


12  INTRODUCTION 


Hamilton's  Services 

Hamilton  had  been  one  of  the  younger  members  of  the  con- 
vention; he  was  now  only  thirty-one  years  of  age.  Educated 
at  King's  College  (now  Columbia  University),  he  had  served  in 
the  Revolutionary  War  as  a  member  of  Washington's  staff  and 
finished  the  campaign  with  the  rank  of<  colonel.  During  the 
meetings  of  the  constitutional  convention  he  was  forced  by  the 
pressure  of  his  private  business  affairs  to  be  absent  a  great  deal, 
so  that  his  influence  on  the  course  of  the  deliberations  was  not 
large.  But  this  was  more  than  offset  by  the  torrent  of  zeal  and 
energy  which  he  poured  into  the  subsequent  campaign.  He  had 
a  mind  of  rare  analytical  power,  and  he  could  write  clear,  forceful 
EngUsh.  Both  of  these  gifts  he  used  to  the  utmost  in  the  cause 
which  he  had  so  much  at  heart  during  the  struggles  of  1 787-1 788. 
The  lion's  share  of  the  newspaper  propaganda  came  to  him  and 
he  carried  it  all  with  signal  success. 

James  Madison 

For  his  friend  and  colleague,  James  Madison,  the  New  York 
statesman  had  an  unbounded  personal  admiration.  Hamilton 
had  seen  some  of  Madison's  work  in  the  convention  and  had  been 
deeply  impressed.  So,  when  things  seemed  to  be  moving  badly 
in  New  York,  the  Virginian's  abilities  were  called  upon,  and 
Madison's  letters  contributed  greatly  to  the  effectiveness  of  The 
Federalist.  Madison  also  was  a  young  man,  but  his  knowledge 
of  history  was  unrivaled  in  America.  For  many  years  he  had 
been  a  close  student  of  public  affairs,  both  past  and  present ;  with 
the  exception  of  Benjamin  Franklin  he  was  the  most  erudite 
ijiember  of  the  convention.  His  historical  knowledge  greatly 
impressed  the  other  members  and  he  probably  had  more  influence 
in  molding  the,Constitution  than  any  other  man.  Madison  knew 
the  document  as  no  one  else  knew  it;  hence  it  is  that  his  contri- 
butions to  The  Federalist,  while  not  showing  those  flashes  of 
brilliancy  which  so  often  mark  the  writings  of  Hamilton,  display 


INTRODUCTION  13 

a  mastery  of  details  and  great  skill  in  harmonizing  them  into  a 
solid  system.  For  his  work  both  in  making  and  defending  the 
Constitution  the  RepubHc  owes  him  all  the  homage  that  pos- 
terity can  render. 

John  Jay 

The  third  member  of  the  Federalist  trio,  John  Jay,  was  an  able 
New  Yorker  who  had  not  been  a  member  of  the  constitutional 
convention  but  who  possessed  (what  both  Hamilton  and  Madi- 
son lacked)  some  acquaintance  with  diplomatic  and  foreign 
affairs.  Jay's  part  in  the  writing  of  The  Federalist  was  not 
large;  his  letters  dealt  only  with  such  matters  as  the  foreign 
dangers  of  disunion  and  the  treaty-making  powers  of  the  new 
federal  government.  In  handUng  these  topics  his  experience  as 
a  diplomat  gave  him  proficiency. 

Authorship  of  the  Letters 

All  the  letters  bore  the  common  signature  "  Publius  "  and  the 
exact  authorship  of  several  of  them  has  been  the  theme  of  a  con- 
troversy into  the  merits  of  which  it  is  scarcely  worth  while  to  go; 
but  it  is  beyond  question  that  Hamilton  carried  the  brunt  of  the 
whole  undertaking.  He  not  only  planned  the  series  but  wrote 
at  least  fifty  of  the  eighty-five  letters.  Of  the  remainder,  twenty 
or  more  were  probably  written  by  James  Madison,  and  five  by 
John  Jay.  The  exact  authorship  of  the  other  letters  is  not 
absolutely  certain;  but  some  were  written  by  Hamilton  and 
Madison  together,  and  it  is  practically  certain  that  no  one  out- 
side the  above-named  trio  had  a  share  in  writing  any  of  them. 

^t  Hamilton's  Influence 

This  newspaper  campaign  aided  greatly  in  securing  support 
for  the  Constitution  not  only  in  New  York,  where  support  was 
most  urgently  needed,  but  in  other  states  as  well.  It  was  not 
until  July  20,  1788,  that  New  York  indorsed  the  new  scheme  of 
government  by  a  narrow  majority  of  three  votes  in  the  state 


m 


14  INTRODUCTION 

convention.  Had  it  not  been  for  Hamilton's  literary  enterprise 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe,  therefore,  that  New  York  would 
have  dedined  to  enter  the  new  union  and  would  thereby  have 
dealt  the  entire  scheme  a  rude  setback.  Too  much  credit  cannot 
accordingly  be  given  to  him  and  to  his  associates  for  the  vigorous 
way  in  which  they  threw  their  energies  into  the  fight  and  by  their 
frank  appeals  to  the  sober-minded  element  of  New  York  won 
the  most  difl&cult  battle  of  the  whole  campaign  for  ratification. 

IV.    THE  FEDERALIST  AS  A  TREATISE  ON 
GOVERNMENT 

The  Letters  Collected 

Even  before  all  the  letters  had  appeared  in  the  newspapers  they 
were  collected  and  published  in  book  form  under  the  title  of 
The  Federalist:  A  Collection  of  Essays  written  in  favor  of  the  New 
Constitution  (New  York,  1788).  Since  that  time  at  least  thirty 
editions  of  the  work  have  appeared,  several  of  them  being  in 
foreign  languages.  Although  the  letters  were  written  hastily 
and  as  campaign  polemics,  they  were  the  handiwork  of  men  who 
were  brimful  of  their  subject  and  who  knew,  better  than  any 
others  of  their  time,  just  what  they  were  writing  about.  It 
probably  never  entered  the  mind  of  Hamilton  that  he  was  plan- 
ning and  writing  a  treatise  on  the  science  of  federal  government 
which  would  at  once  take  rank  as  the  best  work  on  that  subject 
in  any  language  and  which  would  hold  its  place  as  such  a  whole 
century  after  his  day.  Yet  that  is  what  The  Federalist  became 
and  continues  to  be.  \It  was  the  first  notable  survey  of  the  his- 
tory of  federalism  and  the  first  systematic  review  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  federal  government./  As  such  it  acquired  at  the  outset 
a  high  place  in  the  literature  of  political  science. 

Importance  or  The  Federalist 

But  The  Federalist  is  more  than  a  general  treatise  on  federal 
government.     It  is  an  exposition  and  defence  of  that  scheme  of 


INTRODUCTION  15 

political  organization  which  the  thirteen  states  adopted  in  the 
later  years  of  the  eighteenth  century.  It  is  a  contemporary 
exposition,  struck  off  at  white  heat  by  the  artisans  whose  handi- 
work the  Constitution  was,  and  as  such  it  has  qualities  not  given 
to  most  commentaries  on  American  government.  For  keenness 
of  analysis,  cogency  in  the  statement  of  arguments,  adroitness 
in  reply  to  critics,  and  brilliancy  of  literary  style.  The  Federalist 
has  stood  unrivaled  in  the  field  of  political  literature  for  one 
hundred  and  twenty-five  years.  This  position,  almost  unique 
among  books  of  American  authorship,  it  seems  Ukely  to  hold  for 
many  years  to  come,  since  the  circumstances  under  which  The 
FederaUst  was  written  can  hardly  ever  arise  again  in  any  land. 

Its  Value  Today 

The  long  period  intervening  since  the  Constitution  went  into 
force  in  1788  has  brought  many  important  changes  in  the  struc- 
ture and  functions  of  American  government.  Seventeen  amend- 
ments have  been  added  during  this  time,  some  of  them  of  great 
significance,  but  none  of  them  discussed  in  The  Federalist. 
Changes  of  great  importance  have  also  been  made  by  judicial 
interpretation  until,  in  their  actual  application,  some  of  the 
Constitution's  original  provisions  cover  a  far  wider  range  than 
any  one  could  have  foreseen  in  1788.  The  Federalist  is  not, 
therefore,  a  reliable  guide  for  those  who  seek  to  master  the  Con- 
stitution in  its  present-day  application  to  the  problems  of  the 
nation.  No  single  book  can  furnish  such  a  guide.  Not  only  the 
provisions  of  the  Constitution  itself,  but  the  federal  statutes,  the 
decisions  of  the  federal  courts,  and  that  host  of  political  customs 
and  usages  which  have  grown  up  during  the  last  hundred  years 
or  more  must  be  reckoned  with  by  students  of  constitutional  law. 
But  as  an  explanation  of  what  the  Constitution  contained  at  the 
time  of  its  adoption,  and  of  what  its  various  provisions  meant  to 
those  who  placed  them  in  the  document,  there  is  nothing  that 
equals  or  even  approaches  The  Federalist  in  usefulness » 


i6  INTRODUCTION 


Its  Comprehensiveness 


The  letters  which  constitute  The  Federalist  were  written,  as 
has  been  pointed  out,  in  accordance  with  a  plan.  Hamilton 
seems  to  have  bestowed  a  great  deal  of  care  in  the  preparation  of 
this  plan,  for  it  covers  the  ground  fully  and  leaves  no  important 
feature  of  the  Constitution  out  of  its  siurvey.  Each  letter  was 
intended  to  form  a  short  but  forceful  essay  on  some  topic  within 
the  scope  of  this  plan,  —  each  complete  in  itself  yet  forming  an 
essential  part  of  a  sustained  argument.  To  carry  through  such 
an  undertaking  successfully  was  no  easy  task,  and  when  it  is 
remembered  that  both  Hamilton  and  Madison  were  otherwise 
very  busy  during  the  campaign  for  the  adoption  of  the  Constitu- 
tion in  New  York  and  Virginia,  respectively,  the  high  standard 
of  excellence  attained  by  those  Federalist  letters  deserves  all  the 
admiration  that  students  of  government  have  bestowed.  /The 
appeal  of  the  writers  was  made  to  the  fair-minded  elements  of 
the  electorate,  to  those  who  were  "  unl^iased  by  considerations 
not  connected  with  the  public  good."  /Consequently  The  Fed- 
/j  eralist  discussions  assumed  a  plane  higli  above  that  taken  by  the 
swarm  of  contemporary  pamphlets  whose  writers  appealed  for 
the  most  part  to  petty  prejudices  and  personal  animosities. 
;  From  the  logic,  style  and  temper  of  their  respective  arguments 
it  was  easy  enough  for  the  unprejudiced  citizen  to  judge  whether 
the  supporters  or  opponents  of  the  new  Constitution  had  the 
public  interest  on  their  side,  and  the  various  state  conventions 
in  their  final  decisions  merely  recorded  the  convictions  of  the 
people  whom  they  representey  With  the  lapse  of  a  century  the 
carping  pamphlets  and  pamphleteers  have  been  forgotten; 
the  letters  of  The  Federalist,  on  the  other  hand,  have  maintained 
their  place  as  the  most  authoritative  exposition  of  those  princi- 
ples and  motives  which  guided  the  framers  of  the  American 
Constitution  in  the  performance  of  their  monumental  task. 


INTRODUCTION  17 


V.    BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

There  have  been  many  editions  of  The  Federalist;  but  those 
most  useful  to  the  average  student  are  Paul  Leicester  Ford,  The 
Federalist  (New  York,  1898),  and  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  The 
Federalist  (New  York,  1900).  The  complete  proceedings  of  the 
constitutional  convention  are  in  Max  Farrand's  Records  of  the 
Federal  Convention  (3  vols.,  New  Haven,  191 1);  general  narra- 
tives of  the  work  of  the  convention  may  be  foimd  in  the  same 
writer's  later  volume  on  The  Framing  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  (New  Haven,  19 13),  in  George  Bancroft's 
History  of  the  Formation  of  the  Constitution  (2  vols.,  New  York, 
1883),  especially  11. ;  and  in  John  Fiske's  Critical  Period  of 
American  History  (Boston,  1902),  ch.  vi.  Most  of  the  important 
pamphlets  issued  by  opponents  of  the  Constitution  are  reprinted 
in  Paul  Leicester  Ford's  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitution  (Brooklyn, 
1888).  Further  information  concerning  the  pubHc  services  of 
The  Federalists  writers  may  be  had  in  Henry  Cabot  Lodge's 
Life  of  Alexander  Hamilton  (Boston,  1882);  in  S.  H.  Gay's 
James  Madison  (Boston,  1884);  and  in  George  Pellew's  John 
Jay  (Boston,  1890).  All  three  biographies  are  in  the  American 
Statesmen  Series. 


SELECTIONS    FROM   THE 
FEDERALIST 

I 

THE  DANGERS  OF  DISUNION 
(a)  DANGERS  FROM  ABROAD 

Concerning  Dangers  from  Foreign  Force  and  Influence  » 

When  the  people  of  America  reflect  that  they  are  now  called 
upon  to  decide  a  question,  which,  in  its  consequences,  must 
prove  one  of  the  most  important  that  ever  engaged  their  atten- 
tion, the  propriety  of  their  taking  a  very  comprehensive,  as  well 
as  a  very  serious,  view  of  it  will  be  evident. 

Nothing  is  more  certain  than  the  indispensable  necessity  of 
government;  and  it  is  equally  undeniable  that  whenever  and 
however  it  is  instituted,  the  people  must  cede  to  it  some  of  their 
natural  rights,  in  order  to  vest  it  with  requisite  powers.  It  is 
well  worthy  of  consideration,  therefore,  whether  it  would  con- 
duce more  to  the  interest  of  the  people  of  America  that  they 
should,  to  all  general  purposes,  be  one  nation,  under  one  federal 
government,  or  that  they  should  divide  themselves  into  sepa- 
rate confederacies,  and  give  to  the  head  of  each  the  same  kind  of 
powers  which  they  are  advised  to  place  in  one  national  govern- 
ment. 

It  has  until  lately  been  a  received  and  imcontradicted  opinion, 

that  the  prosperity  of  the  people  of  America  depended  on  their 

\pontinuing  firmly  imited;   and  the  wishes,  prayers,  and  efforts 

of  our  best  and  wisest  citizens  have  been  constantly  directed 

»  No.  II.  Jay.  Independent  Journal,  October  31,  1787. 


20  THE  FEDERALIST 

to  that  object.  But  politicians  now  appear,  who  insist  that  this 
opinion  is  erroneous,  and  that  instead  of  looking  for  safety 
and  happiness  in  union,  we  ought  to  seek  it  in  a  division  of  the 
states  into  distinct  confederacies  or  sovereignties.  However 
extraordinary  this  new  doctrine  may  appear,  it  nevertheless 
has  its  advocates;  and  certain  characters  who  were  much 
opposed  to  it  formerly,  are  at  present  of  the  number.  Whatever 
may  be  the  arguments  or  inducements  which  have  wrought 
this  change  in  the  sentiments  and  declarations  of  these  gentle- 
men, it  certainly  would  not  be  wise  in  the  people  at  large  to 
adopt  these  new  political  tenets,  without  being  fully  convinced 
that  they  are  founded  on  truth  and  soimd  policy. 

It  has  often  given  me  pleasure  to  observe,  that  independent 
America  was  not  composed  of  detached  and  distant  territories, 
but  that  one  connected,  fertile,  wide-spreading  country  was  the 
portion  of  our  western  sons  of  Uberty.  Providence  has  in  a 
particular  manner  blessed  it  with  a  variety  of  soils  and  pro- 
ductions, and  watered  it  with  innumerable  streams,  for  the 
delight  and  accommodation  of  its  inhabitants.  A  succession  of 
navigable  waters  forms  a  kind  of  chain  round  its  borders,  as  if 
to  bind  it  together;  while  the  most  noble  rivers  in  the  world, 
running  at  convenient  distances,  present  them  with  highways 
for  the  easy  communication  of  friendly  aids,  and  the  mutual 
transportation  and  exchange  of  their  various  commodities. 

With  equal  pleasure  I  have  as  often  taken  notice  that  Provi- 
dence has  been  pleased  to  give  this  one  connected  country  to 
one  united  people,  a  people  descended  from  the  same  ancestors, 
speaking  the  same  language,  professing  the  same  religion, 
attached  to  the  same  principles  of  government,  very  similar 
in  their  manners  and  customs,  and  who,  by  their  joint  counsels, 
arms  and  efforts,  fighting  side  by  side  throughout  a  long  and 
bloody  war,  have  nobly  established  their  general  liberty  and 
independence. 

\.  This  country  and  this  people  seem  to  have  been  made  for  each 
other;  and  it  appears  as  if  it  was  the  design  of  Providence,  that 
an  inheritance  so  proper  and  convenient  for  a  band  of  brethren, 


THE  FEDERALIST  2i 

united  to  each  other  by  the  strongest  ties,  should  never  be  split 
into  a  number  of  unsocial,  jealous,  and  alien  sovereignties. 

Similar  sentiments  have  hitherto  prevailed  among  all  orders 
and  denominations  of  men  among  us.  To  all  general  purposes, 
we  have  uniformly  been  one  people  —  each  individual  citizen 
everywhere  enjoying  the  same  national  rights,  privileges,  and 
protection.  As  a  nation  we  have  made  peace  and  war;  as  a 
nation  we  have  vanquished  our  common  enemies;  as  a  nation 
we  have  formed  alliances  and  made  treaties,  and  entered  into 
various  compacts  and  conventions  with  foreign  states.  /J 

A  strong  sense  of  the  value  and  blessings  of  union  induced 
the  people,  at  a  very  early  period,  to  institute  a  federal  govern- 
ment to  preserve  and  perpetuate  it.  They  formed  it  almost  as 
soon  as  they  had  a  poHtical  existence;  nay,  at  a  time  when  their 
habitations  were  in  flames,  when  many  of  their  citizens  were 
bleeding,  and  when  the  progress  of  hostility  and  desolation 
left  little  room  for  those  calm  and  mature  inquiries  and 
reflections,  which  must  ever  precede  the  formation  of  a  wise  and 
well-balanced  government  for  a  free  people.  It  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that  a  government  instituted  in  times  so  inau- 
spicious, should  on  experiment  be  found  greatly  deficient,  and 
inadequate  to  the  purpose  it  was  intended  to  answer. 

This  int^Uigent  people  perceived  and  regretted  these  defects. 
Still  continuing  no  less  attached  to  union  than  enamored  of 
hberty,  they  observed  the  danger  which  immediately  threatened 
the  former  and  more  remotely  the  latter;  and  being  persuaded 
that  ample  security  for  both  could  only  be  found  in  a  national 
government  more  wisely  framed,  they,  as  with  one  voice,  con- 
vened the  late  Convention  at  Philadelphia,  to  take  that  import- 
ant subject  imder  consideration. 

This  Convention,  composed  of  men  who  possessed  the  con- 
fidence of  the  people,  and  many  of  whom  had  become  highly, 
distinguished  by  their  patriotism,  virtue  and  wisdom,  in  times 
which  tried  the  minds  and  hearts  of  men,  imdertook  the  arduous  ' 
task.     In  the  mild  season  of  peace,  with  minds  imoccupied  by 
other  subjects,  they  passed  many  months  in  cool,  uninterrupted, 


22  THE  FEDERALIST 

and  daily  consultations;  and  finally,  without  having  been  awed 
by  power,  or  influenced  by  any  passions,  except  love  for  their 
coimtry,  they  presented  and  recommended  to  the  people  the 
plan  produced  by  their  joint  and  very  imanimous  councils. 

Admit,  for  so  is  the  fact,  that  this  plan  is  only  recommended^ 
not  imposed,  yet  let  it  be  remembered  that  it  is  neither  recom- 
mended to  blind  approbation,  nor  to  blind  reprobation,  but  to 
that  sedate  and  candid  consideration  which  the  magnitude  and 
importance  of  the  subject  demand,  and  which  it  certainly  ought 
to  receive.  But,  as  has  been  already  remarked,  it  is  more  to  be 
wished  than  expected  that  it  may  be  so  considered  and  examined. 
Experience  on  a  former  occasion  teaches  us  not  to  be  too  san- 
guine in  such  hopes.  It  is  not  yet  forgotten  that  well-grounded 
apprehensions  of  imminent  danger  induced  the  people  of  America 
to  form  the  memorable  Congress  of  1774.  That  body  recom- 
mended certain  measures  to  their  constituents,  and  the  event 
proved  their  wisdom;  yet  it  is  fresh  in  our  memories  how  soon 
the  press  began  to  teem  with  pamphlets  and  weekly  papers 
against  those  very  measures.  Not  only  many  of  the  oflSicers  of 
government,  who  obeyed  the  dictates  of  personal  interest,  but 
others,  from  a  mistaken  estimate  of  consequences,  from  the 
undue  influence  of  ancient  attachments,  or  whose  ambition 
aimed  at  objects  which  did  not  correspond  with  the  public  good, 
were  indefatigable  in  their  endeavors  to  persuade  the  people 
to  reject  the  advice  of  that  patriotic  Congress.  Many,  indeed, 
were  deceived  and  deluded,  but  the  great  majority  of  the  people 
reasoned  and  decided  judiciously;  and  happy  they  are  in  reflect- 
ing that  they  did  so. 

They  considered  that  the  Congress  was  composed  of  many 
wise  and  experienced  men.  That,  being  convened  from  different 
parts  of  the  country,  they  brought  with  them  and  communicated 
to  each  other  a  variety  of  useful  information.  That,  in  the 
course  of  the  time  they  passed  together  in  inquiring  into  and 
discussing  the  true  interests  of  their  country,  they  must  have 
acquired  very  accurate  knowledge  on  that  head.  That  they 
were  individually  interested  in  the  public  liberty  and  prosperity, 


THE  FEDERALIST  23 

and  therefore  that  it  was  not  less  their  inclination  than  their 
duty  to  recommend  only  such  measures  as,  after  the  most  mature 
deliberation,  they  really  thought  prudent  and  advisable. 

These  and  similar  considerations  then  induced  the  people  to 
rely  greatly  on  the  judgment  and  integrity  of  the  Congress;  and 
they  took  their  advice,  notwithstanding  the  various  arts  and 
endeavors  used  to  deter  and  dissuade  them  from  it.  But  if  the 
people  at  large  had  reason  to  confide  in  the  men  of  that  Congress, 
few  of  whom  had  then  been  fully  tried  or  generally  known,  still 
greater  reason  have  they  now  to  respect  the  judgment  and  advice 
of  the  Convention,  for  it  is  well  known  that  some  of  the  most 
distinguished  members  of  that  Congress,  who  have  been  since 
tried  and  justly  approved  for  patriotism  and  abilities,  and  who 
have  grown  old  in  acquiring  political  information,  were  also 
members  of  this  Convention,  and  carried  into  it  their  accumu- 
lated knowledge  and  experience. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  not  only  the  first,  but  every  suc- 
ceeding Congress,  as  well  as  the  late  Convention,  have  invariably 
joined  with  the  people  in  thinking  that  the  prosperity  of  America 
depended  on  its  Union.  To  preserve  and  perpetuate  it  was  the 
great  object  of  the  people  in  forming  that  Convention,  and  it  is 
also  the  great  object  of  the  plan  which  the  Convention  has  advised 
them  to  adopt.  With  what  propriety,  therefore,  or  for  what 
good  purposes,  are  attempts  at  this  particular  period  made  by 
some  men  to  depreciate  the  importance  of  the  Union  ?  Or  why 
is  it  suggested  that  three  or  four  confederacies  would  be  better 
than  one  ?  I  am  persuaded  in  my  own  mind  that  the  people 
have  always  thought  right  on  this  subject,  and  that  their  uni- 
versal and  uniform  attachment  to  the  cause  of  the  Union  rests 
on  great  and  weighty  reasons,  which  I  shall  endeavor  to  develop 
and  explain  in  some  ensuing  papers.  They  who  promote  the 
idea  of  substituting  a  number  of  distinct  confederacies  in  the 
room  of  the  plan  of  the  Convention,  seem  clearly  to  foresee  that 
the  rejection  of  it  would  put  the  continuance  of  the  Union  in  the 
utmost  jeopardy.  That  certainly  would  be  the  case,  and  I 
sincerely  wish  that  it  may  be  as  clearly  foreseen  by  every  good 


24  THE  FEDERALIST 

citizen,  that  whenever  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  arrives, 
America  will  have  reason  to  exclaim,  in  the  words  of  the  poet, 
"  Farewell!  a  long  Farewell,  to  all  my  Greatness!" 

,  PUBLIUS. 

The  same  Subject  continued  i 

It  is  not  a  new  observation  that  the  people  of  any  country 
(if,  Uke  the  Americans,  intelligent  and  well-informed)  seldom 
adopt  and  steadily  persevere  for  many  years  in  an  erroneous 
opinion  respecting  their  interests.  That  consideration  natu- 
rally tends  to  create  great  respect  for  the  high  opinion  which 
the  people  of  America  have  so  long  and  imiformly  entertained 
of  the  importance  of  their  continuing  firmly  united  under  one 
federal  government,  vested  with  sufficient  powers  for  all  general 
and  national  purposes. 

The  more  attentively  I  consider  and  investigate  the  reasons 
which  appear  to  have  given  birth  to  this  opinion,  the  more  I 
become  convinced  that  they  are  cogent  and  conclusive. 

Among  the  many  objects  to  which  a  wise  and  free  people  find 
it  necessary  to  direct  their  attention,  that  of  providing  for  their 
safety  seems  to  be  the  first.  The  safety  of  the  people  doubtless 
has  relation  to  a  great  variety  of  circumstances  and  considera- 
tions, and  consequently  affords  great  latitude  to  those  who  wish 
to  define  it  precisely  and  comprehensively. 

At  present  I  mean  only  to  consider  it  as  it  respects  security 
for  the  preservation  of  peace  and  tranquilUty,  as  well  against 
dangers  from  foreign  arms  and  influence  as  from  dangers  of  the 
like  kind  arising  from  domestic  causes.  As  the  former  of  these 
comes  first  in  order,  it  is  proper  it  should  be  the  first  discussed. 
Let  us  therefore  proceed  to  examine  whether  the  people  are  not 
right  in  their  opinion  that  a  cordial  union,  under  an  efficient 
national  government,  affords  them  the  best  security  that  can  be 
devised  against  hostilities  from  abroad. 

The  number  of  wars  which  have  happened  or  will  happen  in 
the  world  will  always  be  found  to  be  in  proportion  to  the  niunber 

No.  III.    Jay.    Independent  Journal,  November  3,  1787. 


THE  FEDERALIST  25 

and  weight  of  the  causes,  whether  real  or  pretended,  which  pro- 
voke or  invite  them.  If  this  remark  be  just,  it  becomes  useful 
to  inquire  whether  so  many  just  causes  of  war  are  Hkely  to  be 
given  by  united  America  as  by  disunited  America;  for  if  it  should 
turn  out  that  united  America  will  probably  give  the  fewest,  then 
it  will  follow  that  in  this  respect  the  union  tends  most  to  pre- 
serve the  people  in  a  state  of  peace  with  other  nations. 

The  just  causes  of  war,  for  the  most  part,  arise  either  from 
violations  of  treaties  or  from  direct  violence.  America  has 
already  formed  treaties  with  no  less  than  six  foreign  nations, 
and  all  of  them,  except  Prussia,  are  maritime,  and  therefore 
able  to  annoy  and  injure  us.  She  has  also  extensive  commerce 
with  Portugal,  Spain,  and  Britain,  and,  with  respect  to  the  two 
latter,  has,  in  addition,  the  circumstance  of  neighborhood  to 
attend  to. 

It  is  of  high  importance  to  the  peace  of  America  that  she 
observe  the  laws  of  nations  towards  all  these  powers,  and  to  me 
it  appears  evident  that  this  will  be  more  perfectly  and  punctually 
done  by  one  national  government  than  it  could  be  either  by 
thirteen  separate  states  or  by  three  or  four  distinct  confederacies. 
For  this  opinion  various  reasons  may  be  assigned.  When  once 
an  efficient  national  government  is  established,  the  best  men  in 
the  country  will  not  only  consent  to  serve,  but  also  will  generally 
be  appointed  to  manage  it;  for,  although  town  or  country,  or 
other  contracted  influence,  may  place  men  in  state  assemblies, 
or  senates,  or  courts  of  justice,  or  executive  departments,  yet 
more  general  and  extensive  reputation  for  talents  and  other 
qualifications  will  be  necessary  to  recommend  men  to  offices 
under  the  national  government,  especially  as  it  will  have  the 
widest  field  for  choice,  and  never  experience  that  want  of  proper 
persons  which  is  not  uncommon  in  some  of  the  states.  Hence, 
it  will  result  that  the  administration,  the  political  counsels,  and 
the  judicial  decisions  of  the  national  government  will  be  more 
wise,  systematical,  and  judicious  than  those  of  individual  states, 
and  consequently  more  satisfactory  with  respect  to  other  nations, 
as  well  as  more  safe  with  respect  to  us. 


^ 


26  THE  FEDERALIST 

Under  the  national  government,  treaties  and  articles  of 
treaties,  as  well  as  the  laws  of  nations,  will  always  be  expounded 
in  one  sense  and  executed  in  the  same  manner,  whereas  adjudi- 
cations on  the  same  points  and  questions,  in  thirteen  states, 
or  in  three  or  four  confederacies,  will  not  always  accord  or  be 
consistent;  and  that,  as  well  from  the  variety  of  independent 
courts  and  judges  appointed  by  different  and  independent 
governments,  as  from  the  different  local  laws  and  interests  which 
may  affect  and  influence  them.  The  wisdom  of  the  Convention, 
in  committing  such  questions  to  the  jurisdiction  and  judgment 
\~  of  courts  appointed  by  and  responsible  only  to  one  national 
government,  cannot  be  too  much  commended. 

The  prospect  of  present  loss  or  advantage  may  often  tempt 
the  governing  party  in  one  or  two  states  to  swerve  from  good 
faith  and  justice;  but  those  temptations,  not  reaching  the  other 
states,  and  consequently  having  little  or  no  influence  on  the 
national  government,  the  temptations  will  be  fruitless,  and  good 
faith  and  justice  be  preserved.  The  case  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
with  Britain  adds  great  weight  to  this  reasoning. 

If  even  the  governing  party  in  a  state  should  be  disposed  to 
resist  such  temptations,  yet,  as  such  temptations  may,  and 
commonly  do,  result  from  circumstances  peculiar  to  the  state, 
and  may  affect  a  great  number  of  the  inhabitants,  the  govern- 
ing party  may  not  always  be  able,  if  willing,  to  prevent  the 
injustice  meditated,  or  to  punish  the  aggressors.  But  the 
national  government,  not  being  affected  by  those  local  circum- 
stances, will  neither  be  induced  to  commit  the  wrong  themselves, 
nor  want  power  or  inclination  to  prevent  or  punish  its  commis- 
sion by  others. 

So  far,  therefore,  as  either  designed  or  accidental  violations  of 
treaties  and  of  the  laws  of  nations  afford  jw^/  causes  of  war,  they 
are  less  to  be  apprehended  imder  one  general  government  than 
under  several  lesser  ones,  and  in  that  respect  the  former  most 
favors  the  sajety  of  the  people. 

As  to  those  just  causes  of  war  which  proceed  from  direct  and 
unlawful  violence,  it  appears  equally  clear  to  me  that  one  good 


THE  FEDERALIST  27 

national  government  affords  •vastly  more  security  against  dan- 
gers of  that  sort  than  can  be  derived  from  any  other  quarter. 

Such  violences  are  more  frequently  occasioned  by  the  pas- 
sions and  interests  of  a  part  than  of  the  whole,  of  one  or  two 
states  than  of  the  Union.  Not  a  single  Indian  war  has  yet  been 
produced  by  aggressions  of  the  present  federal  government, 
feeble  as  it  is;  but  there  are  several  instances  of  Indian  hostilities 
having  been  provoked  by  the  improper  conduct  of  individual 
states,  which,  either  unable  or  unwilling  to  restrain  or  punish 
offenses,  have  given  occasion  to  the  slaughter  of  many  innocent 
inhabitants. 

The  neighborhood  of  Spanish  and  British  territories,  border- 
ing on  some  states  and  not  on  others,  naturally  confines  the 
causes  of  quarrel  more  immediately  to  the  borderers.  The  bor- 
dering states,  if  any,  will  be  those  who,  under  the  impulse  of 
sudden  irritation,  and  a  quick  sense  of  apparent  interest  or  injury, 
will  be  most  likely,  by  direct  violence,  to  excite  war  with  those 
nations;  and  nothing  can  so  effectually  obviate  that  danger  as 
a  national  government,  whose  wisdom  and  prudence  will  not  be 
diminished  by  the  passions  which  actuate  the  parties  imme- 
diately interested. 

But  not  only  fewer  just  causes  of  war  will  be  given  by  the 
national  government,  but  it  will  also  be  more  in  their  power  to 
accommodate  and  settle  them  amicably.  They  will  be  more 
temperate  and  cool,  and  in  that  respect,  as  well  as  in  others,  will 
be  more  in  capacity  to  act  with  circumspection  than  the  offend- 
ing state.  The  pride  of  states,  as  well  as  of  men,  naturally 
disposes  them  to  justify  all  their  actions,  and  opposes  their 
acknowledging,  correcting,  or  repairing  their  errors  and  offenses. 
The  national  government,  in  such  cases,  will  not  be  affected  by 
this  pride,  but  will  proceed  with  moderation  and  candor  to 
consider  and  decide  on  the  means  most  proper  to  extricate  them 
from  the  difficulties  which  threaten  them. 

Besides,  it  is  well  known  that  acknowledgments,  explanations, 
and  compensations  are  often  accepted  as  satisfactory  from  a 
strong  united  nation,  which  would  be  rejected  as  unsatisfactory 


28  THE  FEDERALIST 

if  offered  by  a  state  or  confederacy  of  little  consideration  or 
power. 

In  the  year  1685,  the  state  of  Genoa  having  offended  Louis 
XrV,  endeavored  to  appease  him.  He  demanded  that  they 
should  send  their  Doge,  or  chief  magistrate,  accompanied  by  four 
of  their  senators,  to  France,  to  ask  his  pardon  and  receive  his 
terms.  They  were  obliged  to  submit  to  it  for  the  sake  of  peace. 
Would  he  on  any  occasion  either  have  demanded  or  have  received 
the  like  humiliation  from  Spain,  or  Britain,  or  any  other  powerful 
nation  ?  Publius. 

The  same  Subject  continued  1 

My  last  paper  assigned  several  reasons  why  the  safety  of  the 
people  would  be  best  secured  by  union  against  the  danger  it 
may  be  exposed  to  hy  just  causes  of  war  given  to  other  nations; 
and  those  reasons  show  that  such  causes  would  not  only  be  more 
rarely  given,  but  would  also  be  more  easily  accommodated,  by  a 
national  government  than  either  by  the  state  governments  or 
the  proposed  confederacies. 

But  the  safety  of  the  people  of  America  against  dangers  from 
foreign  force  depends  not  only  on  their  forbearing  to  give  just 
causes  of  war  to  other  nations,  but  also  on  their  placing  and 
continuing  themselves  in  such  a  situation  as  not  to  invite  hostil- 
ity or  insult;  for  it  need  not  be  observed  that  there  are  pre- 
tended as  well  as  just  causes  of  war. 

kit  is  too  true,  however  disgraceful  it  may  be  to  human  nature, 
at  nations  in  general  will  make  war  whenever  they  have  a  pros- 
pect of  getting  anything  by  it;  nay,  that  absolute  monarchs  will 
often  make  war  when  their  nations  are  to  get  nothing  by  it,  but 
for  purposes  and  objects  merely  personal,  such  as  a  thirst  for 
military  glory,  revenge  for  personal  affronts,  ambition,  or  private 
compacts  to  aggrandize  or  support  their  particular  families  or 
partisans.  These  and  a  variety  of  motives,  which  affect  only 
the  mind  of  the  sovereign,  often  lead  him  to  engage  in  wars  not 
sanctified  by  justice  or  the  voice  and  interests  of  his  people. 

1  No.  IV.     Jay.     Independent  Journal,  November  7,  1787. 


THE  FEDERALIST  29 

But,  independent  of  these  inducements  to  war,  which  are  most 
prevalent  in  absolute  monarchies,  but  which  well  deserve  our 
attention,  there  are  others  which  affect  nations  as  often  as  kings; 
and  some  of  them  will  on  examination  be  found  to  grow  out  of  our 
relative  situation  and  circumstances. 

With  France  and  with  Britain  we  are  rivals  in  the  fisheries, 
and  can  supply  their  markets  cheaper  than  they  can  themselves, 
notwithstanding  any  efforts  to  prevent  it  by  bounties  on  their 
own  or  duties  on  foreign  fish. 

With  them  and  most  other  European  nations  we  are  rivals 
in  navigation  and  the  carrying  trade;  and  we  shall  deceive  our- 
selves, if  we  suppose  that  any  of  them  will  rejoice  to  see  it 
flourish;  for,  as  our  carrying  trade  cannot  increase  without  in 
some  degree  diminishing  theirs,  it  is  more  their  interest,  and  will 
be  more  their  policy,  to  restrain  than  to  promote  it. 

In  the  trade  to  China  and  India,  we  interfere  with  more  than 
one  nation,  inasmuch  as  it  enables  us  to  partake  in  advantages 
which  they  had  in  a  manner  monopolized,  and  as  we  thereby 
supply  ourselves  with  commodities  which  we  used  to  purchase 
from  them. 

The  extension  of  our  own  commerce  in  our  own  vessels  cannot 
give  pleasure  to  any  nations  who  possess  territories  on  or  near 
this  continent,  because  the  cheapness  and  excellence  of  our  pro- 
ductions, added  to  the  circumstance  of  vicinity,  and  the  enter- 
prise and  address  of  our  merchants  and  navigators,  will  give 
us  a  greater  share  in  the  advantages  which  those  territories 
afford,  than  consists  with  the  wishes  or  poHcy  of  their  respective 
sovereigns. 

Spain  thinks  it  convenient  to  shut  the  Mississippi  against 
us  on  the  one  side,  and  Britain  excludes  us  from  the  St.  Law- 
rence on  the  other;  nor  will  either  of  them  permit  the  other 
waters  which  are  between  them  and  us  to  become  the  means  of 
mutual  intercourse  and  traffic. 

From  these  and  such  like  considerations,  which  might,  if  con- 
sistent with  prudence,  be  more  amplified  and  detailed,  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  jealousies  and  uneasinesses  may  gradually  slide  into 


30  THE  FEDERALIST 

the  minds  and  cabinets  of  other  nations,  and  that  we  are  not  to 
expect  that  they  should  regard  our  advancement  in  union,  in 
power  and  consequence  by  land  and  by  sea,  with  an  eye  of 
indifference  and  composure. 

The  people  of  America  are  aware  that  inducements  to  war 
may  arise  out  of  these  circumstances,  as  well  as  from  others 
not  so  obvious  at  present,  and  that  whenever  such  inducements 
may  find  fit  time  and  opportunity  for  operation,  pretenses  to 
color  and  justify  them  will  not  be  wanting.  Wisely,  therefore, 
do  they  consider  union  and  a  good  national  government  as  neces- 
sary to  put  and  keep  them  in  such  a  situation  as,  instead  of  inviting 
war,  will  tend  to  repress  and  discourage  it.  That  situation  con- 
sists in  the  best  possible  state  of  defense,  and  necessarily  depends 
on  the  government,  the  arms,  and  the  resources  of  the  country. 
/  As  the  safety  of  the  whole  is  the  interest  of  the  whole,  and 
cannot  be  provided  for  without  government,  either  one  or  more 
or  many,  let  us  inquire  whether  one  good  government  is  not, 
relative  to  the  object  in  question,  more  competent  than  any  other 
given  number  whatever. 

One  government  can  collect  and  avail  itself  of  the  talents  and 
experience  of  the  ablest  men,  in  whatever  part  of  the  Union  they 
may  be  found.  It  can  move  on  uniform  principles  of  poKcy. 
It  can  harmonize,  assimilate,  and  protect  the  several  parts  and 
members,  and  extend  the  benefit  of  its  foresight  and  precautions 
to  each.  In  the  formation  of  treaties,  it  will  regard  the  interest 
of  the  whole,  and  the  particular  interests  of  the  parts  as  con- 
nected with  that  of  the  whole.  It  can  apply  the  resources  and 
power  of  the  whole  to  the  defense  of  any  particular  part,  and 
that  more  easily  and  expeditiously  than  state  governments  or 
separate  confederacies  can  possibly  do,  for  want  of  concert  and 
unity  of  system.  It  can  place  the  miHtia  under  one  plan  of  dis- 
cipline, and,  by  putting  their  officers  in  a  proper  fine  of  sub- 
ordination to  the  chief  magistrate,  will  in  a  manner  consolidate 
them  into  one  corps,  and  thereby  render  them  more  efficient 
than  if  divided  into  thirteen  or  into  three  or  four  distinct  inde- 
pendent bodies. 


THE  FEDERALIST  '  31 

What  would  the  militia  of  Britain  be  if  the  English  militia 
obeyed  the  government  of  England,  if  the  Scotch  militia  obeyed 
the  government  of  Scotland,  and  if  the  Welsh  militia  obeyed  the 
government  of  Wales?  Suppose  an  invasion:  would  those 
three  governments  (if  they  agreed  at  all)  be  able,  with  all  their 
respective  forces,  to  operate  against  the  enemy  so  efifectually  as 
the  single  government  of  Great  Britain  would  ? 

We  have  heard  much  of  the  fleets  of  Britain,  and  the  time 
may  come,  if  we  are  wise,  when  the  fleets  of  America  may  engage 
attention.  But  if  one  national  government  had  not  so  regu- 
lated the  navigation  of  Britain  as  to  make  it  a  nursery  for  sea- 
men, if  one  national  government  had  not  called  forth  all  the 
national  means  and  materials  for  forming  fleets,  their  prowess 
and  their  thunder  would  never  have  been  celebrated.  Let 
England  have  its  navigation  and  fleet  —  let  Scotland  have  its 
navigation  and  fleet  —  let  Wales  have  its  navigation  and  fleet  — 
let  Ireland  have  its  navigation  and  fleet  —  let  those  four  of  the 
constituent  parts  of  the  British  empire  be  under  four  independ- 
ent governments,  and  it  is  easy  to  perceive  how  soon  they  would 
each  dwindle  into  comparative  insignificance. 

Apply  these  facts  to  our  own  case.  Leave  America  divided 
into  thirteen  or,  if  you  please,  into  three  or  four  independent 
governments,  —  what  armies  could  they  raise  and  pay,  what 
fleets  could  they  ever  hope  to  have  ?  If  one  was  attacked, 
would  the  others  fly  to  its  succor,  and  spend  their  blood  and 
money  in  its  defense  ?  Would  there  be  no  danger  of  their  being 
flattered  into  neutrality  by  specious  promises,  or  seduced  by 
a  too  great  fondness  for  peace  to  decline  hazarding  their  tran- 
quillity and  present  safety  for  the  sake  of  neighbors,  of  whom 
perhaps  they  have  been  jealous,  and  whose  importance  they  are 
content  to  see  diminished  ?  Although  such  conduct'would  not 
be  wise,  it  would,  nevertheless,  be  natural.  The  history  of  the 
states  of  Greece,  and  of  other  countries,  abounds  with  such 
instances,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  what  has  so  often 
happened  would,  under  similar  circumstances,  happen  again. 

But  admit  that  they  might  be  willing  to  help  the  invaded 


32  THE  FEDERALIST 

state  or  confederacy.  How,  and  when,  and  in  what  proportion 
shall  aids  of  men  and  money  be  afforded  ?  Who  shall  command 
the  allied  armies,  and  from  which  of  them  shall  he  receive  his 
orders  ?  Who  shall  settle  the  terms  of  peace,  and  in  case  of 
disputes  what  umpire  shall  decide  between  them  and  compel 
acquiescence  ?  Various  difficulties  and  inconveniences  would 
be  inseparable  from  such  a  situation;  whereas  one  government, 
watching  over  the  general  and  common  interests,  and  combining 
and  directing  the  powers  and  resources  of  the  whole,  would  be 
free  from  all  these  embarrassments,  and  conduce  far  more  to  the 
safety  of  the  people. 

But  whatever  may  be  our  situation,  whether  firmly  united 
under  one  national  government,  or  split  into  a  number  of  con- 
federacies, certain  it  is  that  foreign  nations  will  know  and  view 
it  exactly  as  it  is;  and  they  will  act  towards  us  accordingly.  If 
they  see  that  our  national  government  is  efficient  and  well 
administered,  our  trade  prudently  regulated,  our  militia  properly 
organized  and  disciplined,  our  resources  and  finances  discreetly 
managed,  our  credit  reestabhshed,  our  people  free,  contented, 
and  imited,  they  will  be  much  more  disposed  to  cultivate  our 
friendship  than  provoke  our  resentment.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
they  find  us  either  destitute  of  an  effectual  government  (each 
state  doing  right  or  wrong,  as  to  its  rulers  may  seem  convenient), 
or  split  into  three  or  four  independent  and  probably  discordant 
republics  or  confederacies,  one  inclining  to  Britain,  another  to 
France,  and  a  third  to  Spain,  and  perhaps  played  off  against 
each  other  by  the  three,  what  a  poor,  pitiful  figure  will  America 
make  in  their  eyes!  How  liable  would  she  become  not  only  to 
their  contempt,  but  to  their  outrage;  and  how  soon  would  dear- 
bought  experience  proclaim  that  when  a  people  or  family  so 
divide,  it  never  fails  to  be  against  themselves. 

PUBLIUS. 


THE  FEDERALIST  (\^ 

The  same  Subject  continued  ^ 

Queen  Anne,  in  her  letter  of  the  ist  July,  1706,  to  the  Scotch 
Parliament,  makes  some  observations  on  the  importance  of  the 
union  then  forming  between  England  and  Scotland,  which  merit 
our  attention.  I  shall  present  the  public  with  one  or  two  extracts 
from  it:  "An  entire  and  perfect  union  will  be  the  solid  founda- 
tion of  lasting  peace:  it  will  secure  your  religion,  liberty,  and 
property,  remove  the  animosities  amongst  yourselves,  and  the 
jealousies  and  differences  betwixt  our  two  kingdoms.  It  must 
increase  your  strength,  riches,  and  trade;  and  by  this  imion  the 
whole  island,  being  joined  in  affection  and  free  from  all  appre- 
hensions of  different  interest,  will  be  enabled  to  resist  all  its 
enemies. ^^  "We  most  earnestly  recommend  to_ you  calmiiess 
and  unanimity  in  this  great  and  weighty  affair,  that  the  imion 
may  be  brought  to  a  happy  conclusion,  being  the  only  effectual 
way  to  secure  our  present  and  future  happiness;  and  disappoint 
the  designs  of  our  and  your  enemies,  who  will  doubtless,  on  this 
occasion,  use  their  utmost  endeavours  to  prevent  or  delay  this 
union  J' 

It  was  remarked  in  the  preceding  paper,  that  weakness  and 
divisions  at  home  would  invite  dangers  from  abroad;  and  that 
nothing  would  tend  more  to  secure  us  from  them  than  union, 
strength,  and  good  government  within  ourselves.  This  subject 
is  copious  and  cannot  easily  be  exhausted. 

The  history  of  Great  Britain  is  the  one  with  which  we  are  in 
general  the  best  acquainted,  and  gives  us  many  useful  lessons. 
We  may  profit  by  their  experience  without  paying  the  price 
which  it  cost  them.  Although  it  seems  obvious  to  common 
sense  that  the  people  of  such  an  island  should  be  but  one  nation, 
yet  we  find  that  they  were  for  ages  divided  into  three,  and 
those  three  were  almost  constantly  embroiled  in  quarrels  and 
wars  with  one  another.  Notwithstanding  their  true  interest 
with  respect  to  the  continental  nations  was  really  the  same,  yet 
by  the  arts  and  pohcy  and  practices  of  those  nations,  their 

»  No.  v.     Jay.     Independent  Journal,  November  lo,  1787. 


34  THE  FEDERALIST 

mutual  jealousies  were  perpetually  kept  inflamed,  and  for  a  long 
series  of  years  they  were  far  more  inconvenient  and  troublesome 
than  they  were  useful  and  assisting  to  each  other. 

Should  the  people  of  America  divide  themselves  into  three  or 
four  nations,  would  not  the  same  thing  happen  ?  Would  not 
similar  jealousies  arise,  and  be  in  Hke  manner  cherished  ? 
Instead  of  their  being  *'  joined  in  affection  and  free  from  all 
apprehension  of  different  interests,"  envy  and  jealousy  would 
soon  extinguish  confidence  and  affection,  and  the  partial  interests 
of  each  confederacy,  instead  of  the  general  interests  of  all 
America,  would  be  the  only  objects  of  their  policy  and  pursuits. 
Hence,  like  most  other  bordering  nations,  they  would  always  be 
either  involved  in  disputes  and  war,  or  live  in  the  constant 
apprehension  of  them. 

The  most  sanguine  advocates  for  three  or  four  confederacies 
cannot  reasonably  suppose  that  they  would  long  remain  exactly 
on  an  equal  footing  in  point  of  strength,  even  if  it  was  possible 
to  form  them  so  at  first;  but,  admitting  that  to  be  practicable, 
yet  what  human  contrivance  can  secure  the  continuance  of  such 
equality  ?  Independent  of  those  local  circumstances  which  tend 
to  beget  and  increase  power  in  one  part  and  to  impede  its  pro- 
gress in  another,  we  must  advert  to  the  effects  of  that  superior 
pohcy  and  good  management  which  would  probably  distinguish 
the  government  of  one  above  the  rest,  and  by  which  their  relative 
equaUty  in  strength  and  consideration  would  be  destroyed.  For 
it  cannot  be  presumed  that  the  same  degree  of  sound  policy, 
prudence,  and  foresight  would  uniformly  be  observed  by  each  of 
these  confederacies  for  a  long  succession  of  years. 

Whenever,  and  from  whatever  causes,  it  might  happen,  and 
happen  it  would,  that  any  one  of  these  nations  or  confederacies 
should  rise  on  the  scale  of  poHtical  importance  much  above  the 
degree  of  her  neighbors,  that  moment  would  those  neighbors 
behold  her  with  envy  and  with  fear.  Both  those  passions  would 
lead  them  to  countenance,  if  not  to  promote,  whatever  might 
promise  to  diminish  her  importance,  and  would  also  restrain 
them  from  measures  calculated  to  advance  or  even  to  secure  her 


THE  FEDERALIST  35 

prosperity.  Much  time  would  not  be  necessary  to  enable  her  to 
discern  these  unfriendly  dispositions.  She  would  soon  begin, 
not  only  to  lose  confidence  in  her  neighbors,  but  also  to  feel  a 
disposition  equally  unfavorable  to  them.  Distrust  naturally 
creates  distrust,  and  by  nothing  is  good  will  and  kind  conduct 
more  speedily  changed  than  by  invidious  jealousies  and  un- 
candid  imputations,  whether  expressed  or  implied. 

The  North  is  generally  the  region  of  strength,  and  many  local 
circumstances  render  it  probable  that  the  most  northern  of 
the  proposed  confederacies  would,  at  a  period  not  very  distant, 
be  imquestionably  more  formidable  than  any  of  the  others.  No 
sooner  would  this  become  evident  than  the  Northern  Hive  would 
excite  the  same  ideas  and  sensations  in  the  more  southern  parts 
of  America  which  it  formerly  did  in  the  southern  parts  of  Europe. 
Nor  does  it  appear  to  be  a  rash  conjecture  that  its  young  swarms 
might  often  be  tempted  to  gather  honey  in  the  more  bloom- 
ing fields  and  milder  air  of  their  luxurious  and  more  delicate 
neighbors. 

They  who  well  consider  the  history  of  similar  divisions  and 
confederacies  will  find  abundant  reason  to  apprehend  that  those 
in  contemplation  would  in  no  other  sense  be  neighbors  than  as 
they  would  be  borderers;  that  they  would  neither  love  nor  trust 
one  another,  but  on  the  contrary  would  be  a  prey  to  discord, 
jealousy,  and  mutual  injuries;  in  short,  that  they  would  place 
us  exactly  in  the  situation  in  which  some  nations  doubtless  wish 
to  see  us,  wiz.,  formidable  only  to  each  other. 

From  these  considerations  it  appears  that  those  persons  are 
greatly  mistaken  who  suppose  that  alliances  offensive  and  defen- 
sive might  be  formed  between  these  confederacies,  and  would 
produce  that  combination  and  union  of  wills,  of  arms,  and  of 
resources  which  would  be  necessary  to  put  and  keep  them  in  a 
formidable  state  of  defense  against  foreign  enemies. 

When  did  the  independent  states,  into  which  Britain  and  Spain 
were  formerly  divided,  combine  in  such  alliances,  or  unite  their 
forces  against  a  foreign  enemy  ?  The  proposed  confederacies 
will  be  distinct  nations.     Each  of  them  would  have  its  com- 


36  THE  FEDERALIST 

merce  with  foreigners  to  regulate  by  distinct  treaties;  and  as 
their  productions  and  commodities  are  different  and  proper 
for  different  markets,  so  would  those  treaties  be  essentially 
different.  Different  commercial  concerns  must  create  different 
interests,  and  of  course  different  degrees  of  political  attachment 
to  and  connection  with  different  foreign  nations.  Hence  it 
might  and  probably  would  happen  that  the  foreign  nation  with 
whom  the  Southern  confederacy  might  be  at  war  would  be  the 
one  with  whom  the  Northern  confederacy  would  be  the  most 
desirous  of  preserving  peace  and  friendship.  An  alliance  so 
contrary  to  their  immediate  interest  would  not  therefore  be  easy 
to  form,  nor,  if  formed,  would  it  be  observed  and  fulfilled  with 
perfect  good  faith. 

Nay,  it  is  far  more  probable  that  in  America,  as  in  Europe, 
neighboring  nations,  acting  under  the  impulse  of  opposite 
interests  and  unfriendly  passions,  would  frequently  be  found 
taking  different  sides.  Considering  our  distance  from  Europe, 
it  would  be  more  natural  for  these  confederacies  to  apprehend 
danger  from  one  another  than  from  distant  nations,  and  there- 
fore that  each  of  them  should  be  more  desirous  to  guard  against 
the  others  by  the  aid  of  foreign  alHances,  than  to  guard  against 
foreign  dangers  by  alhances  between  themselves.  And  here 
let  us  not  forget  how  much  more  easy  it  is  to  receive  foreign 
fleets  into  our  ports,  and  foreign  armies  into  our  country,  than 
it  is  to  persuade  or  compel  them  to  depart.  How  many  con- 
quests did  the  Romans  and  others  make  in  the  character  of 
allies,  and  what  innovations  did  they  under  the  same  character 
introduce  into  the  governments  of  those  whom  they  pretended 
to  protect  ? 

Let  candid  men  judge,  then,  whether  the  division  of  America 
into  any  given  number  of  independent  sovereignties  would  tend 
to  secure  us  against  the  hostilities  and  improper  interference  of 
foreign  nations. 

PUBLIUS. 


THE  FEDERALIST  37 

{b)  DANGERS  AT  HOME 
Concerning  Dangers  from  War  between  the  States  ^ 

The  three  last  numbers  of  this  paper  have  been  dedicated  to 
an  enumeration  of  the  dangers  to  which  we  should  be  exposed, 
in  a  state  of  disunion,  from  the  arms  and  arts  of  foreign  nations. 
I  shall  now  proceed  to  delineate  dangers  of  a  different  and,  per- 
haps, still  more  alarming  kind, —  those  which  will  in  all  pro- 
bability flow\from  dissensions  between  the  states  themselves, 
and  from  domestic  factions  and  convulsions.!  These  have  been 
already  in  some  instances  slightly  anticipated;  but  they  deserve 
a  more  particular  and  more  full  investigation. 

A  man  must  be  far  gone  in  Utopian  speculations  who  can 
seriously  doubt  that,  if  these  states  should  either  be  wholly 
disunited,  or  only  united  in  partial  confederacies,  the  sub-divi- 
sions into  which  they  might  be  thrown  would  have  frequent  and 
violent  contests  with  each  other.    To  presume  a  want  of  motives 
for  such  contests  as  an  argument  against  their  existence,  would 
be  to  forget  that  menare  ambitious,  vindictive,  and  rapaxaaus. 
To  look  for  a  continuation  of  harmony  between  a  number  of  \ 
independent,  unconnected  sovereignties  situated  in  the  same  \ 
neighborhood,  would  be  to  disregard  the  uniform  course  of    ] 
human  events  and  to  set  at  defiance  the  accumulated  experience    J 
of  ages.  -=-i«-^ 

The  causes  of  hostility  among  nations  are  innumerable.  There 
are  some  which  have  a  general  and  almost  constant  operation 
upon  the  collective  bodies  of  society.  Of  this  description  are 
the  love  of  power  or  the  desire  of  preeminence  and  dominion, 
the  jealousy  of  power,  or  the  desire  of  equality  and  safety. 
There  are  others  which  have  a  more  circumscribed  though  an 
equally  operative  influence  within  their  spheres.  Such  are  the 
rivalships  and  competitions  of  commerce  between  commercial 
nations.     And  there  are  others,  not  less  numerous  than  either 

*  No.  VI.     Hamilton.     Independent  Journal,  November  14,  1787. 


\. 


38  THE  FEDERALIST 

of  the  former,  which  take  their  origin  entirely  in  private  pas- 
sions; in  the  attachments,  enmities,  interests,  hopes,  and  fears 
of  leading  individuals  in  the  communities  of  which  they  are 
members.  Men  of  this  class,  whether  the  favorites  of  a  king 
or  of  a  people,  have  in  too  many  instances  abused  the  confidence 
they  possessed;  and  assuming  the  pretext  of  some  public  motive, 
have  not  scrupled  to  sacrifice  the  national  tranquilHty  to  personal 
advantage  or  personal  gratification. 

The  celebrated  Pericles,  in  compliance  with  the  resentments 
of  a  prostitute,^  at  the  expense  of  much  of  the  blood  and  treasure 
of  his  countrymen,  attacked,  vanquished,  and  destroyed  the 
city  of  the  Samnians.  The  same  man,  stimulated  by  private 
pique  against  the  Megarensians,^  another  nation  of  Greece,  or 
to  avoid  a  prosecution  with  which  he  was  threatened  as  an 
accompUce  in  a  supposed  theft  of  the  statuary  Phidias,^  or  to 
get  rid  of  the  accusations  prepared  to  be  brought  against  him 
for  dissipating  the  funds  of  the  state  in  the  purchase  of  popu- 
larity,^ or  from  a  combination  of  all  these  causes,  was  the  prim- 
itive author  of  that  famous  and  fatal  war,  distinguished  in  the 
Grecian  annals  by  the  name  of  the  Peloponnesian  war;  which, 
after  various  vicissitudes,  intermissions,  and  renewals,  ter- 
minated in  the  ruin  of  the  Athenian  commonwealth. 

The  ambitious  cardinal,  who  was  prime  minister  to  Henry 
VIII,  permitting  his  vanity  to  aspire  to  the  triple  crown, ^ 
entertained  hopes  of  succeeding  in  the  acquisition  of  that 
splendid  prize  by  the  influence  of  the  Emperor  Charles  V.  To 
secure  the  favor  and  interest  of  this  enterprising  and  powerful 
monarch,  he  precipitated  England  into  a  war  with  France, 
contrary  to  the  plainest  dictates  of  poUcy,  and  at  the  hazard 
of  the  safety  and  independence,  as  well  of  the  kingdom  over 
which  he  presided  by  his  counsels,  as  of  Europe  in  general. 

»  Aspasia,  vide  Plutarch's  Life  of  Pericles. 
»  Ibid. 

3  Ihid.     Phidias  was  supposed  to  have  stolen  some  public  gold,  with  the  connivance 
of  Pericles,  for  the  embellishment  of  the  statue  of  Minerva. 
« Ibid. 
6  Worn  by  the  popes. 


THE  FEDERALIST  39 

For  if  there  ever  was  a  sovereign  who  bid  fair  to  realize  the 
project  of  universal  monarchy,  it  was  the  Emperor  Charles  V, 
of  whose  intrigues  Wolsey  was  at  once  the  instrument  and  the 
dupe. 

The  influence  which  the  bigotry  of  one  female/  the  petulances 
of  another ,2  and  the  cabals  of  a  third,^  had  in  the  contemporary 
poHcy,  ferments,  and  pacifications,  of  a  considerable  part  of 
Europe,  are  topics  that  have  been  too  often  descanted  upon 
not  to  be  generally  known. 

To  multiply  examples  of  the  agency  of  personal  considera- 
tions in  the  production  of  great  national  events,  either  foreign 
or  domestic,  according  to  their  direction,  would  be  an  unneces- 
sary waste  of  time.  Those  who  have  but  a  superficial  acquaint- 
ance with  the  sources  from  which  they  are  to  be  drawn,  will 
themselves  recollect  a  variety  of  instances;  and  those  who 
have  a  tolerable  knowledge  of  human  nature  will  not  stand  in 
need  of  such  lights,  to  form  their  opinion  either  of  the  reality 
or  extent  of  that  agency.  Perhaps,  however,  a  reference,  tend- 
ing to  illustrate  the  general  principle,  may  with  propriety  be 
made  to  a  case  which  has  lately  happened  among  ourselves. 
If  Shays  had  not  been  a  desperate  debtor,  it  is  much  to  be  doubted 
whether  Massachusetts  would  have  been  plunged  into  a  civil 
war. 

But  notwithstanding  the  concurring  testimony  of  experience 
in  this  particular,  there  are  still  to  be  found  visionary  or  design- 
ing men  who  stand  ready  to  advocate  the  paradox  of  perpetual 
peace  between  the  states,  though  dismembered  and  ahenated 
from  each  other.  The  genius  of  repubHcs  (say  they)  is  pacific; 
the  spirit  of  commerce  has  a  tendency  to  soften  the  manners  of 
men,  and  to  extinguish  those  inflammable  humors  which  have 
so  often  kindled  into  wars.  Commercial  republics,  like  ours, 
will  never  be  disposed  to  waste  themselves  in  ruinous  conten- 
tions with  each  other.      They  will  be  governed  by  mutual 

1  Madame  de  Maintenon. 
'  Duchess  of  Marlborough. 
3  Madame  de  Pompadour. 


40  THE  FEDERALIST 

interest,  and  will  cultivate  a  spirit  of  mutual  amity  and  concord. 

Is  it  not  (we  may  ask  these  projectors  in  politics)  the  true 
interest  of  all  nations  to  cultivate  the  same  benevolent  and 
philosophic  spirit  ?  If  this  be  their  true  interest,  have  they  in 
fact  pursued  it  ?  Has  it  not,  on  the  contrary,  invariably  been 
found  that  momentary  passions,  and  immediate  interests,  have 
a  more  active  and  imperious  control  over  human  conduct  than 
general  or  remote  considerations  of  policy,  utility,  or  justice  ? 
Have  repubHcs  in  practice  been  less  addicted  to  war  than 
monarchies  ?  Are  not  the  former  administered  by  men  as  well 
as  the  latter  ?  Are  there  not  aversions,  predilections,  rivalships, 
and  desires  of  unjust  acquisition,  that  affect  nations  as  well  as 
kings  ?  Are  not  popular  assemblies  frequently  subject  to  the 
impulses  of  rage,  resentment,  jealousy,  avarice,  and  of  other 
irregular  and  violent  propensities  ?  Is  it  not  well  known  that 
their  determinations  are  often  governed  by  a  few  individuals 
in  whom  they  place  confidence,  and  are,  of  course,  liable  to  be 
tinctured  by  the  passions  and  views  of  those  individuals  ?  Has 
commerce  hitherto  done  anything  more  than  change  the  objects 
of  war  ?  Is  not  the  love  of  wealth  as  domineering  and  enter- 
prising a  passion  as  that  of  power  or  glory  ?  Have  there  not 
been  as  many  wars  founded  upon  commercial  motives  since 
that  has  become  the  prevailing  system  of  nations,  as  were  before 
occasioned  by  the  cupidity  of  territory  or  dominion  ?  Has  not 
the  spirit  of  commerce,  in  many  instances,  administered  new 
incentives  to  the  appetite,  both  for  the  one  and  for  the  other  ? 
Let  experience,  the  least  fallible  guide  of  human  opinions,  be 
appealed  to  for  an  answer  to  these  inquiries. 

Sparta,  Athens,  Rome,  and  Carthage  were  all  repubHcs,  two 
of  them,  Athens  and  Carthage,  of  the  commercial  kind.  Yet 
were  they  as  often  engaged  in  wars,  offensive  and  defensive,  as 
the  neighboring  monarchies  of  the  same  time.  Sparta  was 
little  better  than  a  well-regulated  camp;  and  Rome  was  never 
sated  of  carnage  and  conquest. 

Carthage,  though  a  commercial  republic,  was  the  aggressor  in 
the  very  war  that  ended  in  her  destruction.     Hannibal  had 


THE  FEDERALIST  41 

carried  her  arms  into  the  heart  of  Italy,  and  to  the  gates  of 
Rome,  before  Scipio,  in  turn,  gave  him  an  overthrow  in  the 
territories  of  Carthage,  and  made  a  conquest  of  the  common- 
wealth. 

Venice,  in  later  times,  figured  more  than  once  in  wars  of 
ambition,  till,  becoming  an  object  of  terror  to  the  other  Italian 
states.  Pope  JuHus  II  found  means  to  accomplish  that  for- 
midable league,^  which  gave  a  deadly  blow  to  the  power  and 
pride  of  that  haughty  repubHc. 

The  provinces  of  Holland,  till  they  were  overwhelmed  in  debts 
and  taxes,  took  a  leading  and  conspicuous  part  in  the  wars  of 
Europe.  They  had  furious  contests  with  England  for  the 
dominion  of  the  sea,  and  were  among  the  most  persevering  and 
most  implacable  of  the  opponents  of  Louis  XIV. 

In  the  government  of  Britain  the  representatives  of  the  people 
compose  one  branch  of  the  national  legislature.  Commerce 
has  been  for  ages  the  predominant  pursuit  of  that  country. 
Few  nations,  nevertheless,  have  been  more  frequently  engaged 
in  war;  and  the  wars  in  which  that  kingdom  has  been  engaged 
have,  in  numerous  instances,  proceeded  from  the  people. 

There  have  been,  if  I  may  so  express  it,  almost  as  many 
popular  as  royal  wars.  The  cries  of  the  nation  and  the  im- 
portunities of  their  representatives  have,  upon  various  occasions, 
dragged  their  monarchs  into  war,  or  continued  them  in  it,  con- 
trary to  their  inclinations,  and  sometimes  contrary  to  the  real 
interests  of  the  state.  In  that  memorable  struggle  for  superiority 
between  the  rival  houses  of  Austria  and  Bourbon,  which  so  long 
kept  Europe  in  a  flame,  it  is  well  known  that  the  antipathies  of 
the  English  against  the  French,  seconding  the  ambition,  or 
rather  the  avarice,  of  a  favorite  leader,^  protracted  the  war 
beyond  the  limits  marked  out  by  sound  policy,  and  for  a  con- 
siderable time  in  opposition  to  the  views  of  the  court. 

The  wars  of  these  two  last-mentioned  nations  have  in  a  great 

1  The  League  of  Cambray,  comprehending  the  Emperor,  the  King  of  France,  the  King 
of  Aragon,  and  most  of  the  Italian  princes  and  states. 

2  The  Duke  of  Marlborough. 


^ 


42  THE  FEDERALIST 

measure  grown  out  of  commercial  considerations  —  the  desire  of 
supplanting  and  the  fear  of  being  supplanted,  either  in  particular 
branches  of  traffic  or  in  the  general  advantages  of  trade  and 
navigation,  and  sometimes  even  the  more  culpable  desire  of 
sharing  in  the  commerce  of  other  nations  without  their  consent. 

The  last  war  but  two  between  Britain  and  Spain  sprang  from 
the  attempts  of  the  EngHsh  merchants  to  prosecute  an  illicit 
trade  with  the  Spanish  main.  These  unjustifiable  practices 
on  their  part  produced  severities  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards 
towards  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain  which  were  not  more 
justifiable,  because  they  exceeded  the  bounds  of  a  just  retaliation 
and  were  chargeable  with  inhumanity  and  cruelty.  Many  of 
the  English  who  were  taken  on  the  Spanish  coasts  were  sent  to 
dig  in  the  mines  of  Potosi;  and  by  the  usual  progress  of  a  spirit 
of  resentment  the  innocent  were,  after  a  while,  confounded  with 
the  guilty  in  indiscriminate  punishment.  The  complaints  of  the 
merchants  kindled  a  violent  flame  throughout  the  nation,  which 
soon  after  broke  out  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  was  com- 
municated from  that  body  to  the  ministry.  Letters  of  reprisal 
were  granted,  and  a  war  ensued,  which  in  its  consequences  over- 
threw all  the  alliances  that  but  twenty  years  before  had  been 
formed  with  sanguine  expectations  of  the  most  beneficial  fruits. 

From  this  summary  of  what  has  taken  place  in  other  coun- 
tries, whose  situations  have  borne  the  nearest  resemblance  to 
our  own,  what  reason  can  we  have  to  confide  in  those  reveries 
which  would  seduce  us  into  an  expectation  of  peace  and  cordial- 
ity between  the  members  of  the  present  confederacy,  in  a  state 
of  separation  ?  Have  we  not  already  seen  enough  of  the  fallacy 
and  extravagance  of  those  idle  theories  which  have  amused  us 
with  promises  of  an  exemption  from  the  imperfections,  the  weak- 
nesses, and  the  evils  incident  to  society  in  every  shape  ?  Is  it 
not  time  to  awake  from  the  deceitful  dream  of  a  golden  age,  and 
to  adopt  as  a  practical  maxim  for  the  direction  of  our  political 
conduct  that  we,  as  well  as  the  other  inhabitants  of  the  globe, 
are  yet  remote  from  the  happy  empire  of  perfect  wisdom  and 
perfect  virtue  ? 


THE  FEDERALIST  43 

Let  the  point  of  extreme  depression  to  which  our  national 
dignity  and  credit  have  sunk,  let  the  inconveniences  felt  every- 
where from  a  lax  and  ill  administration  of  government,  let  the 
revolt  of  a  part  of  the  state  of  North  Carolina,  the  late  menacing 
disturbances  in  Pennsylvania,  and  the  actual  insurrections  and 
rebellions  in  Massachusetts,  declare  ! 

So  far  is  the  general  sense  of  mankind  from  corresponding 
with  the  tenets  of  those  who  endeavor  to  lull  asleep  our  appre- 
hensions of  discord  and  hostility  between  the  states,  in  the 
event  of  disunion,  that  it  has  from  long  observation  of  the  pro- 
gress of  society  become  a  sort  of  axiom  in  poHtics,  that  vicinity, 
or  nearness  of  situation,  constitutes  nations  natural  enemies. 
An  intelHgent  writer  expresses  himself  on  this  subject  to  this 
effect:  "  Neighboring  nations  [says  he]  are  naturally  enemies  i 
of  each  other,  unless  their  common  weakness  forces  them  to/' 
league  in  a  confederative  republic,  and  their  constitution! 
prevents    the  differences  that  neighborhood  occasions,  extin-        ^^ 
guishing  that  secret  jealousy  which  disposes  all  states  to  aggran-Uc^/cT-^^^ 
dize  themselves  at  the  expense  of  their  neighbors."  ^     Thisj 
passage,  at  the  same  time,  points  out  the  evil  and  suggests  thej 

REMEDY.  PUBLIUS. 

1 

The  Subject  continued,  and  particular  Causes  enumerated^ 

It  is  sometimes  asked,  with  an  air  of  seeming  triumph,  what 
inducements  could  the  states  have,  if  disunited,  to  make  war 
upon  each  other  ?  It  would  be  a  full  answer  to  this  question 
to  say  —  precisely  the  same  inducements  which  have,  at  different 
times,  deluged  in  blood  all  the  nations  in  the  world.  But, 
unfortunately  for  us,  the  question  admits  of  a  more  particular 
answer.  There  are  causes  of  difference  within  our  immediate 
contemplation,  of  the  tendency  of  which,  even  under  the  re- 
straints of  a  federal  constitution,  we  have  had  sufficient  experi- 
ence to  enable  us  to  form  a  judgment  of  what  might  be  expected 
if  those  restraints  were  removed. 

1  Vide  Principes  des  Negociations,  par  I'Abb^  de  Mably. 

*  No.  VII.     Hamilton.     Independent  Journal,  November  17,  1787. 


44  THE  FEDERALIST 

<i  Territorial  disputes  have  at  all  times  been  found  one  of  the 
most  fertile  sources  of  hostility  among  nations.  Perhaps  the 
greatest  proportion  of  the  wars  that  have  desolated  the  earth 
have  sprung  from  this  origin.  This  cause  would  exist  among  us 
in  full  force.  We  have  a  vast  tract  of  unsettled  territory  within 
the  boundaries  of  the  United  States.  There  still  are  discordant  j* 
and  undecided  claims  between  several  of  them,  and  the  dissolu-  / 
tion  of  the  Union  would  lay  a  foundation  for  similar  claims 
between  them  all.  It  is  well  known  that  they  have  heretofore 
had  serious  and  animated  discussions  concerning  the  right  to 
the  lands  which  wel*e  ungranted  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution, 
and  which  usually  went  under  the  name  of  crown  lands.  The 
states  within  the  Hmits  of  whose  colonial  governments  they 
were  comprised  have  claimed  them  as  their  property,  the  others 
have  contended  that  the  rights  of  the  crown  in  this  article 
devolved  upon  the  Union;  especially  as  to  all  that  part  of  the 
Western  territory  which,  either  by  actual  possession,  or  through 
the  submission  of  the  Indian  proprietors,  was  subjected  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  king  of  Great  Britain,  till  it  was  relinquished 
in  the  treaty  of  peace.  This,  it  has  been  said,  was  at  all  events 
an  acquisition  to  the  Confederacy  by  compact  with  a  foreign 
power.  It  has  been  the  prudent  pohcy  of  Congress  to  appease 
this  controversy,  by  prevailing  upon  the  states  to  make  cessions 
to  the  United  States  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole.  This  has  been 
so  far  accompHshed  as,  under  a  continuation  of  the  Union,  to 
afford  a  decided  prospect  of  an  amicable  termination  of  the 
dispute.  A  dismemberment  of  the  Confederacy,  however, 
would  revive  this  dispute,  and  would  create  others  on  the  same 
subject.  At  present,  a  large  part  of  the  vacant  Western  terri- 
tory is,  by  cession  at  least,  if  not  by  any  anterior  right,  the 
common  property  of  the  Union.  If  that  were  at  an  end,  the 
states  which  have  made  cessions,  on  a  principle  of  federal  com- 
promise, would  be  apt,  when  the  motive  of  the  grant  had  ceased, 
to  reclaim  the  lands  as  a  reversion.  The  other  states  would  no 
doubt  insist  on  a  proportion,  by  right  of  representation.  Their 
argument  would  be  that  a  grant,  once  made,  could  not  be 


THE  FEDERALIST  45 

revoked;  and  that  the  justice  of  their  participating  in  territory 
acquired  or  secured  by  the  joint  efforts  of  the  Confederacy, 
remained  undiminished.  If,  contrary  to  probabiHty,  it  should 
be  admitted  by  all  the  states  that  each  had  a  right  to  a  share 
of  this  conamon  stock,  there  would  still  be  a  difficulty  to  be 
surmounted,  as  to  a  proper  rule  of  apportionment.  Different 
principles  would  be  set  up  by  different  states  for  this  purpose, 
and  as  they  would  affect  the  opposite  interests  of  the  parties, 
they  might  not  easily  be  susceptible  of  a  pacific  adjustment. 

In  the  wide  field  of  Western  territory,  therefore,  we  perceive 
an  ample  theater  for  hostile  pretensions,  without  any  umpire 
or  common  judge  to  interpose  between  the  contending  parties. 
To  reason  from  the  past  to  the  future,  we  shaU  have  good  ground 
to  apprehend  that  the  sword  would  sometimes  be  appealed  to 
as  the  arbiter  of  their  differences.  The  circumstances  of  the 
dispute  between  Connecticut  and  Pennsylvania,  respecting  the 
lands  at  Wyoming,  admonish  us  not  to  be  sanguine  in  expecting 
an  easy  accommodation  of  such  differences.  The  Articles  of 
Confederation  obliged  the  parties  to  submit  the  matter  to  the 
decision  of  a  federal  court.  The  submission  was  made,  and  the 
court  decided  in  favor  of  Pennsylvania.  But  Connecticut  gave 
strong  indications  of  dissatisfaction  with  that  determination; 
nor  did  she  appear  to  be  entirely  resigned  to  it,  till,  by  negotiation 
and  management,  something  like  an  equivalent  was  found  for  the 
loss  she  supposed  herself  to  have  sustained.  Nothing  here  said 
is  intended  to  convey  the  sUghtest  censure  on  the  conduct  of 
that  state.  She  no  doubt  sincerely  believed  herself  to  have  been 
injured  by  the  decision;  and  states,  like  individuals,  acquiesce 
with  great  reluctance  in  determinations  to  their  disadvantage. 

Those  who  had  an  opportunity  of  seeing  the  inside  of  the 
transactions  which  attended  the  progress  of  the  controversy 
between  this  state  and  the  district  of  Vermont,  can  vouch  the 
opposition  we  experienced,  as  well  from  states  not  interested 
as  from  those  which  were  interested  in  the  claim;  and  can  attest 
the  danger  to  which  the  peace  of  the  Confederacy  might  have 
been  exposed,  had  this  state  attempted  to  assert  its  rights  by 


46  THE  FEDERALIST 

force.  Two  motives  preponderated  in  that  opposition:  one, 
a  jealousy  entertained  of  our  future  power;  and  the  other,  the 
interest  of  certain  individuals  of  influence  in  the  neighboring 
states,  who  had  obtained  grants  of  lands  under  the  actual 
government  of  that  district.  Even  the  states  which  brought 
forward  claims  in  contradiction  to  ours,  seemed  more  soUcitous 
to  dismember  this  state  than  to  estabUsh  their  own  pretensions. 
These  were  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  and  Connecticut. 
New  Jersey  and  Rhode  Island,  upon  all  occasions,  discovered  a 
warm  zeal  for  the  independence  of  Vermont;  and  Maryland,  un- 
til alarmed  by  the  appearance  of  a  connection  between  Canada 
and  that  place,  entered  deeply  into  the  same  views.  These, 
being  small  states,  saw  with  an  unfriendly  eye  the  perspective 
of  our  growing  greatness.  In  a  review  of  these  transactions  we 
may  trace  some  of  the  causes  which  would  be  likely  to  embroil 
the  states  with  each  other,  if  it  should  be  their  unpropitious 
destiny  to  become  disunited. 

The  competitions  of  commerce  would  be  another  fruitful 
source  of  contention.  The  states  less  favorably  circumstanced 
would  be  desirous  of  escaping  from  the  disadvantages  of  local 
situation,  and  of  sharing  in  the  advantages  of  their  more  for- 
tunate neighbors.  Each  state,  or  separate  confederacy,  would 
pursue  a  system  of  commercial  polity  pecuHar  to  itself.  This 
would  occasion  distinctions,  preferences,  and  exclusions,  which 
would  beget  discontent.  The/  habits  of  intercourse/'  on  the 
basis  of  equal  privileges,  to  which  we  have  been  accustomed 
from  the  earliest  settlement  of  the  country,  would  give  a  keener 
edge  to  those  causes  of  discontent  than  they  would  naturally 
have  independent  of  this  circumstance.  We  should  be  ready 
to  denominate  injuries  those  things  which  were  in  reality  the  justifi- 
able acts  of  independent  sovereignties  consulting  a  distinct  interest. 
The  spirit  of  enterprise,  which  characterizes  the  commercial 
part  of  America,  has  left  no  occasion  of  displaying  itself  unim- 
proved. It  is  not  at  all  probable  that  this  unbridled  spirit 
would  pay  much  respect  to  those  regulations  of  trade  by  which 
particular  states  might  endeavor  to  secure  exclusive  benefits  to 


THE  FEDERALIST  47 

their  own  citizens.  The  infractions  of  these  regulations  on  one 
side,  the  efforts  to  prevent  and  repel  them  on  the  other,  would 
naturally  lead  to  outrages,  and  these  to  reprisals  and  wars. 

The  opportunities  which  some  states  would  have  of  rendering 
others  tributary  to  them  by  commercial  regulations  would  be 
impatient^  submitted  to  by  the  tributary  states.  The  relative 
situation  of  New  York,  Connecticut,  and  New  Jersey  would 
afford  an  example  of  this  kind.  New  York,  from  the  necessities 
of  revenue,  must  lay  duties  on  her  importations.  A  great  part 
of  these  duties  must  be  paid  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  other 
states  in  the  capacity  of  consumers  of  what  we  import.  New 
York  would  neither  be  willing  nor  able  to  forego  this  advantage. 
Her  citizens  would  not  consent  that  a  duty  paid  by  them  should 
be  remitted  in  favor  of  the  citizens  of  her  neighbors;  nor  would 
it  be  practicable,  if  there  were  not  this  impediment  in  the  way, 
to  distinguish  the  customers  in  our  own  markets.  Would 
Connecticut  and  New  Jersey  long  submit  to  be  taxed  by  New 
York  for  her  exclusive  benefit  ?  Should  we  be  long  permitted 
to  remain  in  the  quiet  and  undisturbed  enjoyment  of  a  metro- 
poHs,  from  the  possession  of  which  we  derived  an  advantage 
so  odious  to  our  neighbors,  and,  in  their  opinion,  so  oppressive  ? 
Should  we  be  able  to  preserve  it  against  the  incumbent  weight 
of  Connecticut  on  the  one  side,  and  the  cooperating  pressure 
of  New  Jersey  on  the  other  ?  These  are  questions  that  temerity 
alone  will  answer  in  the  affirmative. 

The  public  debt  of  the  Union  would  be  a  further  cause  of 
collision  between  the  separate  states  or  confederacies.  The 
apportionment,  in  the  first  instance,  and  the  progressive  extin- 
guishment afterwards,  would  be  aKke  productive  of  ill-humor 
and  animosity.  How  would  it  be  possible  to  agree  upon  a  rule 
of  apportionment  satisfactory  to  all  ?  There  is  scarcely  any 
that  can  be  proposed  which  is  entirely  free  from  real  objections. 
These,  as  usual,  would  be  exaggerated  by  the  adverse  interests  of 
the  parties.  There  are  even  dissimilar  views  among  the  states 
as  to  the  general  principle  of  discharging  the  public  debt.  Some 
of  them,  either  less  impressed  with  the  importance  of  national 


48  THE  FEDERALIST 

credit,  or  because  their  citizens  have  little,  if  any,  immediate 
interest  in  the  question,  feel  an  indifference,  if  not  a  repugnance, 
to  the  payment  of  the  domestic  debt  at  any  rate.  These  would 
be  inclined  to  magnify  the  difficulties  of  a  distribution.  Others 
of  them,  a  numerous  body  of  whose  citizens  are  creditors  to  the 
pubHc  beyond  the  proportion  of  the  state  in  the  total  amount  of 
the  national  debt,  would  be  strenuous  for  some  equitable  and 
effectual  provision.  The  procrastinations  of  the  former  would 
excite  the  resentments  of  the  latter.  The  settlement  of  a  rule 
would,  in  the  meantime,  be  postponed  by  real  differences  of 
opinion  and  affected  delays.  The  citizens  of  the  states  interested 
would  clamor;  foreign  powers  would  urge  for  the  satisfaction 
of  their  just  demands,  and  the  peace  of  the  states  would  be 
hazarded  to  the  double  contingency  of  external  invasion  and 
internal  contention. 

Suppose  the  difficulties  of  agreeing  upon  a  rule  surmoimted, 
and  the  apportionment  made.  Still  there  is  great  room  to 
suppose  that  the  rule  agreed  upon  would,  upon  experiment, 
be  found  to  bear  harder  upon  some  states  than  upon  others. 
Those  which  were  sufferers  by  it  would  naturally  seek  for  a 
mitigation  of  the  burden.  The  others  would  as  naturally  be 
disinclined  to  a  revision,  which  was  Hkely  to  end  in  an  increase 
of  their  own  incumbrances.  Their  refusal  would  be  too  plausible 
a  pretext  to  the  complaining  states  to  withhold  their  contribu- 
tions, not  to  be  embraced  with  avidity;  and  the  non-compUance 
of  these  states  with  their  engagements  would  be  a  ground  of 
bitter  dissension  and  altercation.  If  even  the  rule  adopted 
should  in  practice  justify  the  equaUty  of  its  principle,  still 
delinquencies  in  payment  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  states 
would  result  from  a  diversity  of  other  causes  —  the  real  de- 
ficiency of  resources;  the  mismanagement  of  their  finances; 
accidental  disorders  in  the  administration  of  the  government, 
and,  in  addition  to  the  rest,  the  reluctance  with  which  men 
commonly  part  with  money  for  purposes  that  have  outhved 
the  exigencies  which  produced  them,  and  interfere  with  the 
supply  of  immediate  wants.      Delinquencies,  from  whatever 


THE  FEDERALIST  49 

causes,  would  be  productive  of  complaints,  recriminations,  and 
quarrels.  There  is,  perhaps,  nothing  more  Ukely  to  disturb  the 
tranquillity  of  nations  than  their  being  bound  to  mutual  con- 
tributions for  any  common  object  which  does  not  yield  an  equal 
and  coincident  benefit.  For  it  is  an  observation,  as  true  as  it 
is  trite,  that  there  is  nothing  men  differ  so  readily  about  as  the 
payment  of  money. 

Laws  in  violation  of  private  contracts,  as  they  amount  to 
aggressions  on  the  rights  of  those  states  whose  citizens  are 
injured  by  them,  may  be  considered  as  another  probable  source 
of  hostility.  We  are  not  authorized  to  expect  that  a  more 
liberal  or  more  equitable  spirit  would  preside  over  the  legisla- 
tions of  the  individual  states  hereafter,  if  unrestrained  by  any 
additional  checks,  than  we  have  heretofore  seen  in  too  many 
instances  disgracing  their  several  codes.  We  have  observed 
the  disposition  to  retaliation  excited  in  Connecticut,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  enormities  perpetrated  by  the  legislature  of 
Rhode  Island;  and  we  may  reasonably  infer  that,  in  similar 
cases  imder  other  circumstances,  a  war,  not  of  parchmenty  but 
of  the  sword,  would  chastise  such  atrocious  breaches  of  moral 
obligation  and  social  justice. 

The  probability  of  incompatible  alliances  between  the  different 
states  or  confederacies  and  different  foreign  nations,  and  the 
effects  of  this  situation  upon  the  peace  of  the  whole,  have  been 
sufficiently  unfolded  in  some  preceding  papers.  From  the  view 
they  have  exhibited  of  this  part  of  the  subject,  this  conclusion 
is  to  be  drawn,  that  America,  if  not  connected  at  all,  or  only 
by  the  feeble  tie  of  a  simple  league,  offensive  and  defensive, 
would,  by  the  operation  of  such  opposite  and  jarring  alliances, 
be  gradually  entangled  in  all  the  pernicious  labyrinths  of  Euro- 
pean politics  and  wars;  and  by  the  destructive  contentions  of 
the  parts  into  which  she  was  divided,  would  be  likely  to  become 
a  prey  to  the  artifices  and  machinations  of  powers  equally  the 
enemies  of  them  all.  Divide  et  impera  ^  must  be  the  motto  of 
every  nation  that  either  hates  or  fears  us.  Publius. 

»  Divide  and  command. 


50  THE  FEDERALIST 

The  Effects  of  Internal  War  in  producing  standing  Armies 
and  other  institutions  unfriendly  to  liberty  ^ 

Assuming  it  therefore  as  an  established  truth  that  the  several 
states,  in  case  of  disunion,  or  such  combinations  of  them  as 
might  happen  to  be  formed  out  of  the  wreck  of  the  general 
confederacy,  would  be  subject  to  those  vicissitudes  of  peace 
and  war,  of  friendship  and  enmity  with  each  other,  which  have 
fallen  to  the  lot  of  all  neighboring  nations  not  united  under 
one  government,  let  us  enter  into  a  concise  detail  of  some  of 
the  consequences  that  would  attend  such  a  situation. 

War  between  the  states,  in  the  first  periods  of  their  separate 
existence,  would  be  accompanied  with  much  greater  distresses 
than  it  commonly  is  in  those  countries  where  regular  military 
establishments  have  long  obtained.  The  discipUned  armies 
always  kept  on  foot  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  though  they 
bear  a  malignant  aspect  to  liberty  and  economy,  have,  not- 
withstanding, been  productive  of  the  signal  advantage  of  render- 
ing sudden  conquests  impracticable,  and  of  preventing  that 
rapid  desolation  which  used  to  mark  the  progress  of  war  prior 
to  their  introduction.  The  art  of  fortification  has  contributed 
to  the  same  ends.  The  nations  of  Europe  are  encircled  with 
chains  of  fortified  places,  which  mutually  obstruct  invasion. 
Campaigns  are  wasted  in  reducing  two  or  three  frontier  garrisons, 
to  gain  admittance  into  an  enemy's  country.  Similar  impedi- 
ments occur  at  every  step,  to  exhaust  the  strength  and  delay 
the  progress  of  an  invader.  Formerly,  an  invading  army  would 
penetrate  into  the  heart  of  a  neighboring  country  almost  as 
soon  as  intelligence  of  its  approach  could  be  received;  but  now 
a  comparatively  small  force  of  disciplined  troops,  acting  on  the 
defensive,  with  the  aid  of  posts,  is  able  to  impede,  and  finally 
to  frustrate,  the  enterprises  of  one  much  more  considerable. 
The  history  of  war,  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  is  no  longer  a 
history  of  nations  subdued  and  empires  overturned;    but  of 

1  No.  VIII.     Hamilton.    New  York  Packet,  November  20,  1787. 


THE  FEDERALIST  51 

towns  taken  and  retaken,  of  battles  that  decide  nothing,  of 
retreats  more  beneficial  than  victories,  of  much  effort  and 
little  acquisition. 

In  this  country  the  scene  would  be  altogether  reversed.  The 
jealousy  of  military  establishments  would  postpone  them  as 
long  as  possible.  The  want  of  fortifications,  leaving  the  frontiers 
of  one  state  open  to  another,  would  facilitate  inroads.  The 
populous  states  would,  with  Httle  difl&culty,  overrun  their  less 
populous  neighbors.  Conquests  would  be  as  easy  to  be  made 
as  diflScult  to  be  retained.  War,  therefore,  would  be  desultory 
and  predatory.  Plunder  and  devastation  ever  march  in  the 
train  of  irregulars.  The  calamities  of  individuals  would  make 
the  principal  figure  in  the  events  which  would  characterize  our 
military  exploits. 

This  picture  is  not  too  highly  wrought;  though,  I  confess,  it 
would  not  long  remain  a  just  one.  Safety  from  external  danger 
is  the  most  powerful  director  of  national  conduct.  Even  the 
ardent  lover  of  liberty  will,  after  a  time,  give  way  to  its  dictates. 
The  violent  destruction  of  fife  and  property  incident  to  war,  the 
continual  effort  and  alarm  attendant  on  a  state  of  continual 
danger,  will  compel  nations  the  most  attached  to  liberty  to 
resort  for  repose  and  security  to  institutions  which  have  a 
tendency  to  destroy  their  civil  and  political  rights.  To  be 
more  safe,  they  at  length  become  willing  to  run  the  risk  of  being 
less  free. 

The  institutions  chiefly  alluded  to  are  standing  armies  and 
the  correspondent  appendages  of  mihtary  estabhshment. 
Standing  armies,  it  is  said,  are  not  provided  against  in  the  new 
Constitution;  and  it  is  thence  inferred  that  they  would  exist 
under  it.^  This  inference,  from  the  very  form  of  the  proposition, 
is,  at  best,  problematical  and  uncertain.  But  standing  armies, 
it  may  be  replied,  must  inevitably  result  from  a  dissolution  of 

I  This  objection  will  be  fully  examined  in  its  proper  place,  and  it  will  be  shown  that  the 
only  rational  precaution  which  could  have  been  taken  on  this  subject  has  been  taken,  and 
a  much  better  one  than  is  to  be  found  in  any  constitution  that  has  been  heretofore  framed  in 
America,  most  of  which  contain  no  guard  at  all  on  this  subject. 


52  THE  FEDERALIST 

the  confederacy.  Frequent  war  and  constant  apprehension, 
which  require  a  state  of  as  constant  preparation,  will  infallibly 
produce  them.  The  weaker  states  or  confederacies  would  first 
have  recourse  to  them,  to  put  themselves  upon  an  equality  with 
their  more  potent  neighbors.  They  would  endeavor  to  supply 
the  inferiority  of  population  and  resources  by  a  more  regular 
and  effective  system  of  defense,  by  disciplined  troops,  and  by 
fortifications.  They  would,  at  the  same  time,  be  necessitated 
to  strengthen  the  executive  arm  of  government,  in  doing  which 
their  constitutions  would  acquire  a  progressive  direction  towards 
monarchy.  It  is  of  the  nature  of  war  to  increase  the  executive 
at  the  expense  of  the  legislative  authority. 

The  expedients  which  have  been  mentioned  would  soon  give 
the  states  or  confederacies  that  made  use  of  them  a  superiority 
over  their  neighbors.  Small  states,  or  states  of  less  natural 
strength,  under  vigorous  governments,  and  with  the  assistance 
of  disciplined  armies,  have  often  triumphed  over  large  states, 
or  states  of  greater  natural  strength,  which  have  been  destitute 
of  these  advantages.  Neither  the  pride  nor  the  safety  of  the 
more  important  states  or  confederacies  would  permit  them  long 
to  submit  to  this  mortifying  and  adventitious  inferiority.  They 
would  quickly  resort  to  means  similar  to  those  by  which  it  had 
been  effected,  to  reinstate  themselves  in  their  lost  preeminence. 
Thus  we  should,  in  a  httle  time,  see  established  in  every  part 
of  this  country  the  same  engines  of  despotism  which  have  been 
the  scourge  of  the  Old  World.  This,  at  least,  would  be  the 
natural  course  of  things;  and  our  reasonings  will  be  the  more 
likely  to  be  just,  in  proportion  as  they  are  accommodated  to 
this  standard. 

These  are  not  vague  inferences  drawn  from  supposed  or 
speculative  defects  in  a  constitution,  the  whole  power  of  which 
is  lodged  in  the  hands  of  the  people,  or  their,  representatives  and 
delegates,  but  they  are  soHd  conclusions,  drawn  from  the  natural 
and  necessary  progress  of  human  affairs. 

It  may,  perhaps,  be  asked,  by  way  of  objection  to  this,  why 
did  not  standing  armies  spring  up  out  of  the  contentions  which 


THE  FEDERALIST  53 

so  often  distracted  the  ancient  republics  of  Greece  ?  Different 
answers,  equally  satisfactory,  may  be  given  to  this  question. 
The  industrious  habits  of  the  people  of  the  present  day,  absorbed 
in  the  pursuits  of  gain,  and  devoted  to  the  improvements  of 
agriculture  and  commerce,  are  incompatible  with  the  condition 
of  a  nation  of  soldiers,  which  was  the  true  condition  of  the 
people  of  those  republics.  The  means  of  revenue,  which  have 
been  so  greatly  multiplied  by  the  increase  of  gold  and  silver 
and  of  the  arts  of  industry,  and  the  science  of  finance,  which 
is  the  offspring  of  modem  times,  concurring  with  the  habits  of 
nations,  have  produced  an  entire  revolution  in  the  system  of  war, 
and  have  rendered  disciplined  armies,  distinct  from  the  body  of 
the  citizens,  the  inseparable  companions  of  frequent  hostility. 

There  is  a  wide  difference,  also,  between  mihtary  establish- 
ments in  a  country  seldom  exposed  by  its  situation  to  internal 
invasions,  and  in  one  which  is  often  subject  to  them,  and  always 
apprehensive  of  them.  The  rulers  of  the  former  can  have  no 
good  pretext,  if  they  are  even  so  inclined,  to  keep  on  foot  armies 
so  numerous  as  must  of  necessity  be  maintained  in  the  latter. 
These  armies  being,  in  the  first  case,  rarely,  if  at  all,  called  into 
activity  for  interior  defense,  the  people  are  in  no  danger  of  being 
broken  to  military  subordination.  The  laws  are  not  accustomed 
to  relaxations,  in  favor  of  military  exigencies;  the  civil  state 
remains  in  full  vigor,  neither  corrupted,  nor  confounded  with 
the  principles  or  propensities  of  the  other  state.  The  smallness 
of  the  army  renders  the  natural  strength  of  the  community  an 
over-match  for  it;  and  the  citizens,  not  habituated  to  look  up 
to  the  mihtary  power  for  protection,  or  to  submit  to  its  oppres- 
sions, neither  love  nor  fear  the  soldiery;  they  view  them  with  a 
spirit  of  jealous  acquiescence  in  a  necessary  evil,  and  stand  ready 
to  resist  a  power  which  they  suppose  may  be  exerted  to  the 
prejudice  of  their  rights.  The  army  under  such  circumstances 
may  usefully  aid  the  magistrate  to  suppress  a  small  faction,  or 
an  occasional  mob,  or  insurrection;  but  it  will  be  unable  to 
enforce  encroachments  against  the  united  efforts  of  the  great 
body  of  the  people. 


54  THE  FEDERALIST 

In  a  country  in  the  predicament  last  described,  the  contrary 
of  all  this  happens.  The  perpetual  menacings  of  danger  oblige 
the  government  to  be  always  prepared  to  repel  it;  its  armies 
must  be  numerous  enough  for  instant  defense.  The  continual 
necessity  for  their  services  enhances  the  importance  of  the  soldier, 
and  proportionally  degrades  the  condition  of  the  citizen.  The 
military  state  becomes  elevated  above  the  civil.  The  inhabi- 
tants of  territories,  often  the  theater  of  war,  are  unavoidably 
subjected  to  frequent  infringements  on  their  rights,  which  serve 
to  weaken  their  sense  of  those  rights;  and  by  degrees  the  people 
are  brought  to  consider  the  soldiery  not  only  as  their  protectors 
but  as  their  superiors.  The  transition  from  this  disposition  to 
that  of  considering  them  as  masters,  is  neither  remote  nor  dif- 
ficult; but  it  is  very  difficult  to  prevail  upon  a  people  under  such 
impressions,  to  make  a  bold  or  effectual  resistance  to  usurpa- 
tions supported  by  the  military  power. 

The  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  falls  within  the  first  descrip- 
tion. An  insular  situation,  and  a  powerful  marine,  guarding  it 
in  a  great  measure  against  the  possibility  of  foreign  invasion, 
supersede  the  necessity  of  a  numerous  army  within  the  kingdom. 
A  sufficient  force  to  make  head  against  a  sudden  descent,  till  the 
militia  could  have  time  to  rally  and  embody,  is  all  that  has  been 
deemed  requisite.  No  motive  of  national  policy  has  demanded, 
nor  would  public  opinion  have  tolerated,  a  larger  number  of 
troops  upon  its  domestic  establishment.  There  has  been,  for 
a  long  time  past,  little  room  for  the  operation  of  the  other  causes, 
which  have  been  enumerated  as  the  consequences  of  internal 
war.  This  peculiar  fehcity  of  situation  has,  in  a  great  degree, 
contributed  to  preserve  the  liberty  which  that  country  to  this 
day  enjoys,  in  spite  of  the  prevalent  venality  and  corruption. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  Britain  had  been  situated  on  the  continent, 
and  had  been  compelled,  as  she  would  have  been,  by  that  situa- 
tion, to  make  her  military  establishments  at  home  coextensive 
with  those  of  the  other  great  powers  of  Europe,  she,  like  them, 
would  in  all  probability  be,  at  this  day,  a  victim  to  the  absolute 
power  of  a  single  man.     'Tis  possible,  though  not  easy,  that  the 


THE  FEDERALIST  55 

people  of  that  island  may  be  enslaved  from  other  causes;  but 
it  cannot  be  by  the  prowess  of  an  army  so  inconsiderable  as 
that  which  has  been  usually  kept  up  within  the  kingdom. 

If  we  are  wise  enough  to  preserve  the  Union  we  may  for  ages 
enjoy  an  advantage  similar  to  that  of  an  insulated  situation. 
Europe  is  at  a  great  distance  from  us.  Her  colonies  in  our 
vicinity  will  be  likely  to  continue  too  much  disproportioned 
in  strength  to  be  able  to  give  us  any  dangerous  annoyance. 
Extensive  military  establishments  cannot,  in  this  position,  be 
necessary  to  our  security.  But  if  we  should  be  disunited,  and 
the  integral  parts  should  either  remain  separated,  or,  which  is 
most  probable,  should  be  thrown  together  into  two  or  three 
confederacies,  we  should  be,  in  a  short  course  of  time,  in  the 
predicament  of  the  continental  powers  of  Europe  —  our  Uberties 
would  be  a  prey  to  the  means  of  defending  ourselves  against 
the  ambition  and  jealousy  of  each  other. 

This  is  an  idea  not  superficial  nor  futile,  but  solid  and  weighty. 
It  deserves  the  most  serious  and  mature  consideration  of  every 
prudent  and  honest  man  of  whatever  party.  If  such  men  will 
make  a  firm  and  solemn  pause,  and  meditate  dispassionately  on 
the  importance  of  this  interesting  idea;  if  they  will  contemplate 
it  in  all  its  attitudes,  and  trace  it  to  all  its  consequences,  they 
will  not  hesitate  to  part  with  trival  objections  to  a  Constitution, 
the  rejection  of  which  would  in  all  probability  put  a  final  period 
to  the  Union.  The  airy  phantoms  that  flit  before  the  distem- 
pered imaginations  of  some  of  its  adversaries  would  quickly  give 
place  to  the  more  substantial  prospects  of  dangers,  real,  certain, 
and  formidable. 

PCJBLIUS. 


II 

THE  NEED  OF  A  STRONG  FEDERATION 

(a)  TO  PREVENT  INTERNAL  STRIFE 

The  Utility  or  the  Union  as  a  Safeguard  against  Dpmestic 
Faction  and  Insurrection  ^ 

A  FIRM  union  will  be  of  the  utmost  moment  to  the  peace  and 
liberty  of  the  states,  as  a  barrier  against  domestic  faction  and 
insurrection.  It  is  impossible  to  read  the  history  of  the  petty 
republics  of  Greece  and  Italy  without  feeling  sensations  of  horror 
and  disgust  at  the  distractions  with  which  they  were  continually 
agitated,  and  at  the  rapid  succession  of  revolutions  by  which 
they  were  kept  in  a  state  of  perpetual  vibration  between  the 
extremes  of  tyranny  and  anarchy.  If  they  exhibit  occasional 
calms,  these  only  serve  as  short-Hved  contrasts  to  the  furious 
storms  that  are  to  succeed.  If  now  and  then  intervals  of  feHcity 
open  themselves  to  view,  we  behold  them  with  a  mixture  of 
regret,  arising  from  the  reflection  that  the  pleasing  scenes  before 
us  are  soon  to  be  overwhelmed  by  the  tempestuous  waves  of 
sedition  and  party  rage.  If  momentary  rays  of  glory  break 
forth  from  the  gloom,  while  they  dazzle  us  with  a  transient  and 
fleeting  brilliancy,  they  at  the  same  time  admonish  us  to  lament 
that  the  vices  of  government  should  pervert  the  direction  and 
tarnish  the  luster  of  those  bright  talents  and  exalted  endow- 
ments for  which  the  favored  soils  that  produced  them  have 
been  so  justly  celebrated. 

From  the  disorders  that  disfigure  the  annals  of  those  republics 
the  advocates  of  despotism  have  drawn  arguments,  not  only 
against  the  forms  of  republican  government,  but  against  the  very 
principles  of  civil  liberty.     They  have  decried  all  free  govern- 

>  No.  IX.  Hamilton.     Indepeadent  Joumal,  November  21,  1787. 
S6 


THE  FEDERALIST  57 

ment  as  inconsistent  with  the  order  of  society,  and  have  indulged 
themselves  in  malicious  exultation  over  its  friends  and  partisans. 
Happily  for  mankind,  stupendous  fabrics  reared  on  the  basis  of 
Uberty,  which  have  flourished  for  ages,  have,  in  a  few  glorious 
instances,  refuted  their  gloomy  sophisms.  And,  I  trust,  America, 
will  be  the  broad  and  solid  foundation  of  other  edifices,  not  less 
magnificent,  which  will  be  equally  permanent  monuments  of 
their  errors. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  portraits  they  have  sketched 
of  republican  government  were  too  just  copies  of  the  originals 
from  which  they  were  taken.     If  it  had  been  found  impracticable 
to  have  devised  models  of  a  more  perfect  structure,  the  enUght- 
ened  friends  to  Hberty  would  have  been  obUged  to  abandon  the 
cause  of  that  species  of  government  as  indefensible.    The  science 
of  politics,  however,  like  most  other  sciences,  has  received  great 
improvement.     The  efficacy  of  various  principles  is  now  well 
understood,  which  were  either  not  known  at  all,  or  imperfectly 
known  to  the  ancients.     The  regular  distribution  of  power  into 
distinct  departments;    the  introduction  of  legislative  balances 
and  checks;  the  institution  of  courts  composed  of  judges  holding 
their  offices  during  good  behavior;    the  representation  of  the 
people  in  the  legislature  by  deputies  of  their  own  election:  these 
are  either  wholly  new  discoveries,  or  have  made  their  principal 
progress  towards  perfection  in  modern  times.     They  are  means, 
and  powerful  means,  by  which  the  excellencies  of  republican 
government  may  be  retained  and  its  imperfections  lessened  or 
avoided.     To  this  catalogue  of  circumstances  that  tend  to  the 
amelioration  of  popular  systems  of  civil  government,  I  shall 
venture,  however  novel  it  may  appear  to  some,  to  add  one  more, 
on  a  principle  which  has  been  made  the  foundation  of  an  objec- 
tion to  the  new  Constitution:  I  mean  the  enlargement  of  the  j 
ORBIT  within  which  such  systems  are  to  revolve,  either  in  respect  ^ 
to  the  dimensions  of  a  single  state,  or  to  the  consolidation  of 
several  smaller  states  into  one  great  confederacy.     The  latter 
is  that  which  immediately  concerns  the  object  under  considera- 
tion.    It  will,  however,  be  of  use  to  examine  the  principle  in  its 


58  THE  FEDERALIST 

application  to  a  single  state,  which  shall  be  attended  to  in 
another  place. 

The  utility  of  a  confederacy  as  well  to  suppress  faction  and  to 
guard  the  internal  tranquilUty  of  states,  as  to  increase  their  ex- 
ternal force  and  security,  is  in  reality  not  a  new  idea.  It  has  been 
practiced  upon  in  different  coimtries  and  ages,  and  has  received 
the  sanction  of  the  most  applauded  writers  on  the  subjects  of 
pontics.  The  opponents  of  the  plan  proposed  have,  with  great 
assiduity,  cited  and  circulated  the  observations  of  Montesquieu 
on  the  necessity  of  a  contracted  territory  for  a  republican  govern- 
ment. But  they  seem  not  to  have  been  apprised  of  the  senti- 
ments of  that  great  man  expressed  in  another  part  of  his  work, 
nor  to  have  adverted  to  the  consequences  of  the  principle  to 
which  they  subscribe  with  such  ready  acquiescence. 

When  Montesquieu  recommends  a  small  extent  for  republics, 
the  standards  he  had  in  view  were  of  dimensions  far  short  of  the 
limits  of  almost  every  one  of  these  states.  Neither  Virginia, 
Massachusetts,  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  North  CaroKna,  nor 
Georgia  can  by  any  means  be"^  compared  with  the  models  from 
which  he  reasoned  and  to  which  the  terms  of  his  description 
apply.  If  we  therefore  take  his  ideas  on  this  point  as  the  cri- 
terion of  truth,  we  shall  be  driven  to  the  alternative  either  of 
taking  refuge  at  once  in  the  arms  of  monarchy,  or  of  splitting 
ourselves  into  an  infinity  of  little,  jealous,  clashing,  tumultuous 
commonwealths,  the  wretched  nurseries  of  unceasing  discord, 
and  the  miserable  objects  of  universal  pity  or  contempt.  Some 
of  the  writers  who  have  come  forward  on  the  other  side  of  the 
question  seem  to  have  been  aware  of  the  dilemma;  and  have 
even  been  bold  enough  to  hint  at  the  division  of  the  larger  states 
as  a  desirable  thing.  Such  an  infatuated  policy,  such  a  desperate 
expedient,  might,  by  the  multiplication  of  petty  offices,  answer 
the  views  of  men  who  possess  not  qualifications  to  extend  their 
influence  beyond  the  narrow  circles  of  personal  intrigue,  but  it 
could  never  promote  the  greatness  or  happiness  of  the  people  of 
America. 

Referring  the  examination  of  the  principle  itself  to  another 


THE  FEDERALIST  59 

place,  as  has  been  already  mentioned,  it  will  be  sufficient  to 
remark  here  that,  in  the  sense  of  the  author  who  has  been  most 
emphatically  quoted  upon  the  occasion,  it  would  only  dictate  a 
reduction  of  the  size  of  the  more  considerable  members  of  the 
Union,  but  would  not  militate  against  their  being  all  compre- 
hended in  one  confederate  government.  And  this  is  the  true 
question,  in  the  discussion  of  which  we  are  at  present  interested. 

So  far  are  the  suggestions  of  Montesquieu  from  standing  in , 
opposition  to  a  general  Union  of  the  states,  that  he  expHcitly' 
treats  of  a  confederate  republic  as  the  expedient  for  extend- 
ing the  sphere  of  popular  government,  and  reconciling  the  ad- 
vantages of  monarchy  with  those  of  republicanism. 

"  It  is  very  probable  "  (says  he  ^)  "  that  mankind  would  have 
been  obliged,  at  length,  to  live  constantly  under  the  government 
of  a  SINGLE  PERSON,  had  they  not  contrived  a  kind  of  constitu- 
tion that  has  all  the  internal  advantages  of  a  republican,  to- 
gether with  the  external  force  of  a  monarchical,  government. 
I  mean  a  confederate  republic. 

**  This  form  of  government  is  a  convention,  by  which  several 
smaller  states  agree  to  become  members  of  a  larger  one,  which 
they  intend  to  form.  It  is  a  kind  of  assemblage  of  societies  that 
constitute  a  new  one,  capable  of  increasing,  by  means  of  new 
associations,  till  they  arrive  to  such  a  degree  of  power  as  to  be 
able  to  provide  for  the  security  of  the  united  body. 

"  A  repubHc  of  this  kind,  able  to  withstand  an  external  force, 
may  support  itself  without  any  internal  corruption.  The  form 
of  this  society  prevents  all  manner  of  inconveniences. 

"  If  a  single  member  should  attempt  to  usurp  the  supreme 
authority,  he  could  not  be  supposed  to  have  an  equal  authority 
and  credit  in  all  the  confederate  states.  Were  he  to  have  too 
great  influence  over  one,  this  would  alarm  the  rest.  Were  he  to 
subdue  a  part,  that  which  would  still  remain  free  might  oppose 
him  with  forces  independent  of  those  which  he  had  usurped,  and 
overpower  him  before  he  could  be  settled  in  his  usurpation. 

"  Should  a  popular  insurrection  happen  in  one  of  the  con- 

1  spirit  of  taws,  vol.  i,  book  ix,  chap  r. 


6o  THE  FEDERALIST 

federate  states,  the  others  are  able  to  quell  it.  Should  abuses 
creep  into  one  part,  they  are  reformed  by  those  that  remain 
sound.  The  state  may  be  destroyed  on  one  side,  and  not  on  the 
other;  the  confederacy  may  be  dissolved,  and  the  confederates- 
preserve  their  sovereignty. 

"  As  this  government  is  composed  of  small  repubhcs  it  enjoys 
the  internal  happiness  of  each;  and  with  respect  to  its  external 
situation,  it  is  possessed,  by  means  of  the  association,  of  all  the 
advantages  of  large  monarchies." 

I  have  thought  it  proper  to  quote  at  length  these  interesting 
passages,  because  they  contain  a  luminous  abridgment  of  the 
principal  arguments  in  favor  of  the  Union,  and  must  effectually 
remove  the  false  impressions  which  a  misapplication  of  other 
parts  of  the  work  was  calculated  to  produce.  They  have,  at  the 
same  time,  an  intimate  connection  with  the  more  immediate 
design  of  this  paper;  which  is  to  illustrate  the  tendency  of  the 
Union  to  repress  domestic  faction  and  insurrection. 

A  distinction,  more  subtle  than  accurate,  has  been  raised 
between  a  confederacy  and  a  consolidation  of  the  states.  The 
essential  characteristic  of  the  first  is  said  to  be  the  restriction 
of  its  authority  to  the  members  in  their  collective  capacities, 
without  reaching  to  the  individuals  of  whom  they  are  composed. 
It  is  contended  that  the  national  council  ought  to  have  no 
concern  with  any  object  of  internal  administration.  An  exact 
equality  of  suffrage  between  the  members  has  also  been  insisted 
upon  as  a  leading  feature  of  a  confederate  government.  These 
positions  are,  in  the  main,  arbitrary;  they  are  supported  neither 
by  principle  nor  precedent.  It  has  indeed  happened  that 
governments  of  this  kind  have  generally  operated  in  the  manner 
which  the  distinction,  taken  notice  of,  supposes  to  be  inherent 
in  their  nature;  but  there  have  been  in  most  of  them  extensive 
exceptions  to  the  practice,  which  serve  to  prove,  as  far  as  exam- 
ple will  go,  that  there  is  no  absolute  rule  on  the  subject.  And 
it  will  be  clearly  shown,  in  the  course  of  this  investigation,  that 
as  far  as  the  principle  contended  for  has  prevailed,  it  has  been 
the  cause  of  incurable  disorder  and  imbecility  in  the  government. 


THE  FEDERALIST  6i 

The  definition  of  a  confederate  republic  seems  simply  to  be 
"  an  assemblage  of  societies,"  or  an  association  of  two  or  more 
states  into  one  state.  The  extent,  modifications,  and  objects 
of  the  federal  authority  are  mere  matters  of  discretion.  So  long 
as  the  separate  organization  of  the  members  be  not  abolished, 
so  long  as  it  exists,  by  a  constitutional  necessity,  for  local  pur- 
poses, though  it  should  be  in  perfect  subordination  to  the 
general  authority  of  the  Union,  it  would  still  be,  in  fact  and  in 
theory,  an  association  of  states,  or  a  confederacy.  The  proposed 
Constitution,  so  far  from  implying  an  abolition  of  the  state 
governments,  makes  them  constituent  parts  of  the  national 
sovereignty,  by  allowing  them  a  direct  representation  in  the 
Senate,  and  leaves  in  their  possession  certain  exclusive  and  very 
important  portions  of  sovereign  power.  This  fully  corresponds, 
in  every  rational  import  of  the  terms,  with  the  idea  of  a  federal 
government. 

In  the  Lycian  Confederacy,  which  consisted  of  twenty-three 
CITIES  or  republics,  the  largest  were  entitled  to  three  votes  in 
the  COMMON  COUNCIL,  those  of  the  middle  class  to  two,  and  the 
smallest  to  one.  The  common  council  had  the  appointment 
of  all  the  judges  and  magistrates  of  the  respective  cities.  This 
was  certainly  the  most  dehcate  species  of  interference  in  their 
internal  administration;  for  if  there  be  anything  that  seems 
exclusively  appropriated  to  the  local  jurisdictions,  it  is  the 
appointment  of  their  own  officers.  Yet  Montesquieu,  speaking 
of  this  association,  says:  "  Were  I  to  give  a  model  of  an  excel- 
lent confederate  republic,  it  would  be  that  of  Lycia."  Thus 
we  perceive  that  the  distinctions  insisted  upon  were  not  within 
the  contemplation  of  this  enlightened  civiHan;  and  we  shall  be 
led  to  conclude  that  they  are  the  novel  refinements  of  an  erro- 
neous theory. 

PUBLIUS. 


62  THE  FEDERALIST 

The  same  Subject  continued  ^ 

Among  the  numerous  advantages  promised  by  a  well-con- 
structed union,  none  deserves  to  be  more  accurately  developed 
than  its  tendency  to  break  and  control  the  violence  of  faction. 
The  friend  of  popular  governments  never  finds  himself  so  much 
alarmed  for  their  character  and  fate  as  when  he  contemplates 
their  propensity  to  this  dangerous  vice.  He  will  not  fail,  there- 
fore, to  set  a  due  value  on  any  plan  which,  without  violating 
the  principles  to  which  he  is  attached,  provides  a  proper  cure 
for  it.  The  instabihty,  injustice,  and  confusion  introduced  into 
the  pubUc  councils,  have,  in  truth,  been  the  mortal  diseases 
under  which  popular  governments  have  everywhere  perished, 
as  they  continue  to  be  the  favorite  and  fruitful  topics  from 
which  the  adversaries  to  liberty  derive  their  most  specious 
declamations.  The  valuable  improvements  made  by  the 
American  constitutions  on  the  popular  models,  both  ancient 
and  modern,  cannot  certainly  be  too  much  admired;  but  it 
would  be  an  unwarrantable  partiaHty  to  contend  that  they 
have  as  effectually  obviated  the  danger  on  this  side,  as  was 
wished  and  expected.  Complaints  are  everywhere  heard  from 
our  most  considerate  and  virtuous  citizens,  equally  the  friends 
of  public  and  private  faith,  and  of  public  and  personal  Hberty, 
that  our  governments  are  too  imstable,  that  the  pubhc  good  is 
disregarded  in  the  conflicts  of  rival  parties,  and  that  measures 
are  too  often  decided,  not  according  to  the  rules  of  justice  and 
the  rights  of  the  minor  party,  but  by  the  superior  force  of  an 
interested  and  overbearing  majority.  However  anxiously  we 
may  wish  that  these  complaints  had  no  foundations,  the  evidence 
of  known  facts  will  not  permit  us  to  deny  that  they  are  in  some 
degree  true.  It  will  be  found,  indeed,  on  a  candid  review  of 
our  situation,  that  some  of  the  distresses  under  which  we  labor 
have  been  erroneously  charged  on  the  operation  of  our  govern- 
ments; but  it  will  be  found,  at  the  same  time,  that  other  causes 
will  not  alone  accoimt  for  many  of  our  heaviest  misfortunes, 

*  No.  X.     Madison.    New  York  Daily  Advertiser,  November  aa,  1787. 


THE  FEDERALIST  63 

and,  particularly,  for  that  prevailing  and  increasing  distrust  of 
public  engagements,  and  alarm  for  private  rights,  which  are 
echoed  from  one  end  of  the  continent  to  the  other.  These  must 
be  chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  effects  of  the  imsteadiness  and  injustice 
with  which  a  factious  spirit  has  tainted  our  public  administra- 
tion. 

By  a  faction,  I  understand  a  number  of  citizens,  whether 
amounting  to  a  majority  or  minority  of  the  whole,  who  are 
united  and  actuated  by  some  common  impulse  of  passion,  or 
of  interest,  adverse  to  the  rights  of  other  citizens,  or  to  the 
permanent  and  aggregate  interests  of  the  community. 

There  are  two  methods  of  curing  the  mischiefs  of  faction: 
the  one,  by  removing  its  causes,  the  other,  by  controlKng  its 
effects. 

There  are  again  two  methods  of  removing  the  causes  of 
faction:  the  one,  by  destroying  the  Uberty  which  is  essential 
to  its  existence,  the  other,  by  giving  to  every  citizen  the  same 
opinions,  the  same  passions,  and  the  same  interests. 

It  could  never  be  more  truly  said  than  of  the  first  remedy, 
that  it  is  worse  than  the  disease.  Liberty  is  to  faction  what 
air  is  to  fire,  an  aUment  without  which  it  instantly  expires. 
But  it  could  not  be  a  less  folly  to  aboUsh  Hberty,  which  is  essential 
to  political  life,  because  it  nourishes  faction,  than  it  would  be 
to  wish  the  annihilation  of  air,  which  is  essential  to  animal  life, 
because  it  imparts  to  fire  its  destructive  agency. 

The  second  expedient  is  as  impracticable  as  the  first  would 
be  unwise.  As  long  as  the  reason  of  man  continues  fallible^ 
and  he  is  at  Hberty  to  exercise  it,  different  opinions  will  be 
formed.  As  long  as  the  connection  subsists  between  his  reason 
and  his  self-love,  his  opinions  and  his  passions  will  have  a 
reciprocal  influence  on  each  other;  and  the  former  will  be 
objects  to  which  the  latter  will  attach  themselves.  The  diver- 
sity in  the  faculties  of  men,  from  which  the  rights  of  property 
originate,  is  not  less  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  an  uniformity  of 
interests.  The  protection  of  these  faculties  is  the  first  object 
of  government.      From  the  protection  of  different  and  unequal 


'^U'*-; 


64  THE  FEDERALIST 

faculties  of  acquiring  property,  the  possession  of  different 
degrees  and  kinds  of  property  immediately  results;  and  from 
the  influence  of  these  on  the  sentiments  and  views  of  the  respec- 

(tive  proprietors,  ensues  a  division  of  the  society  into  different 
interests  and  parties. 

The  latent  causes  of  faction  are  thus  sown  in  the  nature  of 
man :  and  we  see  them  everywhere  brought  into  different  degrees 
of  activity,  according  to  the  different  circumstances  of  civil , 
society.  A  zeal  for  different  opinions  concerning  religion,  ; 
concerning  government,  and  many  other  points,  as  well  of  , 
speculation  as  of  practice,  an  attachment  to  different  leaders 
ambitiously  contending  for  preeminence  and  power,  or  to 
persons  of  other  descriptions  whose  fortunes  have  been  interest- 
ing to  the  human  passions,  have,  in  turn,  divided  mankind  into 
parties,  inflamed  them  with  mutual  animosity,  and  rendered 
them  much  more  disposed  to  vex  and  oppress  each  other  than 
to  cooperate  for  their  common  good.  So  strong  is  this  pro- 
pensity of  mankind  to  fall  into  mutual  animosities,  that  where 
no  substantial  occasion  presents  itself,  the  most  frivolous  and 
fanciful  distinctions  have  been  sufficient  to  kindle  their  un- 
jfriendly  passions  and  excite  their  most  violent  conflicts.  But 
y  the  most  common  and  durable  source  of  factions  has  been  the 
S  various  and  unequal  distribution  of  property.  Those  who  hold 
and  those  who  are  without  property  have  ever  formed  distinct 
interests  in  society.  Those  who  are  creditors,  and  those  who 
are  debtors,  fall  under  a  Hke  discrimination.  A  landed  interest, 
a  manufacturing  interest,  a  mercantile  interest,  a  moneyed 
interest,  with  many  lesser  interests,  grow  up  of  necessity  in 
civilized  nations,  and  divide  them  into  different  classes,  actuated 
,  by  different  sentiments  and  views.  The  regulation  of  these 
I  various  and  interfering  interests  forms  the  principal  task  of 
■  modern  legislation,  and  involves  the  spirit  of  party  and  faction 
in  the  necessary  and  ordinary  operations  of  the  government. 

No  man  is  allowed  to  be  a  judge  in  his  own  cause,  because 
his  interest  would  certainly  bias  his  judgment,  and,  not  im- 
probably, corrupt  his  integrity.     With  equal,  nay,  with  greater 


\ 


THE  FEDERALIST  65 

reason,  a  body  of  men  are  unfit  to  be  both  judges  and  parties 
at  the  same  time;  yet  what  are  many  of  the  most  important 
acts  of  legislation  but  so  many  judicial  determinations,  not 
indeed  concerning  the  rights  of  single  persons,  but  concerning 
the  rights  of  large  bodies  of  citizens  ?  And  what  are  the  different 
classes  of  legislators  but  advocates  and  parties  to  the  causes 
which  they  determine  ?  Is  a  law  proposed  concerning  private 
debts  ?  It  is  a  question  to  which  the  creditors  are  parties  on 
one  side  and  the  debtors  on  the  other.  Justice  ought  to  hold 
the  balance  between  them.  Yet  the  parties  are,  and  must  be, 
themselves  the  judges;  and  the  most  numerous  party,  or,  in 
other  words,  the  most  powerful  faction  must  be  expected  to 
prevail.  Shall  domestic  manufactures  be  encouraged,  and  in 
what  degree,  by  restrictions  on  foreign  manufactures  ?  are 
questions  which  would  be  differently  decided  by  the  landed  and 
the  manufacturing  classes,  and  probably  by  neither  with  a  sole 
regard  to  justice  and  the  pubHc  good.  The  apportionment  of 
taxes  on  the  various  descriptions  of  property  is  an  act  which 
seems  to  require  the  most  exact  impartiality;  yet  there  is, 
perhaps,  no  legislative  act  in  which  greater  opportunity  and 
temptation  are  given  to  a  predominant  party  to  trample  on  the 
rules  of  justice.  Every  shilling  with  which  they  overburden 
the  inferior  number  is  a  shilling  saved  to  their  own  pockets. 

It  is  in  vain  to  say  that  enUghtened  statesmen  will  be  able  to 
adjust  these  clashing  interests,  and  render  them  all  subservient 
to  the  public  good.  Enlightened  statesmen  will  not  always 
be  at  the  helm';  nor,  in  many  cases,  can  such  an  adjustment 
be  made  at  all  without  taking  into  view  indirect  and  remote 
considerations,  which  will  rarely  prevail  over  the  immediate 
interest  which  one  party  may  find  in  disregarding  the  rights  of 
another  or  the  good  of  the  whole. 

The  inference  to  which  we  are  brought  is  that  the  causes  of 
faction  cannot  be  removed,  and  that  relief  is  only  to  be  sought 
in  the  means  of  controlling  its  efects. 

If  a  faction  consists  of  less  than  a  majority,  relief  is  supplied 
by  the  repubhcan  principle  which  enables  the  majority  to 


66  THE  FEDERALIST 

defeat  its  sinister  views  by  regular  vote.  It  may  clog  the 
administration,  it  may  convulse  the  society,  but  it  will  be 
unable  to  execute  and  mask  its  violence  under  the  forms  of  the 
Constitution.  When  a  majority  is  included  in  a  faction,  the 
form  of  popular  government,  on  the  other  hand,  enables  it  to 
sacrifice  to  its  ruling  passion  or  interest  both  the  public  good 
and  the  rights  of  other  citizens.  To  secure  the  public  good 
and  private  rights  against  the  danger  of  such  a  faction,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  preserve  the  spirit  and  the  form  of  popular 
government,  is  then  the  great  object  to  which  our  inquiries  are 
directed.  Let  me  add  that  it  is  the  great  desideratum  by 
which  alone  this  form  of  government  can  be  rescued  from  the 
opprobrium  under  which  it  has  so  long  labored,  and  be  recom- 
mended to  the  esteem  and  adoption  of  mankind. 

By  what  means  is  this  object  attainable  ?  Evidently  by  one 
of  two  only.  Either  the  existence  of  the  same  passion  or  interest 
in  a  majority  at  the  same  time  must  be  prevented,  or  the  ma- 
jority, having  such  coexistent  passion  or  interest,  must  be 
rendered,  by  their  number  and  local  situation,  unable  to  concert 
and  carry  into  effect  schemes  of  oppression.  If  the  impulse 
and  the  opportunity  be  suffered  to  coincide,  we  well  know  that 
neither  moral  nor  religious  motives  can  be  reUed  on  as  an 
adequate  control.  They  are  not  found  to  be  such  on  the  injus- 
tice and  violence  of  individuals,  and  lose  their  eflScacy  in  pro- 
portion to  the  number  combined  together,  that  is,  in  proportion 
as  their  eflicacy  becomes  needful. 

From  this  view  of  the  subject  it  may  be  concluded  that  a 
pure  democracy,  by  which  I  mean  a  society  consisting  of  a 
small  number  of  citizens,  who  assemble  and  administer  the 
government  in  person,  can  admit  of  no  cure  for  the  mischiefs 
of  faction.  A  common  passion  or  interest  will,  in  almost  every 
case,  be  felt  by  a  majority  of  the  whole;  a  communication  and 
concert  result  from  the  form  of  government  itself;  and  there 
is  nothing  to  check  the  inducements  to  sacrifice  the  weaker 
party  or  an  obnoxious  individual.  Hence  it  is  that  such  democ- 
racies have  ever  been  spectacles  of  turbulence  and  contention, 


THE  FEDERALIST  67 

have  ever  been  found  incompatible  with  personal  security  or 
the  rights  of  property,  and  have  in  general  been  as  short  in  their 
lives  as  they  have  been  violent  in  their  deaths.  Theoretic 
poUticians,  who  have  patronized  this  species  of  government, 
have  erroneously  supposed  that  by  reducing  mankind  to  a 
perfect  equaUty  in  their  political  rights,  they  would,  at  the  same 
time,  be  perfectly  equalized  and  assimilated  in  their  possessions, 
their  opinions,  and  their  passions. 

A  repubUc,  by  which  I  mean  a  government  in  which  the 
scheme  of  representation  takes  place,  opens  a  different  prospect, 
and  promises  the  cure  for  which  we  are  seeking.  Let  us  examine 
the  points  in  which  it  varies  from  pure  democracy,  and  we  shall 
comprehend  both  the  nature  of  the  cure  and  the  efficacy  which 
it  must  derive  from  the  union. 

The  two  great  points  of  difference  between  a  democracy  and 
a  repubHc  are:  first,  the  delegation  of  the  government,  in  the 
latter,  to  a  small  number  of  citizens  elected  by  the  rest;  secondly, 
the  greater  number  of  citizens,  and  greater  sphere  of  country, 
over  which  the  latter  may  be  extended. 

The  effect  of  the  first  difference  is,  on  the  one  hand,  to  refine 
and  enlarge  the  pubhc  views  by  passing  them  through  the 
medium  of  a  chosen  body  of  citizens,  whose  wisdom  may  best 
discern  the  true  interest  of  their  country,  and  whose  patriotism 
and  love  of  justice  will  be  least  Ukely  to  sacrifice  it  to  temporary 
or  partial  considerations.  Under  such  a  regulation,  it  may  well 
happen  that  the  public  voice,  pronounced  by  the  representatives 
of  the  people,  will  be  more  consonant  to  the  public  good  than 
if  pronounced  by  the  people  themselves,  convened  for  the  pur- 
pose. On  the  other  hand,  the  effect  may  be  inverted.  Men  of 
factious  tempers,  of  local  prejudices,  or  of  sinister  designs,  may, 
by  intrigue,  by  corruption,  or  by  other  means,  first  obtain  the 
suffrages,  and  then  betray  the  interests,  of  the  people.  The 
question  resulting  is,  whether  small  or  extensive  repubHcs  are 
most  favorable  to  the  election  of  proper  guardians  of  the  public 
weal;  and  it  is  clearly  decided  in  favor  of  the  latter  by  two 
obvious  considerations. 


68  THE  FEDERALIST 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that,  however  small 
the  republic  may  be,  the  representatives  must  be  raised  to  a 
certain  number,  in  order  to  guard  against  the  cabals  of  a  few; 
and  that,  however  large  it  may  be,  they  must  be  limited  to  a 
certain  number,  in  order  to  guard  against  the  confusion  of  a 
multitude.  Hence  the  number  of  representatives  in  the  two 
cases  not  being  in  proportion  to  that  of  the  constituents,  and 
being  proportionally  greatest  in  the  small  republic,  it  follows 
that,  if  the  proportion  of  fit  characters  be  not  less  in  the  large 
than  in  the  small  republic,  the  former  will  present  a  greater 
option,  and  consequently  a  greater  probability  of  a  fit  choice. 

In  the  next  place,  as  each  representative  will  be  chosen  by 
a  greater  number  of  citizens  in  the  large  than  in  'the  smaU 
republic,  it  will  be  more  difficult  for  unworthy  candidates  to 
practice  with  success  the  vicious  arts  by  which  elections  are  too 
often  carried;  and  the  suffrages  of  the  people  being  more  free, 
will  be  more  likely  to  center  on  men  who  possess  the  most  attrac- 
tive merit  and  the  most  diffusive  and  established  characters. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  in  this,  as  in  most  other  cases,  there 
is  a  mean,  on  both  sides  of  which  inconveniences  will  be  found 
to  lie.  By  enlarging  too  much  the  number  of  electors,  you 
render  the  representative  too  little  acquainted  with  all  their 
local  circumstances  and  lesser  interests;  as  by  reducing  it  too 
much,  you  render  him  unduly  attached  to  these,  and  too  little 
fit  to  comprehend  and  pursue  great  and  national  objects.  The 
federal  Constitution  forms  a  happy  combination  in  this  respect; 
the  great  and  aggregate  interests  being  referred  to  the  national, 
the  local  and  particular  to  the  state  legislatures. 

The  other  point  of  difference  is  the  greater  number  of  citizens 
and  extent  of  territory  which  may  be  brought  within  the  compass 
of  republican  than  of  democratic  government;  and  it  is  this 
circumstance  principally  which  renders  factious  combinations 
less  to  be  dreaded  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter.  The  smaller 
the  society,  the  fewer  probably  will  be  the  distinct  parties  and 
interests  composing  it;  the  fewer  the  distinct  parties  and  inter- 
ests, the  more  frequently  will  a  majority  be  found  of  the  same 


THE  FEDERALIST  69 

party;  and  the  smaller  the  number  of  individuals  composing 
a  majority,  and  the  smaller  the  compass  within  which  they  are 
placed,  the  more  easily  will  they  concert  and  execute  their  plans 
of  oppression.  Extend  the  sphere,  and  you  take  in  a  greater 
variety  of  parties  and  interests;  you  make  it  less  probable  that 
a  majority  of  the  whole  will  have  a  common  motive  to  invade 
the  rights  of  other  citizens;  or  if  such  a  common  motive  exists, 
it  will  be  more  difficult  for  all  who  feel  it  to  discover  their  own 
strength,  and  to  act  in  unison  with  each  other.  Besides  other 
impediments,  it  may  be  remarked  that,  where  there  is  a  con- 
sciousness of  unjust  or  dishonorable  purposes,  communication 
is  always  checked  by  distrust  in  proportion  to  the  number  whose 
concurrence  is  necessary. 

Hence,  it  clearly  appears,  that  the  same  advantage  which  a 
repubUc  has  over  a  democracy,  in  controlling  the  effects  of 
faction,  is  enjoyed  by  a  large  over  a  small  republic, —  is  enjoyed 
by  the  Union  over  the  states  composing  it.  Does  this  advan- 
tage consist  in  the  substitution  of  representatives  whose  en- 
Hghtened  views  and  virtuous  sentiments  render  them  superior 
to  local  prejudices  and  to  schemes  of  injustice  ?  It  will  not  be 
denied  that  the  representation  of  the  Union  will  be  most  likely 
to  possess  these  requisite  endowments.  Does  it  consist  in  the 
greater  security  afforded  by  a  greater  variety  of  parties,  against 
the  event  of  any  one  party  being  able  to  outnumber  and  oppress 
the  rest  ?  In  an  equal  degree  does  the  increased  variety  of 
parties  comprised  within  the  Union  increase  this  security  ? 
Does  it,  in  fine,  consist  in  the  greater  obstacles  opposed  to  the 
concert  and  accomplishment  of  the  secret  wishes  of  an  unjust 
and  interested  majority  ?  Here,  again,  the  extent  of  the  Union 
jives  it  the  most  palpable  advantage. 

The  influence  of  factious  leaders  may  kindle  a  flame  within 
their  particular  states,  but  will  be  unable  to  spread  a  general 
conflagration  through  the  other  states.  A  reHgious  sect  may 
degenerate  into  a  political  faction  in  a  part  of  the  Confederacy; 
but  the  variety  of  sects  dispersed  over  the  entire  face  of  it  must 
secure  the  national  coimcils  against  any  danger  from  that  source. 


70  THE  FEDERALIST 

A  rage  for  paper  money,  for  an  abolition  of  debts,  for  an  equal 
division  of  property,  or  for  any  other  improper  or  wicked  pro^ 
ject,  will  be  less  apt  to  pervade  the  whole  body  of  the  Union  than 
a  particular  member  of  it;  in  the  same  proportion  as  such  a 
malady  is  more  Hkely  to  taint  a  particular  county  or  district,  than 
an  entire  state. 

In  the  extent  and  proper  structiure  of  the  Union,  therefore, 
we  behold  a  repubhcan  remedy  for  the  diseases  most  incident 
to  republican  government.  And  according  to  the  degree  of 
pleasure  and  pride  we  feel  in  being  republicans,  ought  to  be  our 
zeal  in  cherishing  the  spirit  and  supporting  the  character  of 
Federalists.  Publius. 

(b)  TO  DEVELOP  AND  PROTECT  COMMERCE 

The  Utility  of  the  Union  in  respect  to  Commerce 
AND  A  Navy  » 

The  importance  of  the  Union,  in  a  commercial  Ught,  is  one  of 
those  points  about  which  there  is  least  room  to  entertain  a  differ- 
ence of  opinion,  and  which  has,  in  fact,  commanded  the  most 
general  assent  of  men  who  have  any  acquaintance  with  the 
subject.  This  applies  as  well  to  our  intercourse  with  foreign 
countries  as  with  each  other. 

There  are  appearances  to  authorize  a  supposition  that  the 
adventurous  spirit,  which  distinguishes  the  commercial  char- 
acter of  America,  has  already  excited  uneasy  sensations  in  several 
of  the  maritime  powers  of  Europe.  They  seem  to  be  apprehen- 
sive of  our  too  great  interference  in  that  carrying  trade  which 
is  the  support  of  their  navigation  and  the  foundation  of  their 
naval  strength.  Those  of  them  which  have  colonies  in  America 
look  forward  to  what  this  country  is  capable  of  becoming,  with 
painful  soHcitude.  They  foresee  the  dangers  that  may  threaten 
their  American  dominions  from  the  neighborhood  of  states 
which  have  all  the  dispositions,  and  would  possess  all  the  means, 
requisite  to  the  creation  of  a  powerful  marine.     Impressions  of 

«  No.  XI.    Hamilton.    Independent  Journal,  November  24,  1787. 


THE  FEDERALIST  71 

this  kind  will  naturally  indicate  the  policy  of  fostering  divisions 
among  us,  and  of  depriving  us,  as  far  as  possible,  of  an  active 
COMMERCE  in  our  own  bottoms.  This  would  answer  the  three- 
fold purpose  of  preventing  our  interference  in  their  navigation, 
of  monopolizing  the  profits  of  our  trade,  and  of  clipping  the 
wings  by  which  we  might  soar  to  a  dangerous  greatness.  Did 
not  prudence  forbid  the  detail,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  trace, 
by  facts,  the  workings  of  this  policy  to  the  cabinets  of  ministers. 
If  we  continue  united,  we  may  counteract  a  policy  so  un- 
friendly to  our  prosperity  in  a  variety  of  ways.  By  prohibitory 
regulations,  extending,  at  the  same  time,  throughout  the  states, 
we  may  oblige  foreign  countries  to  bid  against  each  other  for  the 
privileges  of  our  markets.  This  assertion  will  not  appear 
chimerical  to  those  who  are  able  to  appreciate  the  importance  to 
any  manufacturing  nation  of  the  markets  of  three  milHons  of 
people  —  increasing  in  rapid  progression,  for  the  most  part 
exclusively  addicted  to  agriculture,  and  likely  from  local  cir- 
cumstances to  remain  in  this  disposition;  and  the  immense 
difference  there  would  be  to  the  trade  and  navigation  of  such  a 
nation,  between  a  direct  communication  in  its  own  ships,  and 
an  indirect  conveyance  of  its  products  and  returns,  to  and  from 
America,  in  the  ships  of  another  country.  Suppose,  for  instance, 
we  had  a  government  in  America,  capable  of  excluding  Great 
Britain  (with  whom  we  have  at  present  no  treaty  of  commerce) 
from  all  our  ports;  what  would  be  the  probable  operation  of 
this  step  upon  her  politics  ?  Would  it  not  enable  us  to  negotiate, 
with  the  fairest  prospect  of  success,  for  commercial  privileges 
of  the  most  valuable  and  extensive  kind,  in  the  dominions  of 
that  kingdom  ?  When  these  questions  have  been  asked,  upon 
other  occasions,  they  have  received  a  plausible,  but  not  a  solid 
or  satisfactory  answer.  It  has  been  said  that  prohibitions  on 
our  part  would  produce  no  change  in  the  system  of  Britain, 
because  she  could  prosecute  her  trade  with  us  through  the 
medium  of  the  Dutch,  who  would  be  her  immediate  customers 
and  paymasters  for  those  articles  which  were  wanted  for  the 
supply  of  our  markets.      But  would  not  her  navigation  be 


72  THE  FEDERALIST 

materially  injured  by  the  loss  of  the  important  advantage  of 
being  her  own  carrier  in  that  trade  ?  Would  not  the  principal 
part  of  its  profits  be  intercepted  by  the  Dutch,  as  a  compensa- 
tion for  their  agency  and  risk  ?  Would  not  the  mere  circum- 
stance of  freight  occasion  a  considerable  deduction  ?  Would 
not  so  circuitous  an  intercourse  facilitate  the  competitions  of 
other  nations,  by  enhancing  the  price  of  British  commodities 
in  our  markets,  and  by  transferring  to  other  hands  the  man- 
agement of  this  interesting  branch  of  the  British  commerce  ? 

A  mature  consideration  of  the  objects  suggested  by  these  ques- 
tions will  justify  a  belief  that  the  real  disadvantages  to  Great 
Britain  from  such  a  state  of  things,  conspiring  with  the  prepos- 
sessions of  a  great  part  of  the  nation  in  favor  of  the  American 
trade,  and  with  the  importunities  of  the  West  India  Islands, 
would  produce  a  relaxation  in  her  present  system,  and  would  let 
us  into  the  enjoyment  of  privileges  in  the  markets  of  those  islands 
and  elsewhere,  from  which  our  trade  would  derive  the  most  sub- 
stantial benefits.  Such  a  point  gained  from  the  British  govern- 
ment, and  which  could  not  be  expected  without  an  equivalent 
in  exemptions  and  immunities  in  our  markets,  would  be  hkely 
to  have  a  correspondent  effect  on  the  conduct  of  other  nations, 
who  would  not  be  incUned  to  see  themselves  altogether  sup- 
planted in  our  trade. 

A  further  resource  for  influencing  the  conduct  of  European 
nations  towards  us  in  this  respect  would  arise  from  the  establish- 
ment of  a  federal  navy.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  Union  under  an  efficient  government  would 
put  it  in  our  power,  at  a  period  not  very  distant,  to  create  a 
navy  which,  if  it  could  not  vie  with  those  of  the  great  maritime 
powers,  would  at  least  be  of  respectable  weight  if  thrown  into 
the  scale  of  either  of  two  contending  parties.  This  would  be 
more  particularly  the  case  in  relation  to  operations  in  the  West 
Indies.  A  few  ships  of  the  line,  sent  opportunely  to  the  rein- 
forcement of  either  side,  would  often  be  sufficient  to  decide  the 
fate  of  a  campaign,  on  the  event  of  which  interests  of  the  greatest 
magnitude  were  suspended.     Our  position  is,  in  this  respect, 


THE  FEDERALIST  73 

a  very  commanding  one.  And  if  to  this  consideration  we  add 
that  of  the  usefulness  of  supplies  from  this  country,  in  the  pro- 
secution of  miUtary  operations  in  the  West  Indies,  it  will  readily 
be  perceived  that  a  situation  so  favorable  would  enable  us  to 
bargain  with  great  advantage  for  commercial  privileges.  A 
price  would  be  set  not  only  upon  our  friendship  but  upon  our 
neutrality.  By  a  steady  adherence  to  the  Union,  we  may  hope, 
ere  long,  to  become  the  arbiter  of  Europe  in  America,  and  to  be 
able  to  incline  the  balance  of  European  competitions  in  this 
part  of  .the  world  as  our  interest  may  dictate. 

But  in  the  reverse  of  this  eligible  situation,  we  shall  discover 
that  the  rivalships  of  the  parts  would  make  them  checks  upon 
each  other,  and  would  frustrate  all  the  tempting  advantages 
which  nature  has  kindly  placed  within  our  reach.  In  a  state 
so  insignificant  our  commerce  would  be  a  prey  to  the  wanton 
intermeddlings  of  all  nations  at  war  with  each  other;  who, 
having  nothing  to  fear  from  us,  would  with  little  scruple  or 
remorse  supply  their  wants  by  depredations  on  our  property  as 
often  as  it  fell  in  their  way.  The  rights  of  neutrality  will  only 
be  respected  when  they  are  defended  by  an  adequate  power. 
A  nation,  despicable  by  its  weakness,  forfeits  even  the  privilege 
of  being  neutral. 

Under  a  vigorous  national  government,  the  natural  strength 
and  resources  of  the  country,  directed  to  a  common  interest, 
would  baffle  all  the  combinations  of  European  jealousy  to 
restrain  our  growth.  This  situation  would  even  take  away  the 
motive  to  such  combinations,  by  inducing  an  impracticability 
of  success.  An  active  commerce,  an  extensive  navigation,  a 
flourishing  marine  would  then  be  the  inevitable  offspring  of 
moral  and  physical  necessity.  We  might  defy  the  little  arts  of 
little  pohticans  to  control  or  vary  the  irresistible  and  unchange- 
able course  of  nature. 

But  in  a  state  of  disunion,  these  combinations  might  exist  and 
might  operate  with  success.  It  would  be  in  the  power  of  the 
maritime  nations,  availing  themselves  of  our  universal  impo- 
tence, to  prescribe  the  conditions  of  our  poUtical  existence;  and 


74  THE  FEDERALIST 

as  they  have  a  common  interest  in  being  our  carriers,  and  still 
more  in  preventing  our  being  theirs,  they  would  in  all  proba- 
bility combine  to  embarrass  our  navigation  in  such  a  manner 
as  would  in  effect  destroy  it,  and  confine  us  to  a  passive  com- 
merce. We  should  thus  be  compelled  to  content  ourselves 
with  the  first  price  of  our  commodities,  and  to  see  the  profits 
of  our  trade  snatched  from  us  to  enrich  our  enemies  and  perse- 
cutors. That  unequaled  spirit  of  enterprise,  which  signalizes 
the  genius  of  the  American  merchants  and  navigators,  and 
which  is  in  itself  an  inexhaustible  mine  of  national  wealth, 
would  be  stifled  and  lost,  and  poverty  and  disgrace  would 
overspread  a  country  which,  with  wisdom,  might  make  herself 
the  admiration  and  envy  of  the  world. 

There  are  rights  of  great  moment  to  the  trade  of  America 
which  are  rights  of  the  Union  —  I  allude  to  the  fisheries,  to  the 
navigation  of  the  Lakes,  and  to  that  of  the  Mississippi.  The 
dissolution  of  the  Confederacy  would  give  room  for  delicate 
questions  concerning  the  future  existence  of  these  rights,  which 
the  interest  of  more  powerful  partners  would  hardly  fail  to  solve 
to  our  disadvantage.  The  disposition  of  Spain  with  regard  to 
the  Mississippi  needs  no  comment.  France  and  Britain  are 
concerned  with  us  in  the  fisheries,  and  view  them  as  of  the 
utmost  moment  to  their  navigation.  They,  of  course,  would 
hardly  remain  long  indifferent  to  that  decided  mastery,  of  which 
experience  has  shown  us  to  be  possessed  in  this  valuable  branch 
of  traffic,  and  by  which  we  are  able  to  undersell  those  nations  in 
their  own  markets.  What  more  natural  than  that  they  should  be 
disposed  to  exclude  from  the  lists  such  dangerous  competitors  ? 

This  branch  of  trade  ought  not  to  be  considered  as  a  partial 
benefit.  All  the  navigating  states  may,  in  different  degrees, 
advantageously  participate  in  it,  and  under  circumstances  of 
a  greater  extension  of  mercantile  capital,  would  not  be  unlikely 
to  do  it.  As  a  nursery  of  seamen,  it  now  is,  or,  when  time  shall 
have  more  nearly  assimilated  the  principles  of  navigation  in  the 
several  states,  will  become,  an  universal  resource.  To  the 
establishment  of  a  navy,  it  must  be  indispensable. 


THE  FEDERALIST  75 

To  this  great  national  object,  a  navy,  union  will  contribute 
in  various  ways.  Every  institution  will  grow  and  flourish  in 
proportion  to  the  quantity  and  extent  of  the  means  concentered 
towards  its  formation  and  support.  A  navy  of  the  United 
States,  as  it  would  embrace  the  resources  of  all,  is  an  object 
far  less  remote  than  a  navy  of  any  single  state  or  partial  con- 
federacy, which  would  only  embrace  the  resources  of  a  part. 
It  happens,  indeed,  that  dijGferent  portions  cf  confederated 
America  possess  each  some  peculiar  advantage  for  this  essential 
establishment.  The  more  Southern  States  furnish  in  greater 
abundance  certain  kinds  of  naval  stores  —  tar,  pitch,  and  tur- 
pentine. Their  wood  for  the  construction  of  ships  is  also  of  a 
more  solid  and  lasting  texture.  The  difference  in  the  duration 
of  the  ships  of  which  the  navy  might  be  composed,  if  chiefly 
constructed  of  Southern  wood,  would  be  of  signal  importance, 
either  in  the  view  of  naval  strength  or  of  national  economy. 
Some  of  the  Southern  and  of  the  Middle  States  yield  a  greater 
plenty  of  iron,  and  of  better  quality.  Seamen  must  chiefly  be 
drawn  from  the  Northern  hive.  The  necessity  of  naval  pro- 
tection to  external  or  maritime  commerce,  and  the  conducive- 
ness  of  that  species  of  commerce  to  the  prosperity  of  a  navy, 
are  points  too  manifest  to  require  a  particular  elucidation. 
They,  by  a  kind  of  reaction  mutually  beneficial,  promote  each 
other. 

An  unrestrained  intercourse  between  the  states  themselves 
will  advance  the  trade  of  each  by  an  interchange  of  their  respec- 
tive productions,  not  only  for  the  supply  of  reciprocal  wants  at 
home,  but  for  exportation  to  foreign  markets.  The  veins  of 
commerce  in  every  part  will  be  replenished,  and  will  acquire 
additional  motion  and  vigor  from  a  free  circulation  of  the 
commodities  of  every  part.  Commercial  enterprise  will  have 
much  greater  scope,  from  the  diversity  in  the  productions  of 
different  states.  When  the  staple  of  one  fails  from  a  bad  har- 
vest or  unproductive  crop,  it  can  call  to  its  aid  the  staple  of 
another.  The  variety,  not  less  than  the  value,  of  products  for 
exportation  contributes  to  the  activity  of  foreign  commerce. 


76  THE  FEDERALIST 

It  can  be  conducted  upon  much  better  terms  with  a  large 
number  of  materials  of  a  given  value  than  with  a  small  number 
of  materials  of  the  same  value,  arising  from  the  competitions 
of  trade  and  from  the  fluctuations  of  markets.  Particular  arti- 
cles may  be  in  great  demand  at  certain  periods,  and  unsalable 
at  others;  but  if  there  be  a  variety  of  articles,  it  can  scarcely 
happen  that  they  should  all  be  at  one  time  in  the  latter  predica- 
ment, and  on  this  account  the  operations  of  the  merchant  would 
be  less  liable  to  any  considerable  obstruction  or  stagnation. 
The  speculative  trader  will  at  once  perceive  the  force  of  these 
observations,  and  will  acknowledge  that  the  aggregate  balance 
of  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  would  bid  fair  to  be  much 
more  favorable  than  that  of  the  thirteen  states  without  union 
or  with  partial  unions. 

It  may  perhaps  be  replied  to  this,  that  whether  the  states 
are  united  or  disunited,  there  would  still  be  an  intimate  inter- 
course between  them  which  would  answer  the  same  ends;  but 
this  intercourse  would  be  fettered,  interrupted,  and  narrowed 
by  a  multiplicity  of  causes  which  in  the  course  of  these  papers 
have  been  amply  detailed.  An  unity  of  commercial,  as  well  as 
political,  interests  can  only  result  from  an  unity  of  government. 

There  are  other  points  of  view  in  which  this  subject  might  be 
placed,  of  a  striking  and  animating  kind;  but  they  would  lead 
us  too  far  into  the  regions  of  futurity,  and  would  involve  topics 
not  proper  for  a  newspaper  discussion.  I  shall  briefly  observe 
that  our  situation  invites  and  our  interest  prompts  us  to  aim 
at  an  ascendant  in  the  system  of  American  affairs.  The  world 
may  poHtically,  as  well  as  geographically,  be  divided  into  four 
parts,  each  having  a  distinct  set  of  interests.  Unhappily  for 
the  other  three,  Europe,  by  her  arms  and  by  her  negotiations, 
by  force  and  by  fraud,  has,  in  different  degrees,  extended  her 
dominion  over  them  all.  Africa,  Asia,  and  America  have 
successively  felt  her  domination.  The  superiority  she  has  long 
maintained  has  tempted  her  to  plume  herself  as  the  Mistress 
of  the  World,  and  to  consider  the  rest  of  mankind  as  created  for 
her  benefit.     Men  admired  as  profound  philosophers  have,  in 


THE  FEDERALIST  77 

direct  terms,  attributed  to  her  inhabitants  a  physical  superiority, 
and  have  gravely  asserted  that  all  animals,  and  with  them  the 
human  species,  degenerate  in  America  —  that  even  dogs  cease 
to  bark  after  having  breathed  awhile  in  our  atmosphere.^  Facts 
have  too  long  supported  these  arrogant  pretensions  of  the  Euro- 
pean. It  belongs  to  us  to  vindicate  the  honor  of  the  human 
race,  and  to  teach  that  assuming  brother,  moderation.  Union 
will  enable  us  to  do  it.  Disunion  will  add  another  victim  to  his 
triumphs.  Let  Americans  disdain  to  be  the  instruments  of 
European  greatness!  Let  the  thirteen  states,  bound  together 
in  a  strict  and  indissoluble  Union,  concur  in  erecting  one  great 
American  system,  superior  to  the  control  of  all  transatlantic 
force  or  influence,  and  able"  to  dictate  the  terms  of  the  connection 
between  the  Old  and  the  New  World!  Publius. 

(c)   TO  PROVIDE  AN  ADEQUATE  REVENUE 
The  Utility  of  the  Union  in  respect  to  Revenue  2 

The  effects  of  union,  upon  the  commercial  prosperity  of  the 
states,  have  been  sufficiently  deHneated.  Its  tendency  to  pro- 
mote the  interests  of  revenue  will  be  the  subject  of  our  present 
inquiry. 

The  prosperity  of  commerce  is  now  perceived  and  acknowl- 
edged by  all  enlightened  statesmen  to  be  the  most  useful  as 
well  as  the  most  productive  source  of  national  wealth,  and  has 
accordingly  become  a  primary  object  of  their  political  cares. 
By  multiplying  the  means  of  gratification,  by  promoting  the 
introduction  and  circulation  of  the  precious  metals,  those  darUng 
objects  of  human  avarice  and  enterprise,  it  serves  to  vivify  and 
invigorate  all  the  channels  of  industry,  and  to  make  them  flow 
with  greater  activity  and  copiousness.  The  assiduous  merchant, 
the  laborious  husbandman,  the  active  mechanic,  and  the  indus- 
trious manufacturer  —  all  orders  of  men  look  forward  with 
eager  expectation  and  growing  alacrity  to  this  pleasing  reward 

*  Recherches  philosophiques  sur  les  Atniricains. 

«  No.  XII.     Hamilton.     New  York  Packet,  November  27,  1787. 


78  THE  FEDERALIST 

of  their  toils.  The  often-agitated  question  between  agriculture 
and  commerce  has  from  indubitable  experience  received  a 
decision  which  has  silenced  the  rivalships  that  once  subsisted 
between  them,  and  has  proved,  to  the  entire  satisfaction  of  their 
friends,  that  their  interests  are  intimately  blended  and  inter- 
woven. It  has  been  found,  in  various  countries,  that  in  propor- 
tion as  commerce  has  flourished  land  has  risen  in  value.  And 
how  could  it  have  happened  otherwise  ?  Could  that  which 
procures  a  freer  vent  for  the  products  of  the  earth  —  which  fur- 
nishes new  incitements  to  the  cultivators  of  land  —  which  is 
the  most  powerful  instrument  in  increasing  the  quantity  of 
money  in  a  state  —  could  that,  in  fine,  which  is  the  faithful 
handmaid  of  labor  and  industry,  in  every  shape,  fail  to  aug- 
ment the  value  of  that  article,  which  is  the  prolific  parent  of  far 
the  greatest  part  of  the  objects  upon  which  they  are  exerted  ? 
It  is  astonishing  that  so  simple  a  truth  should  ever  have  had  an 
adversary;  and  it  is  one,  among  a  multitude  of  proofs,  how  apt 
a  spirit  of  ill-informed  jealousy  or  of  too  great  abstraction  and 
refinement  is  to  lead  men  astray  from  the  plainest  paths  of 
reason  and  conviction. 

The  ability  of  a  country  to  pay  taxes  must  always  be  pro- 
portioned, in  a  great  degree,  to  the  quantity  of  money  in  circu- 
lation and  to  the  celerity  with  which  it  circulates.  Commerce, 
contributing  to  both  these  objects,  must  of  necessity  render  the 
payment  of  taxes  easier,  and  faciHtate  the  requisite  supplies 
to  the  treasury.  The  hereditary  dominions  of  the  Emperor  of 
Germany  contain  a  great  extent  of  fertile,  cultivated  and  popu- 
lous territory,  a  large  proportion  of  which  is  situated  in  mild 
and  luxuriant  chmates.  In  some  parts  of  this  territory  are  to 
be  found  the  best  gold  and  silver  mines  in  Europe.  And  yet, 
from  the  want  of  the  fostering  influence  of  commerce,  that 
monarch  can  boast  but  slender  revenues.  He  has  several  times 
been  compelled  to  owe  obligations  to  the  pecimiary  succors 
of  other  nations  for  the  preservation  of  his  essential  interests, 
and  is  imable,  upon  the  strength  of  his  own  resources,  to  sustain 
a  long  or  continued  war. 


THE  FEDERALIST  79 

But  it  is  not  in  this  aspect  of  the  subject  alone  that  union 
will  be  seen  to  conduce  to  the  purposes  of  revenue.  There  are 
other  points  of  view  in  which  its  influence  will  appear  more 
immediate  and  decisive.  It  is  evident  from  the  state  of  the 
country,  from  the  habits  of  the  people,  from  the  experience  we 
have  had  on  the  point  itself,  that  it  is  impracticable  to  raise 
any  very  considerable  sums  by  direct  taxation.  Tax  laws  have 
in  vain  been  multiplied;  new  methods  to  enforce  the  collection 
have  in  vain  been  tried;  the  public  expectation  has  been 
uniformly  disappointed,  and  the  treasuries  of  the  states  have 
remained  empty.  The  popular  system  of  administration 
inherent  in  the  nature  of  popular  government,  coinciding  with 
the  real  scarcity  of  money  incident  to  a  languid  and  mutilated 
state  of  trade,  has  hitherto  defeated  every  experiment  for 
extensive  collections,  and  has  at  length  taught  the  different 
legislatures  the  folly  of  attempting  them. 

No  person  acquainted  with  what  happens  in  other  countries 
will  be  surprised  at  this  circumstance.  In  so  opulent  a  nation 
as  that  of  Britain,  where  direct  taxes  from  superior  wealth 
must  be  much  more  tolerable,  and,  from  the  vigor  of  the 
government,  much  more  practicable  than  in  America,  far  the 
greatest  part  of  the  national  revenue  is  derived  from  taxes  of 
the  indirect  kind,  from  imposts,  and  from  excises.  Duties  on 
imported  articles  form  a  large  branch  of  this  latter  description. 

In  America,  it  is  evident  that  we  must  a  long  time  depend 
for  the  means  of  revenue  chiefly  on  such  duties.  In  most  parts 
of  it,  excises  must  be  confined  within  a  narrow  compass.  The 
genius  of  the  people  will  ill  brook  the  inquisitive  and  peremptory 
spirit  of  excise  laws.  The  pockets  of  the  farmers,  on  the  other 
hand,  will  reluctantly  yield  but  scanty  supplies,  in  the  unwel- 
come shape  of  impositions  on  their  houses  and  lands;  and 
personal  property  is  too  precarious  and  invisible  a  fund  to  be 
laid  hold  of  in  any  other  way  than  by  the  imperceptible  agency 
of  taxes  on  consimaption. 

If  these  remarks  have  any  foundation,  that  state  of  things 
which  will  best  enable  us  to  improve  and  extend  so  valuable  a 


8o  THE  FEDERALIST 

resource  must  be  the  best  adapted  to  our  political  welfare. 
And  it  cannot  admit  of  a  serious  doubt  that  this  state  of  things 
must  rest  on  the  basis  of  a  general  union.  As  far  as  this  would 
be  conducive  to  the  interests  of  commerce,  so  far  it  must  tend 
to  the  extension  of  the  revenue  to  be  drawn  from  that  source. 
As  far  as  it  would  contribute  to  rendering  regulations  for 
the  collection  of  the  duties  more  simple  and  efficacious,  so 
far  it  must  serve  to  answer  the  purposes  of  making  the  same 
rate  of  duties  more  productive,  and  of  putting  it  into  the 
power  of  the  government  to  increase  the  rate  without  preju- 
dice to  trade. 

The  relative  situation  of  these  states;  the  number  of  rivers 
with  which  they  are  intersected,  and  of  bays  that  wash  their 
shores;  the  facility  of  communication  in  every  direction;  the 
affinity  of  language  and  manners;  the  familiar  habits  of  inter- 
course;—  all  these  are  circumstances  that  would  conspire  to 
render  an  illicit  trade  between  them  a  matter  of  little  difficulty, 
and  would  insure  frequent  evasions  of  the  commercial  regula- 
tions of  each  other.  The  separate  states  or  confederacies  would 
be  necessitated  by  mutual  jealousy  to  avoid  the  temptations 
to  that  kind  of  trade  by  the  lowness  of  their  duties.  The 
temper  of  our  governments,  for  a  long  time  to  come,  would  not 
permit  those  rigorous  precautions  by  which  the  European 
nations  guard  the  avenues  into  their  respective  countries,  as 
well  by  land  as  by  water;  and  which,  even  there,  are  found 
insufficient  obstacles  to  the  adventurous  stratagems  of  avarice. 

In  France,  there  is  an  army  of  patrols  (as  they  are  called) 
constantly  employed  to  secure  her  fiscal  regulations  against 
the  inroads  of  the  dealers  in  contraband.  Mr.  Neckar  computes 
the  number  of  these  patrols  at  upwards  of  twenty  thousand. 
This  proves  the  immense  difficulty  in  preventing  that  species 
of  traffic,  where  there  is  an  inland  communication,  and  shows 
in  a  strong  light  the  disadvantages  with  which  the  collection  of 
duties  in  this  country  would  be  encumbered,  if  by  disunion  the 
states  should  be  placed  in  a  situation,  with  respect  to  each  other, 
resembling  that  of  France  with  respect  to  her  neighbors.     The 


THE  FEDERALIST  8i 

arbitrary  and  vexatious  powers  with  which  the  patrols  are 
necessarily  armed,  would  be  intolerable  in  a  free  country. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  there  be  but  one  government  pervading 
all  the  states,  there  will  be,  as  to  the  principal  part  of  our  com- 
merce, but  ONE  SIDE  to  guard  —  the  Atlantic  coast.  Vessels 
arriving  directly  from  foreign  countries,  laden  with  valuable 
cargoes,  would  rarely  choose  to  hazard  themselves  to  the  com- 
phcated  and  critical  perils  which  would  attend  attempts  to 
unlade  prior  to  their  coming  into  port.  They  would  have  to 
dread  both  the  dangers  of  the  coast,  and  of  detection,  as  well 
after  as  before  their  arrival  at  the  places  of  their  final  destina- 
tion. An  ordinary  degree  of  vigilance  would  be  competent  to 
the  prevention  of  any  material  infractions  upon  the  rights  of 
the  revenue.  A  few  armed  vessels,  judiciously  stationed  at  the 
entrances  of  our  ports,  might  at  small  expense  be  made  useful 
sentinels  of  the  laws.  And  the  government  having  the  same 
interest  to  provide  against  violations  everywhere,  the  coopera- 
tion of  its  measures  in  each  state  would  have  a  powerful  tendency 
to  render  them  effectual.  Here  also  we  should  preserve,  by 
union,  an  advantage  which  nature  holds  out  to  us,  and  which 
would  be  relinquished  by  separation.  The  United  States  lie 
at  a  great  distance  from  Europe,  and  at  a  considerable  distance 
from  all  other  places  with  which  they  would  have  extensive 
connections  of  foreign  trade.  The  passage  from  them  to  us, 
in  a  few  hours,  or  in  a  single  night,  as  between  the  coasts  of 
France  and  Britain,  and  of  other  neighboring  nations,  would 
be  impracticable.  This  is  a  prodigious  security  against  a  direct 
contraband  with  foreign  countries;  but  a  circuitous  contraband 
to  one  state,  through  the  medium  of  another,  would  be  both 
easy  and  safe.  The  difference  between  a  direct  importation 
from  abroad,  and  an  indirect  importation  through  the  channel 
of  a  neighboring  state,  in  small  parcels,  according  to  time  and 
opportunity,  with  the  additional  facilities  of  inland  commimica- 
tion,  must  be  palpable  to  every  man  of  discernment. 

It  ^s  therefore  evident  that  one  national  government  would 
be  able,  at  much  less  expense,  to  extend  the  duties  on  imports. 


82  THE  FEDERALIST 

beyond  comparison,  further  than  would  be  practicable  to  the 
states  separately,  or  to  any  partial  confederacies.  Hitherto, 
I  believe,  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that  these  duties  have  not 
upon  an  average  exceeded  in  any  state  three  per  cent.  In 
France  they  are  estimated  at  about  fifteen  per  cent,  and  in 
Britain  the  proportion  is  still  greater.  There  seems  to  be  nothing 
to  hinder  their  being  increased  in  this  country  to  at  least  treble 
their  present  amount.  The  single  article  of  ardent  spirits,  under 
federal  regulation,  might  be  made  to  furnish  a  considerable 
revenue.  Upon  a  ratio  to  the  importation  into  this  state,  the 
whole  quantity  imported  into  the  United  States  may  at  a  low 
computation  be  estimated  at  four  milUons  of  gallons;  which,  at 
a  shilling  per  gallon,  would  produce  two  hundred  thousand 
pounds.  That  article  would  well  bear  this  rate  of  duty;  and  if 
it  should  tend  to  diminish  the  consumption  of  it,  such  an  effect 
would  be  equally  favorable  to  the  agriculture,  to  the  economy, 
to  the  morals,  and  to  the  health  of  the  society.  There  is,  per- 
haps, nothing  so  much  a  subject  of  national  extravagance  as 
this  very  article. 

What  will  be  the  consequence,  if  we  are  not  able  to  avail 
ourselves  of  the  resource  in  question  in  its  full  extent  ?  A 
nation  cannot  long  exist  without  revenue.  Destitute  of  this 
essential  support,  it  must  resign  its  independence,  and  sink  into 
the  degraded  condition  of  a  province.  This  is  an  extremity  to 
which  no  government  will  of  choice  accede.  Revenue,  therefore, 
must  be  had  at  all  events.  In  this  country,  if  the  principal  part 
be  not  drawn  from  commerce,  it  must  fall  with  oppressive  weight 
upon  land.  It  has  been  already  intimated  that  excises,  in  their 
true  signification,  are  too  little  in  unison  with  the  feelings  of  the 
people  to  admit  of  great  use  being  made  of  that  mode  of  taxa- 
tion; nor,  indeed,  in  the  states  where  almost  the  sole  employ- 
ment is  agriculture,  are  the  objects  proper  for  excise  sufficiently 
numerous  to  permit  very  ample  collections  in  that  way.  Per- 
sonal estate  (as  has  been  before  remarked),  from  the  difficulty 
in  tracing  it,  cannot  be  subjected  to  large  contributions  by  any 
other  means  than  by  taxes  on  consumption.     In  populous  cities, 


THE  FEDERALIST  83 

it  may  be  enough  the  subject  of  conjecture  to  occasion  the 
oppression  of  individuals  without  much  aggregate  benefit  to 
the  state;  but  beyond  these  circles,  it  must,  in  a  great  measure, 
escape  the  eye  and  the  hand  of  the  tax-gatherer.  As  the  neces- 
sities of  the  state,  nevertheless,  must  be  satisfied  in  some  mode 
or  other,  the  defect  of  other  resources  must  throw  the  principal 
weight  of  the  public  burdens  on  the  possessors  of  land.  And  as, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  wants  of  the  government  can  never 
obtain  an  adequate  supply,  unless  all  the  sources  of  revenue 
are  open  to  its  demands,  the  finances  of  the  community,  under 
such  embarrassments,  cannot  be  put  into  a  situation  consistent 
with  its  respectabiHty  or  its  security.  Thus  we  shall  not  even 
have  the  consolations  of  a  full  treasury  to  atone  for  the  oppres- 
sion of  that  valuable  class  of  the  citizens  who  are  employed  in 
the  cultivation  of  the  soil.  But  pubHc  and  private  distress  will 
keep  pace  with  each  other  in  gloomy  concert,  and  unite  in 
deploring  the  infatuation  of  those  counsels  which  led  to  disunion. 

PUBLIUS. 

The  same  Subject  continued,  with  a  View  to  Economy  ^ 

As  connected  with  the  subject  of  revenue,  we  may  with  pro- 
priety consider  that  of  economy.  The  money  saved  from  one 
object  may  be  usefully  appHed  to  another,  and  there  will  be  so 
much  the  less  to  be  drawn  from  the  pockets  of  the  people.  If 
the  states  are  united  under  one  government,  there  will  be  but 
one  national  civil  list  to  support;  if  they  are  divided  into  several 
confederacies,  there  will  be  as  many  different  national  civil  lists 
to  be  provided  for  —  and  each  of  them,  as  to  the  principal  depart- 
ments, coextensive  with  that  which  would  be  necessary  for  a 
government  of  the  whole.  The  entire  separation  of  the  states 
into  thirteen  unconnected  sovereignties  is  a  project  too  extra- 
vagant and  too  replete  with  danger  to  have  many  advocates. 
The  ideas  of  men  who  speculate  upon  the  dismemberment  of  the 
empire  seem  generally  turned  towards  three  confederacies  — 

>  No.  XIII,     Hamilton.     Independent  Journal,  November  28,  1787. 


84  THE  FEDERALIST 

one  consisting  of  the  four  Northern,  another  of  the  four  Middle 
and  a  third  of  the  five  Southern  States.  There  is  Uttle  proba- 
bihty  that  there  would  be  a  greater  number.  According  to  this 
distribution,  each  confederacy  would  comprise  an  extent  of 
territory  larger  than  that  of  the  kingdom  of  Great  Britain.  No 
well-informed  man  will  suppose  that  the  affairs  of  such  a  con- 
federacy can  be  properly  regulated  by  a  government  less  compre- 
hensive in  its  organs  or  institutions  than  that  which  has  been 
proposed  by  the  Convention.  When  the  dimensions  of  a  state 
attain  to  a  certain  magnitude,  it  requires  the  same  energy  of 
government  and  the  same  forms  of  administration  which  are 
requisite  in  one  of  much  greater  extent.  This  idea  admits  not  of 
precise  demonstration,  because  there  is  no  rule  by  which  we  can 
measure  the  momentum  of  civil  power  necessary  to  the  govern- 
ment of  any  given  number  of  individuals;  but  when  we  consider 
that  the  island  of  Britain,  nearly  commensurate  with  each  of  the 
supposed  confederacies,  contains  about  eight  millions  of  people, 
and  when  we  reflect  upon  the  degree  of  authority  required  to 
direct  the  passions  of  so  large  a  society  to  the  public  good,  we 
shall  see  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  like  portion  of  power  would 
be  sufficient  to  perform  the  same  task  in  a  society  far  more 
numerous.  Civil  power,  properly  organized  and  exerted,  is 
capable  of  diffusing  its  force  to  a  very  great  extent;  and  can,  in 
a  manner,  reproduce  itself  in  every  part  of  a  great  empire  by 
a  judicious  arrangement  of  subordinate  institutions. 

The  supposition  that  each  confederacy  into  which  the  states 
would  be  likely  to  be  divided  would  require  a  government  not 
less  comprehensive  than  the  one  proposed,  will  be  strengthened 
by  another  supposition  more  probable  than  that  which  presents 
us  with  three  confederacies  as  the  alternative  to  a  general  union. 
If  we  attend  carefully  to  geographical  and  commercial  con- 
siderations, in  conjunction  with  the  habits  and  prejudices  of  the 
different  states,  we  shall  be  led  to  conclude  that  in  case  of  dis- 
union they  will  most  naturally  league  themselves  under  two 
governments.  The  four  Eastern  States,  from  all  the  causes  that 
form  the  links  of  national  sympathy  and  connection,  may  with 


THE  FEDERALIST  85 

certainty  be  expected  to  unite.  New  York,  situated  as  she  is, 
would  never  be  unwise  enough  to  oppose  a  feeble  and  unsup- 
ported flank  to  the  weight  of  that  confederacy.  There  are 
obvious  reasons  that  would  faciHtate  her  accession  to  it.  New 
Jersey  is  too  small  a  state  to  think  of  being  a  frontier,  in  opposi- 
tion to  this  still  more  powerful  combination;  nor  do  there  appear 
to  be  any  obstacles  to  her  admission  into  it.  Even  Pennsylvania 
would  have  strong  inducements  to  join  the  Northern  league. 
An  active  foreign  commerce,  on  the  basis  of  her  own  navigation, 
is  her  true  policy,  and  coincides  with  the  opinions  and  disposi- 
tions of  her  citizens.  The  more  Southern  states,  from  various 
circumstances,  may  not  think  themselves  much  interested  in  the 
encouragement  of  navigation.  They  may  prefer  a  system  which 
would  give  unlimited  scope  to  all  nations  to  be  the  carriers  as 
well  as  the  purchasers  of  their  commodities.  Pennsylvania  may 
not  choose  to  confound  her  interests  in  a  connection  so  adverse  to 
her  policy.  As  she  must  at  all  events  be  a  frontier,  she  may 
deem  it  most  consistent  with  her  safety  to  have  her  exposed  side 
turned  towards  the  weaker  power  of  the  Southern,  rather  than 
towards  the  stronger  power  of  the  Northern,  confederacy. 
This  would  give  her  the  fairest  chance  to  avoid  being  the  Flan- 
ders of  America.  Whatever  may  be  the  determination  of 
Pennsylvania,  if  the  Northern  confederacy  includes  New  Jersey, 
there  is  no  likelihood  of  more  than  one  confederacy  to  the  south 
of  that  state. 

Nothing  can  be  more  evident  than  that  the  thirteen  states 
will  be  able  to  support  a  national  government  better  than  one 
half,  or  one  third,  or  any  number  less  than  the  whole.  This 
reflection  must  have  great  weight  in  obviating  that  objection  to 
the  proposed  plan,  which  is  foimded  on  the  principle  of  expense; 
an  objection,  however,  which,  when  we  come  to  take  a  nearer 
view  of  it,  will  appear  in  every  Hght  to  stand  on  mistaken  ground. 

If,  in  addition  to  the  consideration  of  a  pluraUty  of  civil  lists, 
we  take  into  view  the  number  of  persons  who  must  necessarily 
be  employed  to  guard  the  inland  communication  between  the 
different  confederacies  against  illicit  trade,  and  who  in  time 


86  THE  FEDERALIST 

will  infallibly  spring  up  out  of  the  necessities  of  revenue;  and 
if  we  also  take  into  view  the  miHtary  establishments  which  it 
has  been  shown  would  unavoidably  result  from  the  jealousies 
and  conflicts  of  the  several  nations  into  which  the  states  would 
be  divided,  we  shall  clearly  discover  that  a  separation  would  be 
not  less  injurious  to  the  economy,  than  to  the  tranquiUity, 
commerce,  revenue,  and  liberty  of  every  part. 

PUBLIUS. 


Ill 


THE  INADEQUACY  OF  THE  OLD 
CONFEDERATION 

(a)   GENERAI.  FEATURES  OF  WEAKNESS 
An  Objection  drawn  from  the  Extent  of  Country  answered  » 

We  have  seen  the  necessity  of  the  Union,  as  our  bulwark  against 
foreign  danger,  as  the  conservator  of  peace  among  ourselves, 
as  the  guardian  of  our  commerce  and  other  conmion  interests, 
as  the  only  substitute  for  those  military  estabHshments  which 
have  subverted  the  Uberties  of  the  Old  World,  and  as  the  proper 
antidote  for  the  diseases  of  faction,  which  have  proved  fatal 
to  other  popular  governments,  and  of  which  alarming  symptoms 
have  been  betrayed  by  our  own.  All  that  remains,  within  this 
branch  of  our  inquiries,  is  to  take  notice  of  an  objection  that 
may  be  drawn  from  the  great  extent  of  country  which  the  Union 
embraces.  A  few  observations  on  this  subject  will  be  the  more 
proper,  as  it  is  perceived  that  the  adversaries  of  the  new  Con- 
stitution are  availing  themselves  of  a  prevaihng  prejudice 
with  regard  to  the  practicable  sphere  of  repubhcan  administra- 
tion, in  order  to  supply,  by  imaginary  difficulties,  the  want 
of  those  soHd  objections  which  they  endeavor  in  vain  to  find. 

The  error  which  limits  republican  government  to  a  narrow 
district  has  been  unfolded  and  refuted  in  preceding  papers.  I 
remark  here  only  that  it  seems  to  owe  its  rise  and  prevalence 
chiefly  to  the  confounding  of  a  republic  with  a  democracy, 
applying  to  the  former  reasonings  drawn  from  the  nature  of 
the  latter.  The  true  distinction  between  these  forms  was  also 
adverted  to  on  a  former  occasion.  It  is,  that  in  a  democracy  the 
people  meet  and  exercise  the  government  in  person;  in  a  repub- 
Uc,  they  assemble  and  administer  it   by  their  representatives 

«  No.  XIV.     Madison.     New  York  Packet,  November  30,  1787. 
87 


8S  THE  FEDERALIST 

and  agents.  A  democracy,  consequently,  must  be  confined  to  a 
small  spot.    A  republic  may  be  extended  over  a  large  region. 

To  this  accidental  source  of  the  error  may  be  added  the 
artifice  of  some  celebrated  authors,  whose  writings  have  had  a 
great  share  in  forming  the  modern  standard  of  political  opinions. 
Being  subjects  either  of  an  absolute  or  limited  monarchy,  they 
have  endeavored  to  heighten  the  advantages  or  palhate  the  evils 
of  those  forms,  by  placing  in  comparison  with  them  the  vices 
and  defects  of  the  repubUcan,  and  by  citing  as  specimens  of  the 
latter  the  turbulent  democracies  of  ancient  Greece  and  modern 
Italy.  Under  the  confusion  of  names,  it  has  been  an  easy  task 
to  transfer  to  a  repubUc  observations  applicable  to  a  democracy 
only;  and  among  others,  the  observation  that  it  can  never  be 
established  but  among  a  small  number  of  people,  living  within 
a  small  compass  of  territory. 

Such  a  fallacy  may  have  been  the  less  perceived,  as  most  of 
the  popular  governments  of  antiquity  were  of  the  democratic 
species;  and  even  in  modern  Europe,  to  which  we  owe  the  great 
principle  of  representation,  no  example  is  seen  of  a  government 
wholly  popular,  and  founded,  at  the  same  time,  wholly  on  that 
principle.  If  Europe  has  the  merit  of  discovering  this  great 
mechanical  power  in  government,  by  the  simple  agency  of  which 
the  will  of  the  largest  political  body  may  be  concentered,  and  its 
force  directed  to  any  object  which  the  public  good  requires, 
America  can  claim  the  merit  of  making  the  discovery  the  basis 
of  unmixed  and  extensive  republics.  It  is  only  to  be  lamented 
that  any  of  her  citizens  should  wish  to  deprive  her  of  the  addi- 
tional merit  of  displaying  its  full  efficacy  in  the  establishment 
of  the  comprehensive  system  now  under  her  consideration. 

As  the  natural  limit  of  a  democracy  is  that  distance  from  the 
central  point  which  will  just  permit  the  most  remote  citizens 
to  assemble  as  often  as  their  public  functions  demand,  and  will 
include  no  greater  number  than  can  join  in  those  fimctions,  so 
the  natural  limit  of  a  repubhc  is  that  distance  from  the  center 
which  will  barely  allow  the  representatives  of  the  people  to  meet 
as  often  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  administration  of  public 


THE  FEDERALIST  89 

affairs.  Can  it  be  said  that  the  Umits  of  the  United  States 
exceed  this  distance  ?  It  will  not  be  said  by  those  who  recollect 
that  the  Atlantic  coast  is  the  longest  side  of  the  Union,  that 
during  the  term  of  thirteen  years  the  representatives  of  the 
states  have  been  almost  continually  assembled,  and  that  the 
members  from  the  most  distant  states  are  not  chargeable  with 
greater  intermissions  of  attendance  than  those  from  the  states 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Congress. 

That  we  may  form  a  juster  estimate  with  regard  to  this 
interesting  subject,  let  us  resort  to  the  actual  dimensions  of 
the  Union.  The  Umits,  as  fixed  by  the  treaty  of  peace,  are: 
on  the  east  the  Atlantic,  on  the  south  the  latitude  of  thirty- 
one  degrees,  on  the  west  the  Mississippi,  and  on  the  north  an 
irregular  Une  running  in  some  instances  beyond  the  forty-fifth 
degree,  in  others  falling  as  low  as  the  forty-second.  The  south- 
ern shore  of  Lake  Erie  Hes  below  that  latitude.  Computing 
the  distance  between  the  thirty-first  and  forty-fifth  degrees, 
it  amounts  to  nine  himdred  and  seventy- three  common  miles; 
computing  it  from  thirty-one  to  forty-two  degrees,  to  seven 
hundred,  sixty-four  miles  and  a  half.  Taking  the  mean 
for  the  distance,  the  amount  will  be  eight  hundred,  sixty- 
eight  miles  and  three  fourths.  The  mean  distance  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Mississippi  does  not  probably  exceed  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  miles.  On  a  comparison  of  this  extent  with 
that  of  several  countries  in  Europe,  the  practicabiHty  of  render- 
ing our  system  commensurate  to  it  appears  to  be  demonstrable. 
It  is  not  a  great  deal  larger  than  Germany,  where  a  diet  represent- 
ing the  whole  empire  is  continually  assembled;  or  than  Poland 
before  the  late  dismemberment,  where  another  national  diet  was 
the  depositary  of  the  supreme  power.  Passing  by  France  and 
Spain,  we  find  that  in  Great  Britain,  inferior  as  it  may  be  in  size, 
the  representatives  of  the  northern  extremity  of  the  island  have 
as  far  to  travel  to  the  national  council  as  will  be  required  of 
those  of  the  most  remote  parts  of  the  Union. 

Favorable  as  this  view  of  the  subject  may  be,  some  observa- 
tions remain  which  will  place  it  in  a  light  still  more  satisfactory. 


90  THE  FEDERALIST 

In  the  first  place  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  general 
government  is  not  to  be  charged  with  the  whole  power  of  mak- 
ing and  administering  laws.  Its  jurisdiction  is  Umited  to 
certain  enimierated  objects,  which  concern  all  the  members  of 
the  republic,  but  which  are  not  to  be  attained  by  the  separate 
provisions  of  any.  The  subordinate  governments,  which  can 
extend  their  care  to  all  those  other  objects  which  can  be  sepa- 
rately provided  for,  will  retain  their  due  authority  and  activity. 
Were  it  proposed  by  the  plan  of  the  Convention  to  aboUsh  the 
governments  of  the  particular  states,  its  adversaries  would  have 
some  ground  for  their  objection;  though  it  would  not  be  diflficult 
to  show  that  if  they  were  aboHshed  the  general  government 
would  be  compelled,  by  the  principle  of  self-preservation,  to 
reinstate  them  in  their  proper  jurisdiction. 

A  second  observation  to  be  made  is  that  the  immediate  object 
of  the  federal  Constitution  is  to  secure  the  union  of  the  thirteen 
primitive  states,  which  we  know  to  be  practicable;  and  to  add 
to  them  such  other  states  as  may  arise  in  their  own  bosoms,  or 
in  their  neighborhoods,  which  we  cannot  doubt  to  be  equally 
practicable.  The  arrangements  that  may  be  necessary  for 
those  angles  and  fractions  of  our  territory  which  lie  on  our 
northwestern  frontier,  must  be  left  to  those  whom  further  dis- 
coveries and  experience  will  render  more  equal  to  the  task. 

Let  it  be  remarked,  in  the  third  place,  that  the  intercourse 
throughout  the  Union  will  be  daily  facilitated  by  new  improve- 
ments. Roads  will  everywhere  be  shortened,  and  kept  in  better 
order;  accommodations  for  travelers  will  be  multiplied  and 
meliorated;  an  interior  navigation  on  our  eastern  side  will  be 
opened  throughout,  or  nearly  throughout,,  the  whole  extent  of 
the  thirteen  states.  The  commimication  between  the  western 
and  Atlantic  districts,  and  between  different  parts  of  each,  will 
be  rendered  more  and  more  easy  by  those  numerous  canals  with 
which  the  beneficence  of  nature  has  intersected  our  coimtry, 
and  which  art  finds  it  so  little  difficult  to  connect  and  complete. 

A  fourth  and  still  more  important  consideration  is,  that  as 
almost  every  state  will,  on  one  side  or  other,  be  a  frontier,  and 


THE  FEDERALIST  91 

will  thus  find,  in  a  regard  to  its  safety,  an  inducement  to  make 
some  sacrifices  for  the  sake  of  the  general  protection,  so  the 
states  which  lie  at  the  greatest  distance  from  the  heart  of  the 
Union,  and  which,  of  course,  may  partake  least  of  the  ordinary 
circulation  of  its  benefits,  will  be  at  the  same  time  immediately 
contiguous  to  foreign  nations,  and  will  consequently  stand,  on 
particular  occasions,  in  greatest  need  of  its  strength  and  re- 
sources. It  may  be  inconvenient  for  Georgia,  or  the  states 
forming  our  western  or  northeastern  borders,  to  send  their 
representatives  to  the  seat  of  government:  but  they  would  find 
it  more  so  to  struggle  alone  against  an  invading  enemy,  or  even 
to  support  alone  the  whole  expense  of  those  precautions  which 
may  be  dictated  by  the  neighborhood  of  continual  danger. 
If  they  should  derive  less  benefit,  therefore,  from  the  Union 
in  some  respects  than  the  less  distant  states,  they  will  derive 
greater  benefit  from  it  in  other  respects,  and  thus  the  proper 
equiHbrium  will  be  maintained  throughout. 

I  submit  to  you,  my  fellow-citizens,  these  considerations,  in 
full  confidence  that  the  good  sense  which  has  so  often  marked 
your  decisions  will  allow  them  their  due  weight  and  effect;  and 
that  you  will  never  suffer  difficulties,  however  formidable  in 
appearance,  or  however  fashionable  the  error  on  which  they 
may  be  founded,  to  drive  you  into  the  gloomy  and  perilous 
scenes  into  which  the  advocates  for  disunion  would  conduct 
you.  Hearken  not  to  the  unnatural  voice  which  tells  you  that 
the  people  of  America,  knit  together  as  they  are  by  so  many 
cords  of  affection,  can  no  longer  live  together  as  members  of 
the  same  family,  can  no  longer  continue  the  mutual  guardians 
of  their  mutual  happiness,  can  no  longer  be  fellow-citizens  of 
one  great,  respectable,  and  flourishing  empire.  Hearken  not 
to  the  voice  which  petulantly  tells  you  that  the  form  of  govern- 
ment recommended  for  your  adoption  is  a  novelty  in  the  polit- 
ical world;  that  it  has  never  yet  had  a  place  in  the  theories 
of  the  wildest  projectors;  that  it  rashly  attempts  what  it  is 
impossible  to  accompHsh.  No,  my  countrymen,  shut  your  ears 
against  this  unhallowed  language.      Shut  your  hearts  against 


92  THE  FEDERALIST 

the  poison  which  it  conveys;  the  kindred  blood  which  flows  in 
the  veins  of  American  citizens,  the  mingled  blood  which  they 
have  shed  in  defense  of  their  sacred  rights,  consecrate  their 
Union,  and  excite  horror  at  the  idea  of  their  becoming  aUens, 
rivals,  enemies.  And  if  novelties  are  to  be  shunned,  believe 
me,  the  most  alarming  of  all  novelties,  the  most  wild  of  all 
projects,  the  most  rash  of  all  attempts,  is  that  of  rending  us 
in  pieces,  in  order  to  preserve  our  liberties  and  promote  our 
happiness.  But  why  is  the  experiment  of  an  extended  repubHc 
to  be  rejected,  merely  because  it  may  comprise  what  is  new  ? 
Is  it  not  the  glory  of  the  people  of  America  that,  whilst  they 
have  paid  a  decent  regard  to  the  opinions  of  former  times  and 
other  nations,  they  have  not  suffered  a  blind  veneration  for 
antiquity,  for  custom,  or  for  names,  to  overrule  the  suggestions 
of  their  own  good  sense,  the  knowledge  of  their  own  situation, 
and  the  lessons  of  their  own  experience  ?  To  this  manly  spirit, 
posterity  will  be  indebted  for  the  possession,  and  the  world  for 
the  example,  of  the  numerous  innovations  displayed  on  the 
American  theater,  in  favor  of  private  rights  and  pubUc  happi- 
ness. Had  no  important  step  been  taken  by  the  leaders  of  the 
Revolution  for  which  a  precedent  could  not  be  discovered,  no 
government  estabHshed  of  which  an  exact  model  did  not  present 
itself,  the  people  of  the  United  States  might,  at  this  moment, 
have  been  numbered  among  the  melancholy  victims  of  mis- 
guided councils,  must  at  best  have  been  laboring  imder  the 
weight  of  some  of  those  forms  which  have  crushed  the  Uberties 
of  the  rest  of  mankind.  Happily  for  America,  happily,  we 
trust,  for  the  whole  human  race,  they  pursued  a  new  and  more 
noble  course.  They  accomplished  a  revolution  which  has  no 
parallel  in  the  annals  of  human  society.  They  reared  the 
fabrics  of  governments  which  have  no  model  on  the  face  of  the 
globe.  They  formed  the  design  of  a  great  confederacy,  which 
it  is  incumbent  on  their  successors  to  improve  and  perpetuate. 
If  their  works  betray  imperfections,  we  wonder  at  the  fewness 
of  them.  If  they  erred  most  in  the  structure  of  the  Union,  this 
was  the  work  most  difficult  to  be  executed:   this  is  the  work 


THE  FEDERALIST  93 

which  has  been  new  modeled  by  the  act  of  your  Convention, 
and  it  is  that  act  on  which  you  are  now  to  deliberate  and  to 
decide.  Publius. 

(b)   THE  LACK  OF  POWER  TO  COMPEL  OBEDIENCE 
Further  Defects  of  the  Present  Constitution  ^ 

Having  in  the  three  last  numbers  taken  a  summary  review 
of  the  principal  circumstances  and  events  which  depict  the 
genius  and  fate  of  other  confederate  governments,  I  shall  now 
proceed  in  the  enumeration  of  the  most  important  of  those 
defects  which  have  hitherto  disappointed  our  hopes  from  the 
system  established  among  ourselves.  To  form  a  safe  and  satis- 
factory judgment  of  the  proper  remedy,  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary that  we  should  be  well  acquainted  with  the  extent  and 
malignity  of  the  disease. 

The  next  most  palpable  defect  of  the  existing  Confederation 
is  the  total  want  of  a  sanction  to  its  laws.  The  United  States, 
as  now  composed,  have  no  power  to  exact  obedience,  or  punish 
disobedience  to  their  resolutions,  either  by  pecuniary  mulcts, 
by  a  suspension  or  divestiture  of  privileges,  or  by  any  other  con- 
stitutional means.  There  is  no  express  delegation  of  authority 
to  them  to  use  force  against  delinquent  members;  and  if  such 
a  right  should  be  ascribed  to  the  federal  head,  as  resulting  from 
the  nature  of  the  social  compact  between  the  states,  it  must  be 
by  inference  and  construction,  in  the  face  of  that  part  of  the 
second  article,  by  which  it  is  declared,  "  that  each  state  shall 
retain  every  power,  jurisdiction,  and  right,  not  expressly  dele- 
gated to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled."  The  want 
of  such  a  right  involves,  no  doubt,  a  striking  absurdity;  but  we 
are  reduced  to  the  dilemma  either  of  supposing  that  deficiency, 
preposterous  as  it  may  seem,  or  of  contravening  or  explaining 
away  a  provision,  which  has;been  of  late  a  repeated  theme  of 
the  eulogies  of  those  who  oppose  the  new  Constitution;  and  the 
omission  of  which,  in  that  plan,  has  been  the  subject  of  much 

*  No.  XXI.     Hamilton.     Independent  Journal,  December  12,  1787. 


94  THE  FEDERALIST 

plausible  animadversion  and  severe  criticism.  If  we  are  imwill- 
ing  to  impair  the  force  of  this  applauded  provision,  we  shall  be 
obliged  to  conclude  that  the  United  States  afford  the  extraor- 
dinary spectacle  of  a  government  destitute  even  of  the  shadow 
of  constitutional  power  to  enforce  the  execution  of  its  own  laws. 
It  will  appear,  from  the  specimens  which  have  been  cited,  that 
the  American  Confederacy,  in  this  particular,  stands  discrimi- 
nated from  every  other  institution  of  a  similar  kind,  and  exhibits 
a  new  and  unexampled  phenomenon  in  the  political  world. 
"-  The  want  of  a  mutual  guarantee  of  the  state  governments  is 
another  capital  imperfection  in  the "  federal  plan.  There  is 
nothing  of  this  kind  declared  in  the  articles  that  compose  it; 
and  to  imply  a  tacit  guarantee  from  considerations  of  utility, 
would  be  a  still  more  flagrant  departure  from  the  clause  which 
has  been  mentioned  than  to  imply  a  tacit  power  of  coercion 
from  the  like  considerations.  The  want  of  a  guarantee,  though 
it  might  in  its  consequences  endanger  the  Union,  does  not  so 
immediately  attack  its  existence  as  the  want  of  a  constitutional 
sanction  to  its  laws. 

Without  a  guarantee  the  assistance  to  be  derived  from  the 
Union  in  repelling  those  domestic  dangers  which  may  some- 
times threaten  the  existence  of  the  state  constitutions,  must 
be  renounced.  Usurpation  may  rear  its  crest  in  each  state,  and 
trample  upon  the  Hberties  of  the  people,  while  the  national 
government  could  legally  do  nothing  more  than  behold  its 
encroachments  with  indignation  and  regret.  A  successful 
faction  may  erect  a  tyranny  on  the  ruins  of  order  and  law,  while 
no  succor  could  constitutionally  be  afforded  by  the  Union  to 
the  friends  and  supporters  of  the  government.  The  tempestuous 
situation  from  which  Massachusetts  has  scarcely  emerged, 
evinces  that  dangers  of  this  kind  are  not  merely  speculative. 
Who  can  determine  what  might  have  been  the  issue  of  her  late 
convulsions,  if  the  malcontents  had  been  headed  by  a  Caesar 
or  by  a  Cromwell  ?  Who  can  predict  what  effect  a  despotism, 
established  in  Massachusetts,  would  have  upon  the  hberties  of 
New  Hampshire  or  Rhode  Island,  of  Connecticut  or  New  York  ? 


THE  FEDERALIST  95 

The  inordinate  pride  of  state  importance  has  suggested  to 
some  minds  an  objection  to  the  principle  of  a  guarantee  in  the 
federal  government,  as  involving  an  officious  interference  in 
the  domestic  concerns  of  the  members.  A  scruple  of  this  kind 
would  deprive  us  of  one  of  the  principal  advantages  to  be 
expected  from  union,  and  can  only  flow  from  a  misapprehension 
of  the  nature  of  the  provision  itself.  It  could  be  no  impediment 
to  reforms  of  the  state  constitutions  by  a  majority  of  the  people 
in  a  legal  and  peaceable  mode.  This  right  would  remain  undi- 
minished. The  guarantee  could  only  operate  against  changes  to 
be  effected  by  violence.  Towards  the  prevention  of  calamities 
of  this  kind,  too  many  checks  cannot  be  provided.  The  peace 
of  society  and  the  stabiUty  of  government  depend  absolutely 
on  the  efficacy  of  the  precautions  adopted  on  this  head.  Where 
the  whole  power  of  the  government  is  in  the  hands  of  the  people, 
there  is  the  less  pretence  for  the  use  of  violent  remedies  in  partial 
or  occasional  distempers  of  the  state.  The  natural  cure  for  an 
ill  administration,  in  a  popular  or  representative  constitution, 
is  a  change  of  men.  A  guarantee  by  the  national  authority 
would  be  as  much  directed  against  the  usurpations  of  rulers  as 
against  the  ferments  and  outrages  of  faction  and  sedition  in  the 
community. 

The  principle  of  regulating  the  contributions  of  the  states- 
to  the  common  treasury  by  quotas  is  another  fundamental 
error  in  the  Confederation.  Its  repugnancy  to  an  adequate 
supply  of  the  national  exigencies  has  been  already  pointed  out, 
and  has  sufficiently  appeared  from  the  trial  which  has  been  made 
of  it.  I  speak  of  it  now  solely  with  a  view  to  equality  among 
the  states.  Those  who  have  been  accustomed  to  contemplate 
the  circumstances  which  produce  and  constitute  national  wealth, 
must  be  satisfied  that  there  is  no  common  standard  or  barometer 
by  which  the  degrees  of  it  can  be  ascertained.  Neither  the  value 
of  lands,  nor  the  numbers  of  the  people,  which  have  been  suc- 
cessively proposed  as  the  rule  of  state  contributions,  has  any 
pretension  to  being  a  just  representative.  If  we  compare  the 
wealth   of  the  United  Netherlands  with   that  of  Russia  or 


96  THE  FEDERALIST 

Germany,  or  even  of  France,  and  if  we  at  the  same  time  com- 
pare the  total  value  of  the  lands  and  the  aggregate  population  of 
the  contracted  territory  of  that  republic  with  the  total  value  of 
the  lands  and  the  aggregate  population  of  the  immense  regions 
of  either  of  those  kingdoms,  we  shall  at  once  discover  that  there 
is  no  comparison  between  the  proportion  of  either  of  these  two 
objects  and  that  of  the  relative  wealth  of  those  nations.  If 
the  like  parallel  were  to  be  run  between  several  of  the  American 
states,  it  would  furnish  a  like  result.  Let  Virginia  be  contrasted 
with  North  Carolina,  Pennsylvania  with  Connecticut,  or  Mary- 
land with  New  Jersey,  and  we  shall  be  convinced  that  the  respec- 
tive abilities  of  those  states,  in  relation  to  revenue,  bear  little 
or  no  analogy  to  their  comparative  stock  in  lands  or  to  their 
comparative  population.  The  position  may  be  equally  illus- 
trated by  a  similar  process  between  the  counties  of  the  same 
state.  No  man  acquainted  with  the  State  of  New  York  will 
doubt  that  the  active  wealth  of  King's  County  bears  a  much 
greater  proportion  to  that  of  Montgomery  than  it  would  appear 
to  do  if  we  should  take  either  the  total  value  of  the  lands  or  the 
total  numbers  of  the  people  as  a  criterion ! 

The  wealth  of  nations  depends  upon  an  infinite  variety  of 
causes..  Situation,  soil,  climate,  the  nature  of  the  productions, 
the  nature  of  the  government,  the  genius  of  the  citizens,  the 
degree  of  information  they  possess,  the  state  of  commerce,  of  arts, 
of  industry,  —  these  circumstances  and  many  more,  too  complex, 
minute,  or  adventitious  to  admit  of  a  particular  specification, 
occasion  differences  hardly  conceivable  in  the  relative  opulence 
and  riches  of  different  coimtries.  The  consequence  clearly  is 
that  there  can  be  no  common  measure  of  national  wealth,  and, 
of  course,  no  general  or  stationary  rule  by  which  the  ability  of 
a  state  to  pay  taxes  can  be  determined.  The  attempt,  therefore, 
to  regulate  the  contributions  of  the  members  of  a  confederacy 
by  any  such  rule,  cannot  fail  to  be  productive  of  glaring  inequal- 
ity and  extreme  oppression. 

This  inequaHty  would  of  itself  be  sufficient  in  America  to  work 
the  eventual  destruction  of  the  Union,  if  any  mode  of  enforcing 


THE  FEDERALIST  97 

a  compliance  with  its  requisitions  could  be  devised.  The  suffer- 
ing states  would  not  long  consent  to  remain  associated  upon 
a  principle  which  distributed  the  pubUc  burdens  with  so  unequal 
a  hand,  and  which  was  calculated  to  impoverish  and  oppress 
the  citizens  of  some  states,  while  those  of  others  would  scarcely 
be  conscious  of  the  small  proportion  of  the  weight  they  were 
required  to  sustain.  This,  however,  is  an  evil  inseparable  from 
the  principle  of  quotas  and  requisitions. 

There  is  no  method  of  steering  clear  of  this  inconvenience, 
but  by  authorizing  the  national  government  to  raise  its  own 
revenues  in  its  own  way.  Imposts,  excises,  and,  in  general, 
all  duties  upon  articles  of  consumption,  may  be  compared  to  a 
fluid,  which  will,  in  time,  find  its  level  with  the  means  of  paying 
them.  The  amount  to  be  contributed  by  each  citizen  will  in  a 
degree  be  at  his  own  option,  and  can  be  regulated  by  an  attention 
to  his  resources.  The  rich  may  be  extravagant,  the  poor  can  be 
frugal;  and  private  oppression  may  always  be  avoided  by  a 
judicious  selection  of  objects  proper  for  such  impositions.  If 
inequaHties  should  arise  in  some  states  from  duties  on  particular 
objects,  these  will,  in  all  probabiUty,  be  counterbalanced  by 
proportional  inequaHties  in  other  states,  from  the  duties  on  other 
objects.  In  the  course  of  time  and  things,  an  equihbrium,  as 
far  as  it  is  attainable  in  so  compHcated  a  subject,  will  be  estab- 
Hshed  everywhere.  Or,  if  inequalities  should  still  exist,  they 
would  neither  be  so  great  in  their  degree,  so  uniform  in  their 
operation,  nor  so  odious  in  their  appearance,  as  those  which 
would  necessarily  spring  from  quotas,  upon  any  scale  that  can 
possibly  be  devised. 

It  is  a  signal  advantage  of  taxes  on  articles  of  consumption 
that  they  contain  in  their  own  nature  a  security  against  excess. 
They  prescribe  their  own  Hmit,  which  cannot  be  exceeded  with- 
out defeating  the  end  proposed,  —  that  is,  an  extension  of  the 
revenue.  When  appHed  to  this  object,  the  saying  is  as  just  as 
it  is  witty,  that,  "  in  poHtical  arithmetic,  two  and  two  do  not 
always  makes  four."  If  duties  are  too  high,  they  lessen  the  con- 
sumption, the  collection  is  eluded,  and  the  product  to  the 


98  THE  FEDERALIST 

treasury  is  not  so  great  as  when  they  are  confined  within  proper 
and  moderate  bounds.  This  forms  a  complete  barrier  against 
any  material  oppression  of  the  citizens  by  taxes  of  this  class, 
and  is  itself  a  natural  limitation  of  the  power  of  imposing  them. 
Impositions  of  this  kind  usually  fall  under  the  denomination  of 
indirect  taxes,  and  must  for  a  long  time  constitute  the  chief 
part  of  the  revenue  raised  in  this  country.  Those  of  the  direct 
kind,  which  principally  relate  to  lands  and  buildings,  may  admit 
of  a  rule  of  apportionment.  Either  the  value  of  land,  or  the 
number  of  the  people,  may  serve  as  a  standard.  The  state  of 
agriculture  and  the  populousness  of  a  country  are  considered 
as  having  a  near  relation  to  each  other.  And,  as  a  rule,  for  the 
purpose  intended,  numbers,  in  the  view  of  simplicity  and  cer- 
tainty, are  entitled  to  a  preference.  In  every  country  it  is  an 
herculean  task  to  obtain  a  valuation  of  the  land;  in  a  country 
imperfectly  settled  and  progressive  in  improvement,  the  diffi- 
culties are  increased  almost  to  impracticabiUty.  The  expense 
of  an  accurate  valuation  is,  in  all  situations,  a  formidable  objec- 
tion. In  a  branch  of  taxation  where  no  limits  to  the  discretion 
of  the  government  are  to  be  found  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  the 
establishment  of  a  fixed  rule,  not  incompatible  with  the  end,  may 
be  attended  with  fewer  inconveniences  than  to  leave  that  dis- 
cretion altogether  at  large.  Publius. 

(c)  THE  LACK  OF  POWER  TO  REGULATE  COMMERCE 

The  same  Subject  continued  and  concluded  ^ 

In  addition  to  the  defects  already  enumerated  in  the  existing 
federal  system,  there  are  others  of  not  less  importance,  which 
concur  in  rendering  it  altogether  unfit  for  the  administration  of 
the  affairs  of  the  Union. 
y,^  The  want  of  a  power  to  regulate  commerce  is  by  all  parties 
allowed  to  be  of  the  number.  The  utihty  of  such  a  power  has 
been  anticipated  under  the  first  head  of  our  inquiries;  and  for 
this  reason,  as  well  as  from  the  universal  conviction  entertained 

*  No.  XXII.     Hamilton.     New  York  Packet,  December  14,  1787. 


THE  FEDERALIST  99 

upon  the  subject,  little  need  be  added  in  this  place.  It  is  indeed 
evident,  on  the  most  superficial  view,  that  there  is  no  object, 
either  as  it  respects  the  interests  of  trade  or  finance,  that  more 
strongly  demands  a  federal  superintendence.  The  want  of  it 
has  already  operated  as  a  bar  to  the  formation  of  beneficial 
treaties  with  foreign  powers,  and  has  given  occasions  of  dis- 
satisfaction between  the  states.  No  nation  acquainted  with 
the  nature  of  our  pohtical  association  would  be  unwise  enough 
to  enter  into  stipulations  with  the  United  States,  conceding  on 
their  part  privileges  of  importance,  while  they  were  apprised 
that  the  engagements  on  the  part  of  the  Union  might  at  any 
moment  be  violated  by  its  members,  and  while  they  found  ivom* 
experience  that  they  might  enjoy  every  advantage  they  desired 
in  our  markets,  without  granting  us  any  return  but  such  as  their 
momentary  convenience  might  suggest.  It  is  not,  therefore,  to 
be  wondered  at  that  Mr.  Jenkinson,  in  ushering  into  the  House 
of  Commons  a  bill  for  regulating  the  temporary  intercourse 
between  the  two  countries,  should  preface  its  introduction  by  a 
declaration  that  similar  provisions  in  former  bills  had  been  found 
to  answer  every  purpose  to  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain,  and 
that  it  would  be  prudent  to  persist  in  the  plan  until  it  should 
appear  whether  the  American  government  was  likely  or  not  to 
acquire  greater  consistency.^ 

Several  states  have  endeavored,  by  separate  prohibitions, 
restrictions,  and  exclusions,  to  influence  the  conduct  of  that 
kingdom  in  this  particular,  but  the  want  of  concert,  arising 
from  the  want  of  a  general  authority  and  from  clashing  and 
dissimilar  views  in  the  states,  has  hitherto  frustrated  every 
experiment  of  the  kind,  and  will  continue  to  do  so  as  long  as  the 
same  obstacles  to  an  uniformity  of  measures  continue  to  exist. 

The  interfering  and  unneighborly  regulations  of  some  states, 
contrary  to  the  true  spirit  of  the  Union,  have,  in  different 
instances,  given  just  cause  of  umbrage  and  complaint  to  others, 
and  it  is  to  be  feared  that  examples  of  this  nature,  if  not  re- 

*  This,  as  nearly  as  I  can  recollect,  was  the  sense  of  this  speech  in  introducing  the  last 
bill. 


lOO  THE  FEDERALIST 

strained  by  a  national  control,  would  be  multiplied  and  extended 
till  they  became  not  less  serious  sources  of  animosity  and  discord 
than  injurious  impediments  to  the  intercourse  between  the 
different  parts  of  the  Confederacy.  "  The  commerce  of  the 
German  empire  ^  is  in  continual  trammels  from  the  multiplicity 
of  the  duties  which  the  several  princes  and  states  exact  upon 
the  merchandises  passing  through  their  territories,  by  means 
of  which  the  fine  streams  and  navigable  rivers  with  which  Ger- 
many is  so  happily  watered  are  rendered  almost  useless." 
Though  the  genius  of  the  people  of  this  country  might  never 
permit  this  description  to  be  strictly  applicable  to  us,  yet  we 
may  reasonably  expect,  from  the  gradual  conflicts  of  state 
regulations,  that  the  citizens  of  each  would  at  length  come  to 
be  considered  and  treated  by  the  others  in  no  better  light  than 
that  of  foreigners  and  aliens. 
>j^  The  power  of  raising  armies,  by  the  most  obvious  construction 
of  the  Articles  of  the  Confederation,  is  merely  a  power  of  making 
requisitions  upon  the  states  for  quotas  of  men.  This  practice,  in 
the  course  of  the  late  war,  was  found  replete  with  obstructions 
to  a  vigorous  and  to  an  economical  system  of  defense.  It  gave 
birth  to  a  competition  between  the  states  which  created  a  kind 
of  auction  for  men.  In  order  to  furnish  the  quotas  required  of 
them,  they  outbid  each  other  till  bounties  grew  to  an  enormous 
and  insupportable  size.  The  hope  of  a  still  further  increase 
afforded  an  inducement  to  those  who  were  disposed  to  serve 
to  procrastinate  their  enlistment,  and  disinclined  them  to 
engage  for  any  considerable  periods.  Hence,  slow  and  scanty 
levies  of  men,  in  the  most  critical  emergencies  of  our  affairs; 
short  enlistments  at  an  unparalleled  expense;  continual  fluctua- 
tions in  the  troops,  ruinous  to  their  discipline  and  subjecting  the 
public  safety  frequently  to  the  perilous  crisis  of  a  disbanded 
army.  Hence,  also,  those  oppressive  expedients  for  raising 
men  which  were  upon  several  occasions  practiced,  and  which 
nothing  but  the  enthusiasm  of  liberty  would  have  induced  the 
people  to  endure. 

»  Encyclopaedia,  article  "Empire." 


THE  FEDERALIST  lOi 

This  method  of  raising  troops  is  not  more  unfriendly  to 
economy  and  vigor  than  it  is  to  an  equal  distribution  of  the 
burden.  The  states  near  the  seat  of  war,  influenced  by  motives 
of  self-preservation,  made  efforts  to  furnish  their  quotas,  which 
even  exceeded  their  abilities,  while  those  at  a  distance  from 
danger  were,  for  the  most  part,  as  remiss  as  the  others  were 
diligent,  in  their  exertions.  The  immediate  pressure  of  this 
inequahty  was  not  in  this  case,  as  in  that  of  the  contributions  of 
money,  alleviated  by  the  hope  of  a  final  liquidation.  The  states 
which  did  not  pay  their  proportions  of  money  might  at  least  be 
charged  with  their  deficiencies;  but  no  account  could  be  formed 
of  the  deficiencies  in  the  supplies  of  men.  We  shall  not,  how- 
ever, see  much  reason  to  regret  the  want  of  this  hope,  when  we 
consider  how  Httle  prospect  there  is  that  the  most  delinquent 
states  ever  will  be  able  to  make  compensation  for  their  pecuniary 
failures.  The  system  of  quotas  and  reqm'sitions,  whether  it  be 
applied  to  men  or  money,  is,  in  every  view,  a  system  of  imbecility 
in  the  Union,  and  of  inequality  and  injustice  among  the  members. 

The  right  of  equal  suffrage  among  the  states  is  another 
exceptionable  part  of  the  Confederation.  Every  idea  of  propor- 
tion and  every  rule  of  fair  representation  conspire  to  condenm 
a  principle  which  gives  to  Rhode  Island  an  equal  weight  in  the 
scale  of  power  with  Massachusetts,  or  Connecticut,  or  New 
York,  and  to  Delaware  an  equal  voice  in  the  national  delibera- 
tions with  Pennsylvania,  or  Virginia,  or  North  Carolina.  Its 
operation  contradicts  that  fundamental  maxim  of  republican 
government,  which  requires  that  the  sense  of  the  majority  should 
prevail.  Sophistry  may  reply  that  sovereigns  are  equal,  and 
that  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the  states  will  be  a  majority  of 
confederated  America.  But  this  kind  of  logical  legerdemain 
will  never  coimteract  the  plain  suggestions  of  justice  and  com- 
mon sense.  It  may  happen  that  this  majority  of  states  is  a 
small  minority  of  the  people  of  America;  ^  and  two  thirds  of  the 

>  New  Hampshire,  Rhode  Island,  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  and 
Maryland  are  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  the  states,  but  they  do  not  contain  one  third 
of  the  people. 


I02  THE  FEDERALIST 

people  of  America  could  not  long  be  persuaded,  upon  the  credit 
of  artificial  distinctions  and  syllogistic  subtleties,  to  submit  their 
interests  to  the  management  and  disposal  of  one  third.  The 
largtr  states  would  after  a  while  revolt  from  the  idea  of  receiving 
the  law  from  the  smaller.  To  acquiesce  in  such  a  privation  of 
their  due  importance  in  the  political  scale,  would  be  not  merely 
to  be  insensible  to  the  love  of  power,  but  even  to  sacrifice  the 
desire  of  equaHty.  It  is  neither  rational  to  expect  the  first,  nor 
just  to  require  the  last.  The  smaller  states,  considering  how 
peculiarly  their  safety  and  welfare  depend  on  union,  ought 
readily  to  renounce  a  pretension  which,  if  not  relinquished, 
would  prove  fatal  to  its  duration. 

It  may  be  objected  to  this,  that  not  seven  but  nine  states,  or 
two  thirds  of  the  whole  number,  must  consent  to  the  most 
important  resolutions;  and  it  may  be  thence  inferred  that  nine 
states  would  always  comprehend  a  majority  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Union.  But  this  does  not  obviate  the  impropriety  of  an 
equal  vote  between  states  of  the  most  unequal  dimensions  and 
populousness;  nor  is  the  inference  accurate  in  point  of  fact,  for 
we  can  enumerate  nine  states  which  contain  less  than  a  majority 
of  the  people,^  and  it  is  constitutionally  possible  that  these  nine 
may  give  the  vote.  Besides,  there  are  matters  of  considerable 
moment  determinable  by  a  bare  majority;  and  there  are  others, 
concerning  which  doubts  have  been  entertained,  which,  if  inter- 
preted in  favor  of  the  sufficiency  of  a  vote  of  seven  states,  would 
extend  its  operation  to  interests  of  the  first  magnitude.  In 
addition  to  this,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  there  is  a  probability 
of  an  increase  in  the  number  of  states,  and  no  provision  for  a 
proportional  augmentation  of  the  ratio  of  votes. 

But  this  is  not  all:  what  at  first  sight  may  seem  a  remedy,  is, 
in  reahty,  a  poison.  To  give  a  minority  a  negative  upon  the 
majority  (which  is  always  the  case  where  more  than  a  majority 
is  requisite  to  a  decision),  is,  in  its  tendency,  to  subject  the  sense 
of  the  greater  number  to  that  of  the  lesser.     Congress,  from  the 

»  Add  New  York  and  Connecticut  to  the  foregoing  seven,  and  they  will  still  be  less 
than  a  majority. 


THE  FEDERALIST  103 

non-attendance  of  a  few  states,  have  been  frequently  in  the 
situation  of  a  PoHsh  diet,  where  a  single  veto  has  been  sufficient 
to  put  a  stop  to  all  their  movements.  A  sixtieth  part  of  the 
Union,  which  is  about  the  proportion  of  Delaware  and  Rhode 
Island,  has  several  times  been  able  to  oppose  an  entire  bar  to  its 
operations.  This  is  one  of  those  refinements  which,  in  practice, 
has  an  effect  the  reverse  of  what  is  expected  from  it  in  theory. 
The  necessity  of  unanimity  in  public  bodies,  or  of  something 
approaching  towards  it,  has  been  founded  upon  a  supposition 
that  it  would  contribute  to  security.  But  its  real  operation 
is  to  embarrass  the  administration,  to  destroy  the  energy  of 
government,  and  to  substitute  the  pleasure,  caprice,  or  artifices 
of  an  insignificant,  turbulent,  or  corrupt  junto,  to  the  regular 
deliberations  and  decisions  of  a  respectable  majority.  In  those 
emergencies  of  a  nation,  in  which  the  goodness  or  badness,  the 
weakness  or  strength  of  its  government,  is  of  the  greatest  import- 
ance, there  is  commonly  a  necessity  for  action.  The  public 
business  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  go  forward.  If  a  pertina- 
cious minority  can  control  the  opinion  of  a  majority  respecting 
the  best  mode  of  conducting  it,  the  majority,  in  ord,er  that  some- 
thing may  be  done,  must  conform  to  the  views  of  the  minority; 
and  thus  the  sense  of  the  smaller  number  will  overrule  that  of 
the  greater,  and  give  a  tone  to  the  national  proceedings.  Hence, 
tedious  delays,  continual  negotiation  and  intrigue,  contem- 
temptible  compromises  of  the  public  good.  And  yet,  in  such 
a  system,  it  is  even  happy  when  such  compromises  can  take 
place;  for  upon  some  occasions  things  will  not  admit  of  accom- 
modation, and  then  the  measures  of  government  must  be 
injuriously  suspended,  or  fatally  defeated.  It  is  often,  by  the 
impracticability  of  obtaining  the  concurrence  of  the  necessary 
number  of  votes,  kept  in  a  state  of  inaction.  Its  situation  must 
always  savor  of  weakness,  sometimes  border  upon  anarchy. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  discover  that  a  principle  of  this  kind  gives 
greater  scope  to  foreign  corruption,  as  well  as  to  domestic  fac- 
tion, than  that  which  permits  the  sense  of  the  majority  to  decide, 
though  the  contrary  of  this  has  been  presumed.     The  mistake 


I04  THE  FEDERALIST 

has  proceeded  from  not  attending  with  due  care  to  the  mischiefs 
that  may  be  occasioned  by  obstructing  the  progress  of  govern- 
ment at  certain  critical  seasons.  When  the  concurrence  of  a 
large  number  is  required  by  the  Constitution  to  the  doing  of 
any  national  act,  we  are  apt  to  rest  satisfied  that  all  is  safe, 
because  nothing  improper  will  be  likely  to  be  done;  but  we  forget 
how  much  good  may  be  prevented,  and  how  much  ill  may  be 
produced,  by  the  power  of  hindering  that  which  is  necessary 
from  being  done,  and  of  keeping  affairs  in  the  same  unfavorable 
posture  in  which  they  may  happen  to  stand  at  particular  periods. 

Suppose,  for  instance,  we  were  engaged  in  a  war,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  one  foreign  nation,  against  another.  Suppose  the 
necessity  of  our  situation  demanded  peace,  and  the  interest  or 
ambition  of  our  ally  led  him  to  seek  the  prosecution  of  the  war, 
with  views  that  might  justify  us  in  making  separate  terms.  In 
such  a  state  of  things,  this  ally  of  ours  would  evidently  find  it 
much  easier,  by  his  bribes  and  his  intrigues,  to  tie  up  the  hands  of 
government  from  making  peace,  where  two  thirds  of  all  the  votes 
were  requisite  to  that  object,  than  where  a  simple  majority 
would  suffic^  In  the  first  case,  he  would  have  to  corrupt  a 
smaller  number;  in  the  last,  a  greater  number.  Upon  the  same 
principle,  it  would  be  much  easier  for  a  foreign  power  with  which 
we  were  at  war  to  perplex  our  councils  and  embarrass  our 
exertions.  And,  in  a  commercial  view,  we  may  be  subjected  to 
similar  inconveniences.  A  nation,  with  which  we  might  have 
a  treaty  of  commerce,  could  with  much  greater  faciHty  prevent 
our  forming  a  connection  with  her  competitor  in  trade,  though 
such  a  connection  should  be  ever  so  beneficial  to  ourselves. 

Evils  of  this  description  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  imaginary. 
One  of  the  weak  sides  of  republics,  among  their  numerous  advan- 
tages, is  that  they  afford  too  easy  an  inlet  to  foreign  corruption. 
An  hereditary  monarch,  though  often  disposed  to  sacrifice  his 
subjects  to  his  ambition,  has  so  great  a  personal  interest  in  the 
government  and  in  the  external  glory  of  the  nation,  that  it  is  not 
easy  for  a  foreign  power  to  give  him  an  equivalent  for  what 
he  would  sacrifice  by  treachery  to  the  state.    The  world  has 


THE  FEDERALIST  105 

accordingly  been  witness  to  few  examples  of  this  species  of  royal 
prostitution,  though  there  have  been  abundant  specimens  of 
every  other  kind. 

In  republics,  persons  elevated  from  the  mass  of  the  com- 
munity, by  the  suffrages  of  their  fellow-citizens,  to  stations  of 
great  preeminence  and  power,  may  find  compensations  for  be- 
traying their  trust,  which,  to  any  but  minds  actuated  by  superior 
virtue,  may  appear  to  exceed  the  proportion  of  interest  they 
have  in  the  common  stock,  and  to  overbalance  the  obligations 
of  duty.  Hence  it  is  that  history  furnishes  us  with  so  many 
mortifying  examples  of  the  prevalency  of  foreign  corruption  in 
republican  governments.  How  much  this  contributed  to  the 
ruin  of  the  ancient  commonwealths  has  been  already  disclosed. 
It  is  well  known  that  the  deputies  of  the  United  Provinces  have, 
in  various  instances,  been  purchased  by  the  emissaries  of  the 
neighboring  kingdoms.  The  Earl  of  Chesterfield  (if  my  mem- 
ory serves  me  right),  in  a  letter  to  his  court,  intimates  that  his 
success  in  an  important  negotiation  must  depend  on  his  obtain- 
ing a  major's  commission  for  one  of  those  deputies.  And  in 
Sweden  the  parties  were  alternately  bought  by  France  and 
England  in  so  barefaced  and  notorious  a  manner  that  it  excited 
imiversal  disgust  in  the  nation,  and  was  a  principal  cause  that 
the  most  limited  monarch  in  Europe,  in  a  single  day,  without 
tumxilt,  violence,  or  opposition,  became  one  of  the  most  abso- 
lute and  uncontrolled. 

A  circumstance  which  crowns  the  defects  of  the  Confederation 
remains  yet  to  be  mentioned  —  the  want  of  a  judiciary  powefT 
Laws  are  a  dead  letter  without  courts  to  expound  and  define 
their  true  meaning  and  operation.  The  treaties  of  the  United 
States,  to  have  any  force  at  all,  must  be  considered  as  part  of  the 
law  of  the  land.  Their  true  import,  as  far  as  respects  individuals, 
must,  like  all  other  laws,  be  ascertained  by  judicial  determina- 
tions. To  produce  uniformity  in  these  determinations,  they 
ought  to  be  submitted,  in  the  last  resort,  to  one  supreme  tri- 
bunal. And  this  tribunal  ought  to  be  instituted  under  the 
same  authority  which  forms  the  treaties  themselves.     These 


io6  THE  FEDERALIST 

ingredients  are  both  indispensable.  If  there  is  in  each  state  a 
court  of  final  jurisdiction,  there  may  be  as  many  different  final 
determinations  on  the  same  point  as  there  are  courts.  There 
are  endless  diversities  in  the  opinions  of  men.  We  often  see  not 
only  different  courts  but  the  judges  of  the  same  court  differing 
from  each  other.  To  avoid  the  confusion  which  would  unavoid- 
ably result  from  the  contradictory  decisions  of  a  number  of  inde- 
pendent judicatories,  all  nations  have  found  it  necessary  to 
establish  one  court  paramount  to  the  rest,  possessing  a  general 
superintendence,  and  authorized  to  settle  and  declare  in  the  last 
resort  an  uniform  rule  of  civil  justice. 

This  is  the  more  necessary  where  the  frame  of  the  government 
is  so  compounded  that  the  laws  of  the  whole  are  in  danger  of 
being  contravened  by  the  laws  of  the  parts.  In  this  case,  if 
the  particular  tribunals  are  invested  with  a  right  of  ultimate 
jurisdiction,  besides  the  contradictions  to  be  expected  from 
difference  of  opinion,  there  will  be  much  to  fear  from  the  bias 
of  local  views  and  prejudices,  and  from  the  interference  of  local 
regulations.  As  often  as  such  an  interference  was  to  happen, 
there  would  be  reason  to  apprehend  that  the  provisions  of  the 
particular  laws  might  be  preferred  to  those  of  the  general  laws, 
from  the  deference  with  which  men  in  oflGice  naturally  look 
up  to  that  authority  to  which  they  owe  their  official  existence. 
The  treaties  of  the  United  States,  under  the  present  Consti- 
tution, are  hable  to  the  infractions  of  thirteen  different  legis- 
latures, and  as  many  different  courts  of  final  jurisdiction, 
acting  under  the  authority  of  those  legislatures.  The  faith, 
the  reputation,  the  peace  of  the  whole  Union,  are  thus  con- 
tinually at  the  mercy  of  the  prejudices,  the  passions,  and  the 
interests  of  every  member  of  which  it  is  composed.  Is  it 
possible  that  foreign  nations  can  either  respect  or  confide  in 
such  a  government  ?  Is  it  possible  that  the  people  of  America 
will  longer  consent  to  trust  their  honor,  their  happiness,  their 
safety,  on  so  precarious  a  foundation  ? 

In  this  review  of  the  Confederation,  I  have  confined  myself 
to  the  exhibition  of  its  most  material  defects,  passing  over 


THE  FEDERALIST  107 

those  imperfections  in  its  details  by  which  even  a  considerable 
part  of  the  power  intended  to  be  conferred  upon  it  has  been  in  a 
great  measure  rendered  abortive.  It  must  be  by  this  time 
evident  to  all  men  of  reflection  who  are  either  free  from  erroneous 
prepossessions  or  can  divest  themselves  of  them,  that  it  is  a 
system  so  radically  vicious  and  unsound  as  to  admit  not  of 
amendment  but  by  an  entire  change  in  its  leading  features  and 
characters. 

The  organization  of  Congress  is  itself  utterly  improper  for  the  V 
exercise  of  those  powers  which  are  necessary  to  be  depositedr  >^ 
in  the  Union.  A  single  assembly  may  be  a  proper  receptacle 
of  those  slender,  or  rather  fettered,  authorities,  which  have  been 
heretofore  delegated  to  the  federal  head;  but  it  would  be  incon- 
sistent with  all  the  principles  of  good  government  to  intrust 
it  with  those  additional  powers  which,  even  the  moderate  and 
more  rational  adversaries  of  the  proposed  Constitution  admit, 
ought  to  reside  in  the  United  States.  If  that  plan  should  not 
be  adopted,  and  if  the  necessity  of  union  should  be  able  to 
withstand  the  ambitious  aims  of  those  men  who  may  indulge 
magnificent  schemes  of  personal  aggrandizement  from  its  dis- 
solution, the  probability  would  be  that  we  should  run  into  the 
project  of  conferring  supplementary  powers  upon  Congress,  as 
they  are  now  constituted;  and  either  the  machine,  from  the 
intrinsic  feebleness  of  its  structure,  will  moulder  into  pieces, 
in  spite  of  our  ill-judged  efforts  to  prop  it,  or,  by  successive 
augmentations  of  its  force  and  energy,  as  necessity  might  prompt, 
we  shall  finally  accumulate,  in  a  single  body,  all  the  most  im- 
portant prerogatives  of  sovereignty,  and  thus  entail  upon  our 
posterity  one  of  the  most  execrable  forms  of  government  that 
human  infatuation  ever  contrived.  Thus  we  should  create  in 
reaUty  that  very  tyranny  which  the  adversaries  of  the  new 
Constitution  either  are,  or  affect  to  be,  solicitous  to  avert. 

It  has  not  a  Uttle  contributed  to  the  infirmities  of  the  existing 
federal  system,  that  it  never  had  a  ratification  by  the  people. 
Resting  on  no  better  foundation  than  the  consent  of  the  several 
legislatures,  it   has  been  exposed  to  frequent  and  intricate 


io8  THE  FEDERALIST 

questions  concerning  the  validity  of  its  powers,  and  has,  in  some 
instances,  given  birth  to  the  enormous  doctrine  of  a  right  of 
legislative  repeal.  Owing  its  ratification  to  the  law  of  a  state, 
it  has  been  contended  that  the  same  authority  might  repeal 
the  law  by  which  it  was  ratified.  However  gross  a  heresy  it 
may  be  to  maintain  that  a  party  to  a  compact  has  a  right  to 
revoke  that  compact,  the  doctrine  itself  has  had  respectable 
advocates.  The  possibility  of  a  question  of  this  nature  proves 
the  necessity  of  laying  the  foundations  of  our  national  govern- 
ment deeper  than  in  the  mere  sanction  of  delegated  authority. 
The  fabric  of  American  empire  ought  to  rest  on  the  soUd  basis 
of  THE  CONSENT  OF  THE  PEOPLE.  The  Streams  of  national 
power  ought  to  flow  immediately  from  that  pure,  original 
fountain  of  all  legitimate  authority. 

PUBLIUS. 


IV 

DIFFICULTIES  ENCOUNTERED  IN  FRAMING  THE 
NEW  CONSTITUTION 

{a)  INHERENT  DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  UNDERTAKING 

Concerning   the   Difficulties   which   the   Convention  must 

HAVE   experienced  IN  THE   FORMULATION   OF  A   PROPER   PlAN  ^ 

In  reviewing  the  defects  of  the  existing  Confederation,  and 
showing  that  they  cannot  be  supplied  by  a  government  of  less 
energy  than  that  before  the  public,  several  of  the  most  important 
principles  of  the  latter  fell  of  course  imder  consideration.  But 
as  the  ultimate  object  of  these  papers  is  to  determine  clearly 
and  fully  the  merits  of  this  Constitution,  and  the  expediency  of 
adopting  it,  our  plan  cannot  be  completed  without  taking  a  more 
critical  and  thorough  survey  of  the  work  of  the  Convention, 
without  examining  it  on  all  its  sides,  comparing  it  in  all  its  parts, 
and  calculating  its  probable  effects. 

That  this  remaining  task  may  be  executed  under  impressions 
conducive  to  a  just  and  fair  result,  some  reflections  must  in  this 
place  be  indulged,  which  candor  previously  suggests. 

It  is  a  misfortune,  inseparable  from  human  affairs,  that  public 
measures  are  rarely  investigated  with  that  spirit  of  moderation 
which  is  essential  to  a  just  estimate  of  their  real  tendency  to 
advance  or  obstruct  the  public  good;  and  that  this  spirit  is 
more  apt  to  be  diminished  than  promoted  by  those  occasions 
which  require  an  unusual  exercise  of  it.  To  those  who  have 
been  led  by  experience  to  attend  to  this  consideration,  it  could 
not  appear  surprising  that  the  act  of  the  Convention,  which 
recommends  so  many  important  changes  and  innovations, 
which  may  be  viewed  in  so  many  lights  and  relations,  and  which 
touches  the  springs  of  so  many  passions  and  interests,  should 

1  No.  XXXVII  (XXXVI).     Madison.     Dafly  Advertiser,  January  n,  1788. 


no  THE  FEDERALIST 

find  or  excite  dispositions  unfriendly,  both  on  one  side  and  on 
the  other,  to  a  fair  discussion  and  accurate  judgment  of  its 
merits.  In  some,  it  has  been  too  evident  from  their  own  publi- 
cations that  they  have  scanned  the  proposed  Constitution,  not 
only  with  a  predisposition  to  censure,  but  with  a  predetermina- 
tion to  condemn;  as  the  language  held  by  others  betrays  an 
opposite  predetermination  or  bias,  which  must  render  their 
opinions  also  of  little  moment  in  the  question.  In  placing,  how- 
ever, these  different  characters  on  a  level,  with  respect  to  the 
weight  of  their  opinions,  I  wish  not  to  insinuate  that  there  may 
not  be  a  material  difference  in  the  purity  of  their  intentions. 
It  is  but  just  to  remark  in  favor  of  the  latter  description,  that 
as  our  situation  is  universally  admitted  to  be  peculiarly  critical, 
and  to  require  indispensably  that  something  should  be  done  for 
our  relief,  the  predetermined  patron  of  what  has  been  actually 
done  may  have  taken  his  bias  from  the  weight  of  these  con- 
siderations, as  well  as  from  considerations  of  a  sinister  nature. 
The  predetermined  adversary,  on  the  other  hand,  can  have  been 
governed  by  no  venial  motive  whatever.  The  intentions  of  the 
first  may  be  upright,  as  they  may  on  the  contrary  be  culpable. 
The  views  of  the  last  cannot  be  upright,  and  must  be  culpable. 
But  the  truth  is,  that  these  papers  are  not  addressed  to  persons 
falling  imder  either  of  these  characters.  They  solicit  the  atten- 
tion of  those  only  who  add  to  a  sincere  zeal  for  the  happiness 
of  their  country  a  temper  favorable  to  a  just  estimate  of  the 
means  of  promoting  it. 

Persons  of  this  character  will  proceed  to  an  examination  of 
the  plan  submitted  by  the  Convention,  not  only  without  a  dis- 
position to  find  or  to  magnify  faults,  but  will  see  the  propriety 
of  reflecting  that  a  faultless  plan  was  not  to  be  expected.  Nor 
will  they  barely  make  allowances  for  the  errors  which  may  be 
chargeable  on  the  fallibihty  to  which  the  Convention,  as  a  body 
of  men,  were  liable;  but  will  keep  in  mind  that  they  themselves 
also  are  but  men,  and  ought  not  to  assume  an  infallibility  in 
rejudging  the  fallible  opinions  of  others. 

With  equal  readiness  will  it  be  perceived  that,  besides  these 


THE  FEDERALIST  III 

inducements  to  candor,  many  allowances  ought  to  be  made  for 
the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  the  imdertaking 
referred  to  the  Convention. 

The  novelty  of  the  undertaking  immediately  strikes  us.  It 
has  been  shown  in  the  course  of  these  papers,  that  the  existing 
Confederation  is  founded  on  principles  which  are  fallacious; 
that  we  must  consequently  change  this  first  foimdation,  and 
with  it  the  superstructure  resting  upon  it.  It  has  been  shown 
that  the  other  confederacies  which  could  be  consulted  as  prece- 
dents have  been  vitiated  by  the  same  erroneous  principles,  and 
can  therefore  furnish  no  other  light  than  that  of  beacons  which 
give  warning  of  the  course  to  be  shunned,  without  pointing  out 
that  which  ought  to  be  pursued.  The  most  that  the  Convention 
could  do  in  such  a  situation  was  to  avoid  the  errors  suggested 
by  the  past  experience  of  other  countries,  as  well  as  of  our  own, 
and  to  provide  a  convenient  mode  of  rectifying  their  own  errors, 
as  future  experience  may  unfold  them. 

Among  the  difficulties  encountered  by  the  Convention,  a  very 
important  one  must  have  lain  in  combining  the  requisite  stability 
and  energy  in  government  with  the  inviolable  attention  due  to 
liberty  and  to  the  republican  form.  Without  substantially 
accomplishing  this  part  of  their  undertaking,  they  would  have 
very  imperfectly  fulfilled  the  object  of  their  appointment,  or 
the  expectation  of  the  public;  yet  that  it  could  not  be  easily 
accompHshed  will  be  denied  by  no  one  who  is  unwilling  to  betray 
his  ignorance  of  the  subject.  Energy  in  government  is  essential 
to  that  security  against  external  and  internal  danger,  and  to 
that  prompt  and  salutary  execution  of  the  laws  which  enter 
into  the  very  definition  of  good  government.  Stability  in 
government  is  essential  to  national  character  and  to  the  advan- 
tages annexed  to  it,  as  well  as  to  that  repose  and  confidence  in 
the  minds  of  the  people,  which  are  among  the  chief  blessings 
of  civil  society.  An  irregular  and  mutable  legislation  is  not 
more  an  evil  in  itself  than  it  is  odious  to  the  people;  and  it  may 
be  pronounced  with  assurance  that  the  people  of  this  country, 
enlightened    as    they   are    with   regard    to    the  nature,   and 


112  THE  FEDERALIST 

interested,  as  the  great  body  of  them  are,  in  the  effects  of  good 
government,  will  never  be  satisfied  till  some  remedy  be  applied 
to  the  vicissitudes  and  micertainties  which  characterize  the 
state  administrations.  On  comparing,  however,  these  valuable 
ingredients  with  the  vital  principles  of  liberty,  we  must  perceive 
at  once  the  difficulty  of  mingling  them  together  in  their  due 
proportions.  The  genius  of  repubHcan  liberty  seems  to  demand 
on  one  side  not  only  that  all  power  should  be  derived  from  the 
people,  but  that  those  intrusted  with  it  should  be  kept  in  depen- 
dence on  the  people,  by  a  short  duration  of  their  appointments; 
and  that  even  during  this  short  period  the  trust  should  be  placed 
not  in  a  few,  but  in  a  number  of  hands.  Stability,  on  the  con- 
trary, requires  that  the  hands  in  which  power  is  lodged  should 
continue  for  a  length  of  time  the  same.  A  frequent  change  of 
men  will  result  from  a  frequent  return  of  elections,  and  a  fre- 
quent change  of  measures  from  a  frequent  change  of  men; 
whilst  energy  in  government  requires  not  only  a  certain  duration 
of  power,  but  the  execution  of  it  by  a  single  hand. 

How  far  the  Convention  may  have  succeeded  in  this  part  of 
their  work,  will  better  appear  on  a  more  accurate  view  of  it. 
From  the  cursory  view  here  taken,  it  must  clearly  appear  to 
have  been  an  arduous  part. 

Not  less  arduous  must  have  been  the  task  of  marking  the 
proper  Hne  of  partition  between  the  authority  of  the  general 
and  that  of  the  state  governments.  Every  man  will  be  sensible 
of  this  difficulty,  in  proportion  as  he  has  been  accustomed  to 
contemplate  and  discriminate  objects  extensive  and  complicated 
in  their  nature.  The  faculties  of  the  mind  itself  have  never  yet 
been  distinguished  and  defined,  with  satisfactory  precision,  by 
all  the  efforts  of  the  most  acute  and  metaphysical  philosophers. 
Sense,  perception,  judgment,  desire,  voHtion,  memory,  imagina- 
tion, are  foimd  to  be  separated  by  such  delicate  shades  and 
minute  gradations  that  their  boundaries  have  eluded  the  most 
subtle  investigations,  and  remain  a  pregnant  source  of  ingenious 
disquisition  and  controversy.  The  boundaries  between  the 
great  kingdoms  of  nature,  and,  still  more,  between  the  various 


THE  FEDERALIST  113 

provinces  and  lesser  portions  into  which  they  are  subdivided, 
afford  another  illustration  of  the  same  important  truth.  The 
most  sagacious  and  laborious  naturalists  have  never  yet  suc- 
ceeded in  tracing  with  certainty  the  line  which  separates  the 
district  of  vegetable  life  from  the  neighboring  region  of  unor- 
ganized matter,  or  which  marks  the  termination  of  the  former 
and  the  commencement  of  the  animal  empire.  A  still  greater 
obscurity  lies  in  the  distinctive  characters  by  which  the  objects 
in  each  of  these  great  departments  of  nature  have  been  arranged 
and  assorted. 

When  we  pass  from  the  works  of  nature,  in  which  all  the 
delineations  are  perfectly  accurate,  and  appear  to  be  otherwise 
only  from  the  imperfection  of  the  eye  which  surveys  them,  to  the 
institutions  of  man,  in  which  the  obscurity  arises  as  well  from 
the  object  itself  as  from  the  organ  by  which  it  is  contemplated, 
we  must  perceive  the  necessity  of  moderating  still  further  our 
expectations  and  hopes  from  the  efforts  of  human  sagacity. 
Experience  has  instructed  us  that  no  skill  in  the  science  of 
government  has  yet  been  able  to  discriminate  and  define,  with 
sufficient  certainty,  its  three  great  provinces  —  the  legislative, 
executive,  and  judiciary;  or  even  the  privileges  and  powers  of 
the  different  legislative  branches.  Questions  daily  occur  in 
the  course  of  practice  which  prove  the  obscurity  which  reigns  in 
these  subjects,  and  which  puzzle  the  greatest  adepts  in  poUtical 
science. 

The  experience  of  ages,  with  the  continued  and  combined 
labors  of  the  most  enlightened  legislators  and  jurists,  have  been 
equally  imsuccessful  in  delineating  the  several  objects  and  Hmits 
of  different  codes  of  laws  and  different  tribunals  of  justice.  The 
precise  extent  of  the  common  law,  the  statute  law,  the  mari- 
time law,  the  ecclesiastical  law,  the  law  of  corporations,  and 
other  local  laws  and  customs,  remains  still  to  be  clearly  and 
finally  estabhshed  in  Great  Britain,  where  accuracy  in  such 
subjects  has  been  more  industriously  pursued  than  in  any  other 
part  of  the  world.  The  jurisdiction  of  her  several  courts,  general 
and  local,  of  law,  of  equity,  of  admiralty,  etc.,  is  not  less  a  source 


114  THE  FEDERALIST 

of  frequent  and  intricate  discussions,  sufficiently  denoting  the 
indeterminate  limits  by  which  they  are  respectively  circum- 
scribed. All  new  laws,  though  penned  with  the  greatest  techni- 
cal skill,  and  passed  on  the  fullest  and  m,">st  mature  deliberation, 
are  considered  as  more  or  less  obscure  and  equivocal,  until  their 
meaning  be  liquidated  and  ascertained  by  a  series  of  particular 
discussions  and  adjudications.  Besides  the  obscurity  arising 
from  the  complexity  of  objects,  and  the  imperfection  of  the 
human  faculties,  the  medium  through  which  the  conceptions  of 
men  are  conveyed  to  each  other  adds  a  fresh  embarrassment. 
The  use  of  words  is  to  express  ideas.  Perspicuity,  therefore, 
requires  not  only  that  the  ideas  should  be  distinctly  formed, 
but  that  they  should  be  expressed  by  words  distinctly  and 
exclusively  appropriated  to  them.  But  no  language  is  so  copious 
as  to  supply  words  and  phrases  for  every  complex  idea,  or  so 
correct  as  not  to  include  many  equivocally  denoting  different 
ideas.  Hence  it  must  happen  that  however  accurately  objects 
may  be  discriminated  in  themselves,  and  however  accurately 
the  discrimination  may  be  considered,  the  definition  of  them 
may  be  rendered  inaccurate  by  the  inaccuracy  of  the  terms  in 
which  it  is  deUvered.  And  this  unavoidable  inaccuracy  must 
be  greater  or  less,  according  to  the  complexity  and  novelty  of  the 
objects  defined.  When  the  Almighty  himself  condescends  to 
address  mankind  in  their  own  language,  his  meaning,  luminous 
as  it  must  be,  is  rendered  dim  and  doubtful  by  the  cloudy 
medium  through  which  it  is  communicated. 

Here,  then,  are  three  sources  of  vague  and  incorrect  defini- 
tions: indistinctness  of  the  object,  imperfection  of  the  organ  of 
conception,  inadequateness  of  the  vehicle  of  ideas.  Any  one  of 
these  must  produce  a  certain  degree  of  obscurity.  The  Conven- 
tion, in  dehneating  the  boundary  between  the  federal  and  state 
jurisdictions,  must  have  experienced  the  full  effect  of  them  all. 

To  the  difficulties  already  mentioned  may  be  added  the  inter- 
fering pretensions  of  the  larger  and  smaller  states.  We  cannot 
err  in  supposing  that  the  former  would  contend  for  a  participa- 
tion in  the  government,  fully  proportioned  to  their  superior 


THE  FEDERALIST  115 

wealth  and  importance;  and  that  the  latter  would  not  be  less 
tenacious  of  the  equaUty  at  present  enjoyed  by  them.  We  may 
well  suppose  that  neither  side  would  entirely  yield  to  the  other, 
and  consequently  that  the  struggle  could  be  terminated  only  by 
compromise.  It  is  extremely  probable,  also,  that  after  the 
ratio  of  representation  had  been  adjusted,  this  very  compromise 
must  have  produced  a  fresh  struggle  between  the  same  parties, 
to  give  such  a  turn  to  the  organization  of  the  government,  and  to 
the  distribution  of  its  powers,  as  would  increase  the  importance 
of  the  branches,  in  forming  which  they  had  respectively  obtained 
the  greatest  share  of  influence.  There  are  features  in  the  Con- 
stitution which  warrant  each  of  these  suppositions;  and  as  far 
as  either  of  them  is  well  founded,  it  shows  that  the  Convention 
must  have  been  compelled  to  sacrifice  theoretical  propriety  to 
the  force  of  extraneous  considerations. 

Nor  could  it  have  been  the  large  and  small  states  only,  which 
would  marshal  themselves  in  opposition  to  each  other  on  various 
points.  Other  combinations,  resulting  from  a  difference  of 
local  position  and  policy,  must  have  created  additional  diffi- 
culties. As  every  state  may  be  divided  into  different  districts, 
and  its  citizens  into  different  classes,  which  give  birth  to  con- 
tending interests  and  local  jealousies,  so  the  different  parts  of  the 
United  States  are  distingm'shed  from  each  other  by  a  variety 
of  circumstances  which  produce  a  like  effect  on  a  larger  scale. 
And  although  this  variety  of  interests,  for  reasons  sufficiently 
explained  in  a  former  paper,  may  have  a  salutary  influence  on 
the  administration  of  the  government  when  formed,  yet  every 
one  must  be  sensible  of  the  contrary  influence  which  must  have 
been  experienced  in  the  task  of  forming  it. 

Would  it  be  wonderful  if,  under  the  pressure  of  all  these 
difficulties,  the  Convention  should  have  been  forced  into  some 
deviations  from  that  artificial  structure  and  regular  symmetry 
which  an  abstract  view  of  the  subject  might  lead  an  ingenious 
theorist  to  bestow  on  a  Constitution  planned  in  his  closet  or  in 
his  imagination  ?  The  real  wonder  is  that  so  many  difficul- 
ties should  have  been  surmounted,  and  surmoimted  with  an 


ii6  THE  FEDERALIST 

unanimity  almost  as  imprecedented  as  it  must  have  been  im- 
expected.  It  is  impossible  for  any  man  of  candor  to  reflect  on 
this  circumstance  without  partaking  of  the  astonishment.  It 
is  impossible  for  the  man  of  pious  reflection  not  to  perceive  in 
it  a  finger  of  that  Almighty  Hand  which  has  been  so  frequently 
and  signally  extended  to  our  relief  in  the  critical  stages  of  the 
Revolution. 

We  had  occasion,  in  a  former  paper,  to  take  notice  of  the 
repeated  trials  which  have  been  imsuccessfuUy  made  in  the 
United  Netherlands  for  reforming  the  baneful  and  notorious 
vices  of  their  constitution.  The  history  of  almost  all  the  great 
coimcils  and  consultations  held  among  mankind  for  reconciling 
their  discordant  opinions,  assuaging  their  mutual  jealousies, 
and  adjusting  their  respective  interests,  is  a  history  of  factions, 
contentions,  and  disappointments,  and  may  be  classed  among 
the  most  dark  and  degrading  pictures  which  display  the  infirmi- 
ties and  depravities  of  the  human  character.  If,  in  a  few 
scattered  instances,  a  brighter  aspect  is  presented,  they  serve 
only  as  exceptions  to  admonish  us  of  the  general  truth,  and  by 
their  luster  to  darken  the  gloom  of  the  adverse  prospect  to  which 
they  are  contrasted.  In  revolving  the  causes  from  which  these 
exceptions  result,  and  applying  them  to  the  particular  instance 
before  us,  we  are  necessarily  led  to  two  important  conclusions. 
The  first  is,  that  the  Convention  must  have  enjoyed,  in  a  very 
singular  degree,  an  exemption  from  the  pestilential  influence  of 
party  animosities  —  the  diseases  most  incident  to  dehberative 
bodies,  and  most  apt  to  contaminate  their  proceedings.  The 
second  conclusion  is  that  all  the  deputations  composing  the 
Convention  were  either  satisfactorily  accommodated  by  the  final 
act,  or  were  induced  to  accede  to  it  by  a  deep  conviction  of  the 
necessity  of  sacrificing  private  opinions  and  partial  interests  to 
the  public  good,  and  by  a  despair  of  seeing  this  necessity  dimin- 
ished by  delays  or  by  new  experiments.  Publius. 


THE  FEDERALIST      ^^  117 

(b)  DIFFERENCE  OF  OPINION  CONCERNING  DETAILS 

The  Subject  continued,  and  the  Incoherence  of  the 
Objections  to  the  Plan  exposed  ^ 

It  is  not  a  little  remarkable  that  in  every  case  reported  by 
ancient  history,  in  which  government  has  been  established  with 
deliberation  and  consent,  the  task  of  framing  it  has  not  been 
committed  to  an  assembly  of  men,  but  has  been  performed  by 
some  individual  citizen  of  preeminent  wisdom  and  approved 
integrity. 

Minos,  we  learn,  was  the  primitive  founder  of  the  government 
of  Crete,  as  Zaleucus  was  of  that  of  the  Locrians.  Theseus  first, 
and  after  him  Draco  and  Solon,  instituted  the  government  of 
Athens.  Lycurgus  was  the  lawgiver  of  Sparta.  The  founda- 
tion of  the  original  government  of  Rome  was  laid  by  Romulus, 
and  the  work  completed  by  two  of  his  elective  successors,  Numa 
and  Tullus  Hostilius.  On  the  abolition  of  royalty  the  consular 
administration  was  substituted  by  Brutus,  who  stepped  forward 
with  a  project  for  such  a  reform,  which,  he  alleged,  had  been 
prepared  by  Servius  Tullius,  and  to  which  his  address  obtained 
the  assent  and  ratification  of  the  senate  and  people.  This 
remark  is  appHcable  to  confederate  governments  also.  Am- 
phictyon,  we  are  told,  was  the  author  of  that  which  bore  his 
name.  The  Achaean  League  received  its  first  birth  from  Achaeus, 
and  its  second  from  Aratus. 

What  degree  of  agency  these  reputed  lawgivers  might  have 
in  their  respective  establishments,  or  how  far  they  might  be 
clothed  with  the  legitimate  authority  of  the  people,  cannot  in 
every  instance  be  ascertained.  In  some,  however,  the  proceed- 
ing was  strictly  regular.  Draco  appears  to  have  been  intrusted 
by  the  people  of  Athens  with  indefinite  powers  to  reform  its 
government  and  laws.  And  Solon,  according  to  Plutarch,  was 
in  a  manner  compelled,  by  the  universal  suffrage  of  his  fellow- 
citizens,  to  take  upon  him  the  sole  and  absolute  power  of  new- 
modeling  the  constitution.     The  proceedings  under  Lycurgus 

1  No.  XXXVIH  (XXXVII).     Madison.     Independent  Journal,  January  12,  1788. 


Ii8  THE  FEDERALIST 

were  less  regular;  but  as  far  as  the  advocates  for  a  regular 
reform  could  prevail,  they  all  turned  their  eyes  towards  the 
single  efforts  of  that  celebrated  patriot  and  sage,  instead  of 
seeking  to  bring  about  a  revolution  by  the  intervention  of  a 
deliberative  body  of  citizens. 

Whence  could  it  have  proceeded  that  a  people,  jealous  as  the 
Greeks  were  of  their  liberty,  should  so  far  abandon  the  rules  of 
caution  as  to  place  their  destiny  in  the  hands  of  a  single  citizen  ? 
Whence  could  it  have  proceeded  that  the  Athenians,  a  people 
who  would  not  suffer  an  army  to  be  commanded  by  fewer  than 
ten  generals,  and  who  required  no  other  proof  of  danger  to  their 
liberties  than  the  illustrious  merit  of  a  fellow-citizen,  should 
consider  one  illustrious  citizen  as  a  more  eligible  depositary  of 
the  fortimes  of  themselves  and  their  posterity  than  a  select 
body  of  citizens  from  whose  common  deliberations  more  wis- 
dom, as  well  as  more  safety,  might  have  been  expected  ?  These 
questions  cannot  be  fully  answered  without  supposing  that  the 
fears  of  discord  and  disunion  among  a  number  of  counselors 
exceeded  the  apprehension  of  treachery  or  incapacity  in  a  single 
individual.  History  informs  us,  Kkewise,  of  the  difficulties 
with  which  these  celebrated  reformers  had  to  contend,  as  well 
as  of  the  expedients  which  they  were  obHged  to  employ  in  order 
to  carry  their  reforms  into  effect.  Solon,  who  seems  to  have 
indulged  a  more  temporizing  policy,  confessed  that  he  had  not 
given  to  his  countrymen  the  government  best  suited  to  their 
happiness,  but  most  tolerable  to  their  prejudices.  And  Lycur- 
gus,  more  true  to  his  object,  was  under  the  necessity  of  mixing  a 
portion  of  violence  with  the  authority  of  superstition,  and  of 
securing  his  final  success  by  a  voluntary  renunciation,  first  of 
his  coimtry,  and  then  of  his  Ufe.  If  these  lessons  teach  us,  on 
one  hand,  to  admire  the  improvement  made  by  America  on  the 
ancient  mode  of  preparing  and  establishing  regular  plans  of 
government,  they  serve  not  less,  on  the  other,  to  admonish  us 
of  the  hazards  and  difficulties  incident  to  such  experiments, 
and  of  the  great  imprudence  of  unnecessarily  multiplying  them. 

Is  it  an  unreasonable  conjecture  that  the  errors  which  may 


THE  FEDERALIST  119 

be  contained  in  the  plan  of  the  Convention  are  such  as  have 
resulted  rather  from  the  defect  of  antecedent  experience  on  this 
complicated  and  difficult  subject,  than  from  a  want  of  accuracy 
or  care  in  the  investigation  of  it;  and  consequently,  such,  as 
will  not  be  ascertained  until  an  actual  trial  shall  have  pointed 
them  out  ?  This  conjecture  is  rendered  probable,  not  only  by 
many  considerations  of  a  general  nature,  but  by  the  particular 
case  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  It  is  observable  that 
among  the  numerous  objections  and  amendments  suggested  by 
the  several  states,  when  these  articles  were  submitted  for  their 
ratification,  not  one  is  foimd  which  alludes  to  the  great  and 
radical  error  which  on  actual  trial  has  discovered  itself.  And 
if  we  except  the  observations  which  New  Jersey  was  led  to  make, 
rather  by  her  local  situation  than  by  her  peculiar  foresight, 
it  may  be  questioned  whether  a  single  suggestion  was  of  sufficient 
moment  to  justify  a  revision  of  the  system.  There  is  abundant 
reason,  nevertheless,  to  suppose  that  immaterial  as  these  objec- 
tions were,  they  would  have  been  adhered  to  with  a  very  dan- 
gerous inflexibility,  in  some  states,  had  not  a  zeal  for  their 
opinions  and  supposed  interests  been  stifled  by  the  more  power- 
ful sentiment  of  self-preservation.  One  state,  we  may  re- 
member, persisted  for  several  years  in  refusing  her  concurrence, 
although  the  enemy  remained  the  whole  period  at  our  gates, 
or  rather  in  the  very  bowels  of  our  coimtry.  Nor  was  her 
pliancy  in  the  end  effected  by  a  less  motive  than  the  fear  of 
being  chargeable  with  protracting  the  pubHc  calamities,  and 
endangering  the  event  of  the  contest.  Every  candid  reader 
will  make  the  proper  reflections  on  these  important  facts. 

A  patient  who  finds  his  disorder  daily  growing  worse,  and 
that  an  efficacious  remedy  can  no  longer  be  delayed  without 
extreme  danger,  after  coolly  revolving  his  situation,  and  the 
characters  of  different  physicians,  selects  and  calls  in  such  of 
them  as  he  judges  most  capable  of  administering  relief,  and 
best  entitled  to  his  confidence.  The  physicians  attend;  the 
case  of  the  patient  is  carefully  examined;  a  consultation  is  held; 
they  are  unanimously  agreed  that  the  symptoms  are  critical,  but 


I20  THE  FEDERALIST 

that  the  case,  with  proper  and  timely  relief,  is  so  far  from  being 
desperate  that  it  may  be  made  to  issue  in  an  improvement  of 
his  constitution.  They  are  equally  unanimous  in  prescribing 
the  remedy  by  which  this  happy  effect  is  to  be  produced.  The 
prescription  is  no  sooner  made  known,  however,  than  a  number 
of  persons  interpose,  and,  without  denying  the  reaUty  or  danger 
of  the  disorder,  assure  the  patient  that  the  prescription  will  be 
poison  to  his  constitution,  and  forbid  him,  under  pain  of  certain 
death,  to  make  use  of  it.  Might  not  the  patient  reasonably 
demand,  before  he  ventured  to  follow  this  advice,  that  the 
authors  of  it  should  at  least  agree  among  themselves  on  some 
other  remedy  to  be  substituted  ?  And  if  he  found  them  differing 
as  much  from  one  another  as  from  his  first  counselors,  would 
he  not  act  prudently  in  trying  the  experiment  unanimously 
recommended  by  the  latter,  rather  than  in  hearkening  to  those 
who  could  neither  deny  the  necessity  of  a  speedy  remedy,  nor 
agree  in  proposing  one  ? 

Such  a  patient  and  in  such  a  situation  is  America  at  this 
moment.  She  has  been  sensible  of  her  malady.  She  has 
obtained  a  regular  and  unanimous  advice  from  men  of  her  own 
deUberate  choice.  And  she  is  warned  by  others  against  follow- 
ing this  advice  under  pain  of  the  most  fatal  consequences.  Do 
the  monitors  deny  the  reaHty  of  her  danger  ?  No.  Do  they 
deny  the  necessity  of  some  speedy  and  powerful  remedy  ?  No. 
Are  they  agreed,  are  any  two  of  them  agreed,  in  their  objections 
to  the  remedy  proposed,  or  in  the  proper  one  to  be  substituted  ? 
Let  them  speak  for  themselves.  This  one  tells  us  that  the 
proposed  Constitution  ought  to  be  rejected,  because  it  is  not  a 
confederation  of  the  states,  but  a  government  over  individuals. 
Another  admits  that  it  ought  to  be  a  government  over  individu- 
als, to  a  certain  extent,  but  by  no  means  to  the  extent  proposed. 
A  third  does  not  object  to  the  government  over  individuals,  or 
to  the  extent  proposed,  but  to  the  want  of  a  bill  of  rights.  A 
fourth  concurs  in  the  absolute  necessity  of  a  bill  of  rights,  but 
contends  that  it  ought  to  be  declaratory,  not  of  the  personal 
rights  of  individuals,  but  of  the  rights  reserved  to  the  states  in 


THE  FEDERALIST  I2i 

their  political  capacity.  A  fifth  is  of  opinion  that  a  bill  of  rights 
of  any  sort  would  be  superfluous  and  misplaced,  and  that  the 
plan  would  be  unexceptionable  but  for  the  fatal  power  of  regu- 
lating the  times  and  places  of  election.  An  objector  in  a  large 
state  exclaims  loudly  against  the  unreasonable  equality  of 
representation  in  the  Senate.  An  objector  in  a  small  state  is 
equally  loud  against  the  dangerous  inequality  in  the  House  of 
Representatives.  From  this  quarter,  we  are  alarmed  with  the 
amazing  expense  from  the  number  of  persons  who  are  to  admin- 
ister the  new  government.  From  another  quarter,  and  some- 
times from  the  same  quarter,  on  another  occasion,  the  cry  is 
that  the  Congress  will  be  but  the  shadow  of  a  representation,  and 
that  the  government  would  be  far  less  objectionable  if  the  num- 
ber and  the  expense  were  doubled.  A  patriot  in  a  state  that 
does  not  import  or  export  discerns  insuperable  objections  against 
the  power  of  direct  taxation.  The  patriotic  adversary  in  a 
state  of  great  exports  and  imports  is  not  less  dissatisfied  that  the 
whole  burden  of  taxes  may  be  thrown  on  consumption.  This 
politician  discovers  in  the  Constitution  a  direct  and  irresistible 
tendency  to  monarchy;  that  is  equally  sure  it  will  end  in  aristo- 
cracy. Another  is  puzzled  to  say  which  of  these  shapes  it  will 
ultimately  assume,  but  sees  clearly  it  must  be  one  or  other  of 
them:  whilst  a  fourth  is  not  wanting,  who  with  no  less  confi- 
dence affirms  that  the  Constitution  is  so  far  from  having  a  bias 
towards  either  of  these  dangers  that  the  weight  on  that  side  will 
not  be  sufficient  to  keep  it  upright  and  firm  against  its  oppo- 
site propensities.  With  another  class  of  adversaries  to  the  Con- 
stitution the  language  is  that  the  legislative,  executive,  and 
judiciary  departments  are  intermixed  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
contradict  all  the  ideas  of  regular  government  and  all  the  re- 
quisite precautions  in  favor  of  liberty.  Whilst  this  objection 
circulates  in  vague  and  general  expressions,  there  are  not  a  few 
who  lend  their  sanction  to  it.  Let  each  one  come  forward  with 
his  particular  explanation,  and  scarce  any  two  are  exactly  agreed 
on  the  subject.  In  the  eyes  of  one  the  junction  of  the  Senate 
with  the  President  in  the  responsible  function  of  appointing  to 


122  THE  FEDERALIST 

ofl&ces,  instead  of  vesting  this  executive  power  in  the  executive 
alone,  is  the  vicious  part  of  the  organization.  To  another,  the 
exclusion  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  whose  numbers  alone 
could  be  a  due  security  against  corruption  and  partiality  in  the 
exercise  of  such  a  power,  is  equally  obnoxious.  With  another, 
the  admission  of  the  President  into  any  share  of  a  power  which 
must  ever  be  a  da,ngerous  engine  in  the  hands  of  the  executive 
magistrate,  is  an  unpardonable  violation  of  the  maxims  of  re- 
publican jealousy.  No  part  of  the  arrangement,  according  to 
some,  is  more  admissible  than  the  trial  of  impeachments  by  the 
Senate,  which  is  alternately  a  member  both  of  the  legislative 
and  executive  departments,  when  this  power  so  evidently  be- 
longed to  the  judiciary  department.  We  concur  fully,  reply 
others,  in  the  objection  to  this  part  of  the  plan,  but  we  can 
never  agree  that  a  reference  of  impeachments  to  the  judiciary 
authority  would  be  an  amendment  of  the  error.  Our  principal 
dislike  to  the  organization  arises  from  the  extensive  powers 
already  lodged  in  that  department.  Even  among  the  zealous 
patrons  of  a  council  of  state  the  most  irreconcilable  variance  is 
discovered  concerning  the  mode  in  which  it  ought  to  be  consti- 
tuted. The  demand  of  one  gentleman  is  that  the  council 
should  consist  of  a  small  niunber  to  be  appointed  by  the  most 
numerous  branch  of  the  legislature.  Another  would  prefer  a 
larger  number,  and  considers  it  as  a  fundamental  condition  that 
the  appointment  should  be  made  by  the  President  himself. 

As  it  can  give  no  umbrage  to  the  writers  against  the  plan  of 
the  federal  Constitution,  let  us  suppose  that  as  they  are  the 
most  zealous,  so  they  are  also  the  most  sagacious  of  those  who 
think  the  late  Convention  were  unequal  to  the  task  assigned 
them,  and  that  a  wiser  and  better  plan  might  and  ought  to  be 
substituted.  Let  us  further  suppose  that  their  country  should 
concur,  both  in  this  favorable  opinion  of  their  merits,  and  in 
their  unfavorable  opinion  of  the  Convention;  and  should 
accordingly  proceed  to  form  them  into  a  second  convention, 
with  full  powers,  and  for  the  express  purpose  of  revising  and 
remolding  the  work  of  the  first.     Were  the  experiment  to  be 


THE  FEDERALIST  123 

seriously  made,  though  it  requires  some  effort  to  view  it  seriously 
even  in  fiction,  I  leave  it  to  be  decided  by  the  sample  of  opinions 
just  exhibited,  whether,  with  all  their  enmity  to  their  predeces- 
sors, they  would,  in  any  one  point,  depart  so  widely  from  their 
example,  as  in  the  discord  and  ferment  that  would  mark  their 
own  deliberations;  and  whether  the  Constitution  now  before 
the  pubHc  would  not  stand  as  fair  a  chance  for  immortality  as 
Lycurgus  gave  to  that  of  Sparta,  by  making  its  change  to  depend 
on  his  own  return  from  exile  and  death,  if  it  were  to  be  immedi- 
ately adopted,  and  were  to  continue  in  force,  not  until  a  better, 
but  until  ANOTHER  should  be  agreed  upon  by  this  new  assembly 
of  lawgivers. 

It  is  a  matter  both  of  wonder  and  regret  that  those  who  raise 
so  many  objections  against  the  new  Constitution  should  never 
call  to  mind  the  defects  of  that  which  is  to  be  exchanged  for  it. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  the  former  should  be  perfect:  it  is 
sufficient  that  the  latter  is  more  imperfect.  No  man  would 
refuse  to  give  brass  for  silver  or  gold,  because  the  latter  had 
some  alloy  in  it.  No  man  would  refuse  to  quit  a  shattered  and 
tottering  habitation  for  a  firm  and  commodious  building,  be- 
cause the  latter  had  not  a  porch  to  it,  or  because  some  of  the 
rooms  might  be  a  little  larger  or  smaller,  or  the  ceiHng  a  little 
higher  or  lower  than  his  fancy  would  have  planned  them.  But 
waiving  illustrations  of  this  sort,  is  it  not  manifest  that  most 
of  the  capital  objections  urged  against  the  new  system  lie  with 
tenfold  weight  against  the  existing  Confederation  ?  Is  an  inde- 
finite power  to  raise  money  dangerous  in  the  hands  of  a  federal 
government  ?  The  present  Congress  can  make  requisitions 
to  any  amoimt  they  please,  and  the  states  are  constitutionally 
bound  to  furnish  them;  they  can  emit  bills  of  credit  as  long  as 
they  will  pay  for  the  paper;  they  can  borrow,  both  abroad  and 
at  home,  as  long  as  a  shilling  will  be  lent.  Is  an  indefinite  power 
to  raise  troops  dangerous  ?  The  Confederation  gives  to  Con- 
gress that  power  also;  and  they  have  already  begun  to  make 
use  of  it.  Is  it  improper  and  unsafe  to  intermix  the  different 
powers  of  government  in  the  same  body  of  men  ?     Congress, 


124  THE  FEDERALIST 

a  single  body  of  men,  are  the  sole  depositary  of  all  the  federal 
powers.  Is  it  particularly  dangerous  to  give  the  keys  of  the 
treasury,  and  the  command  of  the  army,  into  the  same  hands  ? 
The  Confederation  places  them  both  in  the  hands  of  Congress. 
Is  a  bill  of  rights  essential  to  liberty  ?  The  Confederation  has 
no  bill  of  rights.  Is  it  an  objection  against  the  new  Constitu- 
tion that  it  empowers  the  Senate,  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
Executive,  to  make  treaties  which  are  to  be  the  laws  of  the 
land  ?  The  existing  Congress,  without  any  such  control,  can 
make  treaties  which  they  themselves  have  declared,  and  most 
of  the  states  have  recognized,  to  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land. 
Is  the  importation  of  slaves  permitted  by  the  new  Constitution 
for  twenty  years  ?     By  the  old  it  is  permitted  forever. 

I  shall  be  told  that  however  dangerous  this  mixture  of  powers 
may  be  in  theory,  it  is  rendered  harmless  by  the  dependence 
of  Congress  on  the  states  for  the  means  of  carrying  them  into 
practice;  that  however  large  the  mass  of  powers  may  be,  it  is 
in  fact  a  lifeless  mass.  Then,  say  I,  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
Confederation  is  chargeable  with  the  still  greater  folly  of  declar- 
ing certain  powers  in  the  federal  government  to  be  absolutely 
necessary,  and  at  the  same  time  rendering  them  absolutely 
nugatory;  and,  in  the  next  place,  that  if  the  Union  is  to  con- 
tinue, and  no  better  government  be  substituted,  effective  powers 
must  either  be  granted  to,  or  assumed  by,  the  existing  Congress; 
in  either  of  which  events,  the  contrast  just  stated  will  hold  good. 
But  this  is  not  all.  Out  of  this  lifeless  mass  has  already  grown 
an  excrescent  power,  which  tends  to  realize  all  the  dangers  that 
can  be  apprehended  from  a  defective  construction  of  the  supreme 
government  of  the  Union.  It  is  now  no  longer  a  point  of  specu- 
lation and  hope  that  the  Western  territory  is  a  mine  of  vast 
wealth  to  the  United  States;  and  although  it  is  not  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  extricate  them  from  their  present  distresses,  or, 
for  some  time  to  come,  to  yield  any  regular  supplies  for  the 
public  expenses,  yet  must  it  hereafter  be  able,  under  proper 
management,  both  to  effect  a  gradual  discharge  of  the  domestic 
debt,  and  to  furnish,  for  a  certain  period,  liberal  tributes  to  the 


THE  FEDERALIST  125 

federal  treasury.  A  very  large  proportion  of  this  fund  has  been 
already  surrendered  by  individual  states;  and  it  may  with 
reason  be  expected  that  the  remaining  states  will  not  persist 
in  withholding  similar  proofs  of  their  equity  and  generosity. 
We  may  calculate,  therefore,  that  a  rich  and  fertile  country, 
of  an  area  equal  to  the  inhabited  extent  of  the  United  States, 
will  soon  become  a  national  stock.  Congress  have  assumed  the 
administration  of  this  stock.  They  have  begun  to  render 
it  productive.  Congress  have  imdertaken  to  do  more:  they 
have  proceeded  to  form  new  states,  to  erect  temporary  govern- 
ments, to  appoint  officers  for  them,  and  to  prescribe  the  conditions 
on  which  such  states  shall  be  admitted  into  the  Confederacy. 
All  this  has  been  done,  and  done  without  the  least  color  of 
constitutional  authority.  Yet  no  blame  has  been  whispered; 
no  alarm  has  been  sounded.  A  great  and  independent  fund 
of  revenue  is  passing  into  the  hands  of  a  single  body  of  men, 
who  can  raise  troops  to  an  indefinite  number,  and  appro- 
priate money  to  their  support  for  an  indefinite  period  of 
TIME.  And  yet  there  are  men  who  have  not  only  been  silent 
spectators  of  this  prospect,  but  who  are  advocates  for  the 
system  which  exhibits  it;  and,  at  the  same  time,  urge  against 
the  new  system  the  objections  which  we  have  heard.  Would 
they  not  act  with  more  consistency,  in  urging  the  establishment 
of  the  latter,  as  no  less  necessary  to  guard  the  Union  against 
the  future  powers  and  resources  of  a  body  constructed  Uke  the 
existing  Congress,  than  to  save  it  from  the  dangers  threatened 
by  the  present  impotency  of  that  assembly  ? 

I  mean  not,  by  anything  here  said,  to  throw  censure  on  the 
measures  which  have  been  pursued  by  Congress.  I  am  sensible 
they  could  not  have  done  otherwise.  The  public  interest,  the 
necessity  of  the  case,  imposed  upon  them  the  task  of  overleaping 
their  constitutional  Hmits.  But  is  not  the  fact  an  alarming 
proof  of  the  danger  resulting  from  a  government  which  does  not 
possess  regular  powers  commensurate  to  its  objects  ?  A  dis- 
solution or  usurpation  is  the  dreadful  dilemma  to  which  it  is 
continually  exposed.  Publius. 


THE  CONFORMITY  OF  THE  NEW  CONSTITUTION 
TO  REPUBLICAN  PRINCIPLES 

ESTABLISHES  A  GOVERNMENT  BOTH  REPUBLICAN 
AND   FEDERAL 

The  Conformity  of  the  Plan  to  Republican  Principles: 
AN  Objection  in  Respect  to  the  Powers  of  the 
Convention  examined  ^ 

The  last  paper  having  concluded  the  observations  which  were 
meant  to  introduce  a  candid  survey  of  the  plan  of  govern- 
ment reported  by  the  Convention,  we  now  proceed  to  the  execu- 
tion of  that  part  of  our  undertaking. 

The  first  question  that  offers  itself  is,  whether  the  general 
form  and  aspect  of  the  government  be  strictly  republican.  It  is 
evident  that  no  other  form  would  be  reconcilable  with  the  genius 
of  the  people  of  America;  with  the  fundamental  principles  of 
the  Revolution;  or  with  that  honorable  determination  which 
animates  every  votary  of  freedom,  to  rest  all  our  political  experi- 
ments on  the  capacity  of  mankind  for  self-government.  If  the 
plan  of  the  Convention,  therefore,  be  found  to  depart  from  the 
republican  character,  its  advocates  must  abandon  it  as  no  longer 
defensible. 

What,  then,  are  the  distinctive  characters  of  the  republican 
form  ?  Were  an  answer  to  this  question  to  be  sought,  not  by 
recurring  to  principles,  but  in  the  appHcation  of  the  term  by 
political  writers,  to  the  constitutions  of  different  states,  no 
satisfactory  one  would  ever  be  found.  Holland,  in  which  no 
particle  of  the  supreme  authority  is  derived  from  the  people,  has 
passed  almost  universally  under  the  denomination  of  a  republic. 
The  same  title  has  been  bestowed  on  Venice,  where  absolute 

»  No.  XXXIX  (XXXVIII).     Madison.     Independent  Journal,  January  i6,  1788. 

126 


THE  FEDERALIST  127 

power  over  the  great  body  of  the  people  is  exercised,  in  the  most 
absolute  manner,  by  a  small  body  of  hereditary  nobles.  Poland, 
which  is  a  mixture  of  aristocracy  and  of  monarchy  in  their  worst 
forms,  has  been  dignified  with  the  same  appellation.  The 
government  of  England,  which  has  one  republican  branch  only, 
combined  with  an  hereditary  aristocracy  and  monarchy,  has, 
with  equal  impropriety,  been  frequently  placed  on  the  Hst  of 
republics.  These  examples,  which  are  nearly  as  dissimilar  to 
each  other  as  to  a  genuine  repubhc,  show  the  extreme  inaccuracy 
with  which  the  term  has  been  used  in  political  disquisitions. 

If  we  resort  for  a  criterion  to  the  different  principles  on  which 
different  forms  of  government  are  established,  we  may  define  a 
republic  to  be,  or  at  least  may  bestow  that  name  on,  a  govern- 
ment which  derives  all  its  powers  directly  or  indirectly  from  the 
great  body  of  the  people,  and  is  administered  by  persons  holding 
their  offices  during  pleasure,  for  a  limited  period,  or  during  good 
behavior.  It  is  essential  to  such  a  government  that  it  be 
derived  from  the  great  body  of  the  society,  not  from  an  incon- 
siderable proportion,  or  a  favored  class  of  it;  otherwise  a 
handful  of  tyrannical  nobles,  exercising  their  oppressions  by  a 
delegation  of  their  powers,  might  aspire  to  the  rank  of  republi- 
cans, and  claim  for  their  government  the  honorable  title  of 
repubHc.  It  is  sufficient  for  such  a  government  that  the  persons 
administering  it  be  appointed,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  by 
the  people;  and  that  they  hold  their  appointments  by  either 
of  the  tenures  just  specified;  otherwise  every  government  in 
the  United  States,  as  well  as  every  other  popular  government 
that  has  been  or  can  be  well  organized  or  well  executed,  would 
be  degraded  from  the  republican  character.  According  to  the 
constitution  of  every  state  in  the  Union,  some  or  other  of 
the  officers  of  government  are  appointed  indirectly  only  by  the 
people.  According  to  most  of  them,  the  chief  magistrate  him- 
self is  so  appointed.  And  according  to  one,  this  mode  of  appoint- 
ment is  extended  to  one  of  the  coordinate  branches  of  the 
legislature.  According  to  all  the  constitutions,  also,  the  tenure 
of  the  highest  offices  is  extended  to  a  definite  period,  and  in 


128  THE  FEDERALIST 

many  instances,  both  within  the  legislative  and  executive 
departments,  to  a  period  of  years.  According  to  the  provisions 
of  most  of  the  constitutions,  again,  as  well  as  according  to  the 
most  respectable  and  received  opinions  on  the  subject,  the 
members  of  the  judiciary  department  are  to  retain  their  offices 
by  the  firm  tenure  of  good  behavior. 

On  comparing  the  Constitution  planned  by  the  Convention 
with  the  standard  here  fixed,  we  perceive  at  once  that  it  is,  in 
the  most  rigid  sense,  conformable  to  it.  The  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, like  that  of  one  branch  at  least  of  all  the  state 
legislatures,  is  elected  immediately  by  the  great  body  of  the 
people.  The  Senate,  like  the  present  Congress,  and  the  senate 
of  Maryland,  derives  its  appointment  indirectly  from  the 
people.  The  President  is  indirectly  derived  from  the  choice  of 
the  people,  according  to  the  example  in  most  of  the  states. 
Even  the  judges,  with  all  other  officers  of  the  Union,  will,  as 
in  the  several  states,  be  the  choice,  though  a  remote  choice, 
of  the  people  themselves.  The  duration  of  the  appointments 
is  equally  conformable  to  the  republican  standard,  and  to  the 
model  of  the  state  constitutions.  The  House  of  Representatives 
is  periodically  elective,  as  in  all  the  states,  and  for  the  period 
of  two  years,  as  in  the  state  of  South  Carolina.  The  Senate  is 
elective  for  the  period  of  six  years,  which  is  but  one  year  more 
than  the  period  of  the  senate  of  Maryland,  and  but  two  more 
than  that  of  the  senates  of  New  York  and  Virginia.  The  Pre- 
sident is  to  continue  in  office  for  the  period  of  four  years;  as 
in  New  York  and  Delaware  the  chief  magistrate  is  elected  for 
three  years,  and  in  South  Carolina  for  two  years.  In  the  other 
states  the  election  is  annual.  In  several  of  the  states,  however, 
no  explicit  provision  is  made  for  the  impeachment  of  the  chief 
magistrate.  And  in  Delaware  and  Virginia  he  is  not  impeach- 
able till  out  of  office.  The  President  of  the  United  States  is 
impeachable  at  any  time  during  his  continuance  in  office.  The 
tenure  by  which  the  judges  are  to  hold  their  places  is,  as  it 
unquestionably  ought  to  be,  that  of  good  behavior.  The  tenure 
of  the  ministerial  offices  generally  will  be  a  subject  of   legal 


THE  FEDERALIST  129 

regulation,  conformably  to  the  reason  of  the  case  and  the 
example  of  the  state  constitutions. 

Could  any  further  proof  be  required  of  the  republican  com- 
plexion of  this  system,  the  most  decisive  one  might  be  found  in 
its  absolute  prohibition  of  titles  of  nobility,  both  under  the 
federal  and  the  state  governments,  and  in  its  express  guarantee 
of  the  republican  form  to  each  of  the  latter. 

But  it  was  not  sufficient,  say  the  adversaries  of  the  proposed 
Constitution,  for  the  Convention  to  adhere  to  the  republican 
form.  They  ought,  with  equal  care,  to  have  preserved  the 
federal  form,  which  regards  the  Union  as  a  confederacy  of  sover- 
eign states;  instead  of  which,  they  have  framed  a  national 
government,  which  regards  the  Union  as  a  consolidation  of  the 
states.  And  it  is  asked  by  what  authority  this  bold  and  radical 
innovation  was  undertaken  ?  The  handle  which  has  been 
made  of  this  objection  requires  that  it  should  be  examined  with 
some  precision. 

Without  inquiring  into  the  accuracy  of  the  distinction  on 
which  the  objection  is  foimded,  it  will  be  necessary  to  a  just 
estimate  of  its  force,  first,  to  ascertain  the  real  character  of  the 
government  in  question;  secondly,  to  inquire  how  far  the  Con- 
vention were  authorized  to  propose  such  a  government;  and 
thirdly,  how  far  the  duty  they  owed  to  their  country  could 
supply  any  defect  of  regular  authority. 

First:  In  order  to  ascertain  the  real  character  of  the  govern- 
ment, it  may  be  considered  in  relation  to  the  foundation  on  which 
it  is  to  be  estabUshed;  to  the  sources  from  which  its  ordinary 
powers  are  to  be  drawn;  to  the  operation  of  those  powers;  to  the 
extent  of  them;  and  to  the  authority  by  which  future  changes 
in  the  government  are  to  be  introduced. 

On  examining  the  first  relation,  it  appears,  on  one  hand,  that 
the  Constitution  is  to  be  founded  on  the  assent  and  ratification 
of  the  people  of  America,  given  by  deputies  elected  for  the  special 
purpose;  but,  on  the  other,  that  this  assent  and  ratification  is 
to  be  given  by  the  people,  not  as  individuals  composing  one 
entire  nation,  but  as  composing  the  distinct  and  independent 


I30  THE  FEDERALIST 

states  to  which  they  respectively  belong.  It  is  to  be  the  assent 
and  ratification  of  the  several  states,  derived  from  the  supreme 
authority  in  each  state,  —  the  authority  of  the  people  them- 
selves. The  act,  therefore,  estabUshing  the  Constitution  will 
not  be  a  national ,  but  z,  federal  act. 

That  it  will  be  a  federal  and  not  a  national  act,  as  these  terms 
are  understood  by  the  objectors,  the  act  of  the  people,  as  form- 
ing so  many  independent  states,  not  as  forming  one  aggregate 
nation,  is  obvious  from  this  single  consideration,  that  it  is  to 
result  neither  from  the  decision  of  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the 
Union,  nor  from  that  of  a  majority  of  the  states.  It  must  result 
from  the  unanimous  assent  of  the  several  states  that  are  parties 
to  it,  differing  no  otherwise  from  their  ordinary  assent  than  in 
its  being  expressed,  not  by  the  legislative  authority,  but  by  that 
of  the  people  themselves.  Were  the  peopie  regarded  in  this 
transaction  as  forming  one  nation,  the  will  of  the  raajority  of  the 
whole  people  of  the  United  States  would  bind  the  minority,  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  majority  in  each  state  must  bind  the 
minority;  and  the  will  of  the  majority  must  be  determined 
either  by  a  comparison  of  the  individual  votes,  or  by  considering 
the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  states  as  evidence  of  the  will  of  a 
majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  Neither  of  these 
rules  has  been  adopted.  Each  state,  in  ratifying  the  Constitu- 
tion, is  considered  as  a  sovereign  body,  independent  of  all  others 
and  only  to  be  bound  by  its  own  voluntary  act.  In  this  relation, 
then,  the  new  Constitution  will,  if  established,  be  a  federal ^  and 
not  a  national,  constitution. 

The  next  relation  is  to  the  sources  from  which  the  ordinary 
powers  of  government  are  to  be  derived.  The  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives will  derive  its  powers  from  the  people  of  America; 
and  the  people  will  be  represented  in  the  same  proportion,  and 
on  the  same  principle,  as  they  are  in  the  legislature  of  a  parti- 
cular state.  So  far  the  government  is  national,  not  federal. 
The  Senate,  on  the  other  hand,  will  derive  its  powers  from  the 
states,  as  political  and  coequal  societies;  and  these  will  be 
represented  on  the  principle  of  equaUty  in  the  Senate,  as  they 


THE  FEDERALIST  131 

now  are  in  the  existing  Congress.  So  far  the  government  is 
federal f  not  national.  The  executive  power  will  be  derived  from 
a  very  compound  source.  The  immediate  election  of  the  Presi- 
dent is  to  be  made  by  the  states  in  their  political  characters. 
The  votes  allotted  to  them  are  in  a  compound  ratio,  which 
considers  them  partly  as  distinct  and  coequal  societies,  partly 
as  unequal  members  of  the  same  society.  The  eventual  election, 
again,  is  to  be  made  by  that  branch  of  the  legislature  which 
consists  of  the  national  representatives;  but  in  this  particular 
act  they  are  to  be  thrown  into  the  form  of  individual  delegations, 
from  so  many  distinct  and  coequal  bodies  politic.  From  this 
aspect  of  the  government,  it  appears  to  be  of  a  mixed  character, 
presenting  at  least  as  mainy  federal  as  national  features. 

The  difference  between  a  federal  and  national  government, 
as  it  relates  to  the  operation  of  the  government^  is  by  the  adver- 
saries of  the  plan  of  the  Convention  supposed  to  consist  in  this, 
that  in  the  former  the  powers  operate  on  the  political  bodies 
composing  the  Confederacy,  in  their  political  capacities;  in 
the  latter,  on  the  individual  citizens  composing  the  nation,  in 
their  individual  capacities.  On  trying  the  Constitution  by 
this  criterion,  it  falls  under  the  national,  not  the  federal  character, 
though  perhaps  not  so  completely  as  has  been  understood.  In 
several  cases,  and  particularly  in  the  trial  of  controversies  to 
which  states  may  be  parties,  they  must  be  viewed  and  pro- 
ceeded against  in  their  collective  and  political  capacities  only. 
But  the  operation  of  the  government  on  the  people,  in  their 
individual  capacities,  in  its  ordinary  and  most  essential  pro- 
ceedings, will,  on  the  whole,  in  the  sense  of  its  opponents,  desig- 
nate it,  in  this  relation,  a  national  government. 

But  if  the  government  be  national  with  regard  to  the  operation 
of  its  powers,  it  changes  its  aspect  again  when  we  contemplate  it 
in  relation  to  the  extent  of  its  powers.  The  idea  of  a  national 
government  involves  in  it,  not  only  an  authority  over  the  indi- 
vidual citizens,  but  an  indefinite  supremacy  over  all  persons 
and  things,  so  far  as  they  are  objects  of  lawful  government. 
Among  a  people  consolidated  into  one  nation,  this  supremacy  is 


132  THE  FEDERALIST 

completely  vested  in  the  national  legislature.  Among  com- 
munities united  for  particular  purposes,  it  is  vested  partly  in 
the  general  and  partly  in  the  municipal  legislatures.  In  the 
former  case,  all  local  authorities  are  subordinate  to  the  supreme; 
and  may  be  controlled,  directed,  or  aboHshed  by  it  at  pleasure. 
In  the  latter,  the  local  or  municipal  authorities  form  distinct  and 
independent  portions  of  the  supremacy,  no  more  subject,  within 
their  respective  spheres,  to  the  general  authority  than  the  gen- 
eral authority  is  subject  to  them  within  its  own  sphere.  In 
this  relation,  then,  the  proposed  government  cannot  be  deemed 
a  national  one,  since  its  jurisdiction  extends  to  certain  enumer- 
ated objects  only,  and  leaves  to  the  several  states  a  residuary 
and  inviolable  sovereignty  over  all  other  objects.  It  is  true 
that  in  controversies  relating  to  the  boundary  between  the  two 
jurisdictions,  the  tribunal  which  is  ultimately  to  decide,  is  to 
be  estabhshed  under  the  general  government.  But  this  does 
not  change  the  principle  of  the  case.  The  decision  is  to  be 
impartially  made,  according  to  the  rules  of  the  Constitution; 
and  all  the  usual  and  most  effectual  precautions  are  taken  to 
secure  this  impartiality.  Some  such  tribunal  is  clearly  essential 
to  prevent  an  appeal  to  the  sword  and  a  dissolution  of  the  com- 
pact; and  that  it  ought  to  be  estabhshed  under  the  general 
rather  than  under  the  local  governments,  or,  to  speak  more 
properly,  that  it  could  be  safely  established  imder  the  first  alone, 
is  a  position  not  Ukely  to  be  combated. 

If  we  try  the  Constitution  by  its  last  relation  to  the  authority 
by  which  amendments  are  to  be  made,  we  find  it  neither  wholly 
national  nor  wholly  federal.  Were  it  wholly  national,  the 
supreme  and  ultimate  authority  would  reside  in  the  majority  of 
the  people  of  the  Union;  and  this  authority  would  be  competent 
at  all  times,  Uke  that  of  a  majority  of  every  national  society,  to 
alter  or  abolish  its  estabhshed  government.  Were  it  wholly 
federal,  on  the  other  hand,  the  concurrence  of  each  state  in  the 
Union  would  be  essential  to  every  alteration  that  would  be  bind- 
ing on  all.  The  mode  provided  by  the  plan  of  the  Convention  is 
not  foimded  on  either  of  these  principles.     In  requiring  more 


THE  FEDERALIST  133 

than  a  majority,  and  particularly  in  computing  the  proportion 
by  statesy  not  by  citizens^  it  departs  from  the  national  and 
advances  towards  the  federal  character;  in  rendering  the  con- 
currence of  less  than  the  whole  number  of  states  sufficient,  it 
loses  again  the  federal  and  partakes  of  the  national  character. 

The  proposed  Constitution,  therefore,  even  when  tested  by 
the  rules  laid  down  by  its  antagonists,  is,  in  strictness,  neither 
a  national  nor  a  federal  Constitution,  but  a  composition  of  both. 
In  its  foundation  it  is  federal,  not  national;  in  the  sources  from 
which  the  ordinary  powers  of  the  government  are  drawn,  it  is 
partly  federal  and  partly  national;  in  the  operation  of  these 
powers,  it  is  national,  not  federal;  in  the  extent  of  them,  again, 
it  is  federal,  not  national;  and,  finally,  in  the  authoritative  mode 
of  introducing  amendments,  it  is  neither  wholly  federal  nor 
wholly  national. 

PUBLIUS. 


VI  ,^ 

JUSTIFICATION  OF  THE  POWERS  CONFERRED  BY 
THE  NEW  CONSTITUTION  UPON  THE  FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 

(a)   MILITARY  POWERS 
General  View  of  the  Powers  proposed  to  be 

VESTED  IN  THE  UnION  ^ 

The  Constitution  proposed  by  the  Convention  may  be  con- 
sidered under  two  general  points  of  view.  The  first  relates 
to  the  sum  or  quantity  of  power  which  it  vests  in  the  govern- 
ment, including  the  restraints  imposed  on  the  stat^.  The 
second,  to  the  particular  structure  of  the  government,  and  the 
distribution  of  this  power  among  its  several  branches. 

Under  the  first  view  of  the  subject,  two  important  questions 
arise:  i.  Whether  any  part  of  the  powers  transferred  to  the 
general  government  be  unnecessary  or  improper  ?  2.  Whether 
the  entire  mass  of  them  be  dangerous  to  the  portion  of  juris- 
diction left  in  the  several  states  ? 

Is  the  aggregate  power  of  the  general  government  greater 
than  ought  to  have  been  vested  in  it  ?    This  is  the  first  question. 

It  cannot  have  escaped  those  who  have  attended  with  candor 
to  the  arguments  employed  against  the  extensive  powers  of  the 
government,  that  the  authors  of  them  have  very  Uttle  considered 
how  far  these  powers  were  necessary  means  of  attaining  a  ne- 
cessary end.  They  have  chosen  rather  to  dwell  on  the  incon- 
veniences which  must  be  unavoidably  blended  with  all  political 
advantages,  and  on  the  possible  abuses  which  must  be  incident 
to  every  power  or  trust,  of  which  a  beneficial  use  can  be  madgjj 
This  method  of  handUng  the  subject  cannot  impose  on  the  good 
sense  of  the  people  of  America.     It  may  display  the  subtlety 

»  No.  XLI  (XL).     Madiso^     Independent  Journal,  January  19,  1788. 
134 


THE  FEDERALIST  135 

of  the  writer,  it  may  open  a  boundless  field  for  rhetoric  and 
declamation,  it  may  inflame  the  passions  of  the  unthinking, 
and  may  confirm  the  prejudices  of  the  misthinking;  but  cool 
and  candid  people  will  at  once  reflect  that  the  purest  of  human 
blessings  must  have  a  portion  of  alloy  in  them;  that  the  choice 
must  always  be  made,  if  not  of  the  lesser  evil,  at  least  of  the 
GREATER,  not  the  PERFECT,  good;  and  that  in  every  political 
institution,  a  power  to  advance  the  public  happiness  involves 
a  discretion  which  may  be  misappUed  and  abused.  They  will 
see,  therefore,  that  in  all  cases  where  power  is  to  be  conferred, 
the  point  first  to  be  decided  is,  whether  such  a  power  be  necessary 
to  the  public  good;  as  the  next  will  be,  in  case  of  an  aflirmative 
decision,  to  guard  as  effectually  as  possible  against  a  perversion 
of  the  power  to  the  pubUc  det^ment./ 

That  we  may  form  a  correct  judgment  on  this  subject,  it  will 
be  proper  to  review  the  several  powers  conferred  on  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Union;  and  that  this  may  be  the  more  conveniently 
done  they  may  be  reduced  into  different  classes  as  they  relate 
to  the  following  different  objects:  i.  Security  against  foreign 
danger.  2.  Regulation  of  the  intercourse  with  foreign  nation§^ 
3.  Maintenance  of  harmony  and  proper  intercourse  among  the 
states.  4.  Certain  miscellaneous  objects  of  general  utility. 
5.  Restraint  of  the  states  from  certain  injurious  acts.  6.  Pro- 
visions for  giving  due  efficacy  to  all  these  powers. 

The  powers  falHng  within  the  first  class  are  those  of  declaring 
war  and  granting  letters  of  marque;  of  providing  armies  and 
fleets;  of  regulating  and  calling  forth  the  militia;  of  levjdng 
and  borrowing  money; 

Security  against  foreign  danger  is  one  of  the  primitive  objects 
of  civil  society.  It  is  an  avowed  and  essential  object  of  the 
American  Union.  The  powers  requisite  for  attaining  it  must 
be  effectually  confided  to  the  federal  coimcils. 

Is  the  power  of  declaring  war  necessary  ?  No  man  will  answer 
this  question  in  the  negative.  It  would  be  superfluous,  there- 
fore, to  enter  into  a  proof  of  the  affirmative.  The  existing 
confederation  establishes  this  power  in  the  most  ample  form. 


9»^ 


136  THE  FEDERALIST 

Is  the  power  of  raising  armies  and  equipping  fleets  necessary  ? 
This  is  involved  in  the  foregoing  power.  It  is  involved  in  the 
power  of  self-defense. 

But  was  it  necessary  to  give  an  indefinite  power  of  raising 
TROOPS,  as  well  as  providing  fleets;  and  of  maintaining  both  in 
peace,  as  well  as  in  war  ? 

The  answer  to  these  questions  has  been  too  far  anticipated 
in  another  place  to  admit  an  extensive  discussion  of  them  in 
this  place.  The  answer  indeed  seems  to  be  so  obvious  and 
conclusive  as  scarcely  to  justify  such  a  discussion  in  any  place. 
With  what  color  of  propriety  could  the  force  necessary  for 
defeosfi/be  limited  by  those  who  cannot  limit  the  force  of  offense  ? 
If  a  federal  Constitution  could  chain  the  ambition  or  set  bounds 
to  the  exertions  of  all  other  nations,  then  indeed  might  it  pru- 
dently chain  the  discretion  of  its  own  government,  and  set 
bounds  to  the  exertions  for  its  own  safety. 

How  could  a  readiness  for  war  in  time  of  peace  be  safely  pro- 
hibited, unless  we  could  prohibit,  in  like  manner,  the  prepara- 
tions and  establishments  of  every  hostile  nation  ?  The  means 
of  security  can  only  be  regulated  by  the  means  and  the  danger 
of  attack.  They  will,  in  fact,  be  ever  determined  by  these  rules, 
and  by  no  others.  It  is  in  vain  to  oppose  constitutional  barriers 
to  the  impulse  of  self-preservation.  /It  is  worse  than  in  vain; 
because  it  plants  in  the  Constitution  itself  necessary  usurpa- 
tions of  power,  every  precedent  of  which  is  a  germ  of  unnecessary 
and  multiplied  repetitions/  If  one  nation  maintains  constantly 
a  disciplined  army,  ready  for  the  service  of  ambition  or  revenge, 
it  obliges  the  most  pacific  nations  who  may  be  within  the  reach 
of  its  enterprises  to  take  corresponding  precautions.  The 
fifteenth  century  was  the  unhappy  epoch  of  military  establish- 
ments in  time  of  peace.  They  were  introduced  by  Charles 
VII  of  France.  All  Europe  has  followed,  or  been  forced  into, 
the  example.  Had  the  example  not  been  followed  by  other 
nations  all  Europe  must  long  ago  have  worn  the  chains  of  a 
universal  monarch.  Were  every  nation  except  France  now  to 
disband  its  peace  establishment,  the  same  event  might  follow. 


THE  FEDERALIST  137 

The  veteran  legions  of  Rome  were  an  overmatch  for  the  undis- 
ciplined valor  of  all  other  nations,  and  rendered  her  mistress 
of  the  world. 

Not  less  true  is  it,  that  the  liberties  of  Rome  proved  the 
final  victim  to  her  military  triumphs;  and  that  the  liberties  of 
Europe,  as  far  as  they  ever  existed,  have,  with  few  exceptions, 
been  the  price  of  her  military  establishments.  A  standing  force, 
therefore,  is  a  dangerous,  at  the  same  time  that  it  may  be  a 
necessary  provision.  On  the  smallest  scale  it  has  its  incon- 
veniences. On  an  extensive  scale  its  consequences  may  be  fatal. 
On  any  scale  it  is  an  object  of  laudable  circumspection  and  pre- 
caution. A  wise  nation  will  combine  all  these  considerations; 
and,  whilst, it  does  not  rashly  preclude  itself  from  any  resource 
which  may  become  essential  to  its  safety,  will  exert  all  its 
prudence  in  diminishing  both  the  necessity  and  the  danger  of 
resortin'g  to  one  which  may  be  inauspicious  to  its  liberties. 

T!le  dearest  marks  of  this  prudence  are  stamped  on  the  pro- 
posed Constitution.  The  Union  itself,  which  it  cements  and 
secures,  destroys  every  pretext  for.  a  military  establishment 
which  could  be  dangerous.  America  united,  with  a  handful  of 
troops,  or  without  a  single  soldier,  exhibits  a  more  forbidding 
posture  to  foreign  ambition  than  America  disunited,  with  an 
hundred  thousand  veterans  ready  for  combat.  It  was  remarked 
on  a  former  occasion,  that  the  want  of  this  pretext  had  saved  the 
liberties  of  one  nation  in  Europe.  Being  rendered  by  her  insular 
situation  and  her  maritime  resources  impregnable  to  the  armies 
of  her  neighbors,  the  rulers  of  Great  Britain  have  never  been 
able,  by  real  or  artificial  dangers,  to  cheat  the  public  into  an 
extensive  peace  estabHshment.  The  distance  of  the  United 
States  from  the  powerful^nations  of  the  world  gives  them  the 
same  happy  security.  (\  dangerous  establishment  can  never 
be  necessary  or  plausible,  so  long  as  they  continue  a  united 
people.  But  let  it  never,  for  a  moment,  be  forgotten  that  they 
are  indebted  for  this  advantage  to  their  union  alone?  The 
moment  of  its  dissolution  will  be  the  date  of  a  new  order  of 
things.     The  fears  of  the  weaker,  or  the  ambition  of  the  stronger 


138  THE  FEDERALIST 

states,  or  confederacies,  will  set  the  same  example  in  the  New 
as  Charles  VII  did  in  the  Old  World.  The  example  will  be 
followed  here  from  the  same  motives  which  produced  imiversal 
imitation  there.  Instead  of  deriving  from  our  situation  the 
precious  advantage  which  Great  Britain  has  derived  from  hers, 
the  face  of  America  will  be  but  a  copy  of  that  of  the  continent  of 
Europe.  It  will  present  liberty  everywhere  crushed  between 
standing  armies  and  perpetual  taxes.  The  fortunes  of  disunited 
America  will  be  even  more  disastrous  than  those  of  Europe. 
The  sources  of  evil  in  the  latter  are  confined  to  her  own  limits. 
No  superior  powers  of  another  quarter  of  the  globe  intrigue 
among  her  rival  nations,  inflame  their  mutual  animosities  and 
render  them  the  instruments  of  foreign  ambition,  jealousy,  and 
revenge.  In  America  the  miseries  springing  from  her  internal 
jealousies,  contentions,  and  wars  would  form  a  part  only  of  her 
lot.  A  plentiful  addition  of  evils  would  have  their  source  in 
that  relation  in  which  Europe  stands  to  this  quarter  of  the  earth, 
and  which  no  other  quarter  of  the  earth  bears  to  Europe. 

This  picture  of  the  consequences  of  disunion  cannot  be  too 
highly  colored,  or  too  often  exhibited.  Every  man  who  loves 
peace,  every  man  who  loves  his  country,  every  man  who  loves 
liberty,  ought  to  have  it  ever  before  his  eyes,  that  he  may  cher- 
ish in  his  heart  a  due  attachment  to  the  union  of  America,  and 
be  able  to  set  a  due  value  on  the  means  of  preserving  it. 

Next  to  the  effectual  establishment  of  the  Union,  the  best 
possible  precaution  against  danger  from  standing  armies  is  a 
limitation  of  the  term  for  which  revenue  may  be  appropriated 
to  their  support.  This  precaution  the  Constitution  has  pru- 
dently added.  I  will  not  repeat  here  the  observations  which  I 
flatter  myself  have  placed  this  subject  in  a  just  and  satisfactory- 
light.  But  it  may  not  be  improper  to  take  notice  of  an  argu- 
ment against  this  part  of  the  Constitution  which  has  been  drawn 
from  the  policy  and  practice  of  Great  Britain.  It  is  said  that 
the  continuance  of  an  army  in  that  kingdom  requires  an  annual 
vote  of  the  legislature;  whereas  the  American  Constitution  has 
lengthened  this  critical  period  to  two  years.     This  is  the  form  in 


THE  FEDERALIST  139 

which  the  comparison  is  usually  stated  to  the  public:  but  is  it  a 
just  form  ?  Is  it  a  fair  comparison  ?  Does  the  British  Con- 
stitution restrain  the  parliamentary  discretion  to  one  year  ? 
Does  the  American  impose  on  the  Congress  appropriations  for 
two  years  ?  On  the  contrary,  it  cannot  be  unknown  to  the 
authors  of  the  fallacy  themselves,  that  the  British  Constitution 
fixes  no  limit  whatever  to  the  discretion  of  the  legislature,  and 
that  the  American  ties  down  the  legislature  to  two  years,  as  the 
longest  admissible  term. 

Had  the  argument  from  the  British  example  been  truly  stated, 
it  would  have  stood  thus :  The  term  for  which  supplies  may  be 
appropriated  to  the  army  estabhshment,  though  unlimited  by 
the  British  Constitution,  -has  nevertheless,  in  practice,  been 
Hmited_by  parHamentary  discretion  to  a  single  year.  Now,  if 
Jn  Great  Britain,  where  the  House  of  Commons  is  elected  for 
seven  years,  where  so  great  a  proportion  of  the  members  are 
elected  by  so  small  a  proportion  of  the  people,  where  the  electors 
are  so  corrupted  by  the  representatives,  and  the  representatives 
so  corrupted  by  the  crown,  the  representative  body  can  possess 
a  power  to  make  appropriations  to  the  army  for  an  indefinite 
term,  without  desiring,  or  without  daring,  to  extend  the  term 
beyond  a  single  year,  ought  not  suspicion  herself  to  blush,  in 
pretending  that  the  representatives  of  the  United  States,  elected 
FREELY  by  the  whole  body  of  the  people,  every  second  year, 
cannot  be  safely  intrusted  with  the  discretion  over  such  appro- 
priations, expressly  limited  to  the  short  period  of  two  years  ? 

A  bad  cause  seldom  fails  to  betray  itself.  Of  this  truth,  the 
management  of  the  opposition  to  the  federal  government  is  an 
unvaried  exemplification.  But  among  all  the  blimders  which 
have  been  committed,  none  is-  more  striking  than  the  attempt 
to  enlist  on  that  side  the  prudent  jealousy  entertained  by  the 
people  of  standing  armies.  The  attempt  has  awakened  fully 
the  public  attention  to  that  important  subject,  and  has  led  to 
investigations  which  must  terminate  in  a  thorough  and  imiversal 
conviction,  not  only  that  the  Constitution  has  provided  the  most 
effectual  guards  against  danger  from  that  quarter,  but  that 


I40  THE  FEDERALIST 

nothing  short  of  a  Constitution  fully  adequate  to  the  national 
defense  and  the  preservation  of  the  Union  can  save  America 
from  as  many  standing  armies  as  it  may  be  split  into  states  or 
confederacies,  and  from  such  a  progressive  augmentation  of 
these  estabhshments  in  each  as  will  render  them  as  burden- 
some to  the  properties  and  ominous  to  the  liberties  of  the  people 
as  any  estabHshment  that  can  become  necessary,  under  a  united 
and  efficient  government,  must  be  tolerable  to  the  former  and 
safe  to  the  latter. 

The  palpable  necessity  of  the  power  to  provide  and  maintain  a 
navy  has  protected  that  part  of  the  Constitution  against  a  spirit 
of  censure,  which  has  spared  few  other  parts.  It  must,  indeed, 
be  numbered  among  the  greatest  blessings  of  America,  that  as 
her  Union  will  be  the  only  source  of  her  maritime  strength,  so 
this  will  be  a  principal  source  of  her  security  against  danger  from 
abroad.  In  this  respect  our  situation  bears  another  Hkeness  to 
the  insular  advantage  of  Great  Britain.  The  batteries  most 
capable  of  repelling  foreign  enterprises  on  our  safety  are  happily 
such  as  can  never  be  turned  by  a  perfidious  government  against 
our  Hberties. 

The  inhabitants  of  the  Atlantic  frontier  are  all  of  them  deeply 
interested  in  this  provision  for  naval  protection,  and  if  they  have 
hitherto  been  suffered  to  sleep  quietly  in  their  beds,  if  their 
property  has  remained  safe  against  the  predatory  spirit  of 
licentious  adventurers,  if  their  maritime  towns  have  not  yet 
been  compelled  to  ransom  themselves  from  the  terrors  of  a  con- 
flagration, by  yielding  to  the  exactions  of  daring  and  sudden 
invaders,  these  instances  of  good  fortune  are  not  to  be  ascribed 
to  the  capacity  of  the  existing  government  for  the  protection 
of  those  from  whom  it  claims  allegiance,  but  to  causes  that  are 
fugitive  and  fallacious.  If  we  except  perhaps  Virginia  and 
Maryland,  which  are  peculiarly  vulnerable  on  their  eastern 
frontiers,  no  part  of  the  Union  ought  to  feel  more  anxiety  on 
this  subject  than  New  York.  Her  seacoast  is  extensive.  The 
very  important  district  of  the  state  is  an  island.  The  state 
itself  is  penetrated  by  a  large  navigable  river  for  more  than 


THE  FEDERALIST  141 

fifty  leagues.  The  great  emporium  of  its  commerce,  the  great 
reservoir  of  its  wealth,  lies  every  moment  at  the  mercy  of  events, 
and  may  almost  be  regarded  as  a  hostage  for  ignominious  com- 
pliances with  the  dictates  of  a  foreign  enemy,  or  even  with  the 
rapacious  demands  of  pirates  and  barbarians.  Should  a  war  be 
the  result  of  the  precarious  situation  of  European  affairs,  and  all 
the  unruly  passions  attending  it  be  let  loose  on  the  ocean,  our 
escape  from  insults  and  depredations,  not  only  on  that  element, 
but  every  part  of  the  other  bordering  on  it,  will  be  truly  miracu- 
lous. In  the  present  condition  of  America,  the  states  more 
immediately  exposed  to  these  calamities  have  nothing  to  hope 
from  the  phantom  of  a  general  government  which  now  exists;  and 
if  their  single  resources  were  equal  to  the  task  of  fortifying  them- 
selves against  the  danger,  the  object  to  be  protected  would  be 
almost  consumed  by  the  means  of  protecting  them. 

The  power  of  regulating  and  calHng  forth  the  militia  has  been 
already  sufficiently  vindicated  and  explained. 

The  power  of  levying  and  borrowing  money,  being  the  sinew 
of  that  which  is  to  be  exerted  in  the  national  defense,  is  properly 
thrown  into  the  same  class  with  it.  This  power,  also,  has  been 
examined  already  with  much  attention,  and  has,  I  trust,  been 
clearly  shown  to  be  necessary,  both  in  the  extent  and  form  given 
to  it  by  the  Constitution.  I  will  address  one  additional  reflection 
only  to  those  who  contend  that  the  power  ought  to  have  been 
restrained  to  external  taxation  —  by  which  they  mean  taxes  on 
articles  imported  from  other  countries,  It  cannot  be  doubted 
that  this  will  always  be  a  valuable  source  of  revenue;  that  for  a 
considerable  time  it  must  be  a  principal  source;  that  at  this 
moment  it  is  an  essential  one.  But  we  may  form  very  mistaken 
ideas  on  this  subject  if  we  do  not  call  to  mind  in  our  calculations 
that  the  extent  of  revenue  drawn  from  foreign  commerce  must 
vary  with  the  variations,  both  in  the  extent  and  the  kind  of 
imports;  and  that  these  variations  do  not  correspond  with  the 
progress  of  population,  which  must  be  the  general  measure  of 
the  pubhc  wants.  ASlong  as  agriculture  continues  the  sole  field 
of  labor,  the  importation  of  manufactures  must  increase  as 


142  THE  FEDERALIST 

the  consumers  multiply.  As  soon  as  domestic  manufactures 
are  begun  by  the  hands  not  called  for  by  agriculture,  the  im- 
ported manufactures  will  decrease  as  the  numbers  of  people 
increase.  In  a  more  remote  stage,  the  imports  may  consist  in 
considerable  part  of  raw  materials,  which  will  be  wrought  into 
articles  for  exportation,  and  will,  therefore,  require  rather  the 
encouragement  of  bounties  than  to  be  loaded  with  discouraging 
duties.  A  system  of  government,  meant  for  duration,  ought  to 
contemplate  these  revolutions,  and  be  able  to  accommodate 
itself  to  them. 

Some,  who  have  not  denied  the  necessity  of  the  power  of 
taxation,  have  grounded  a  very  fierce  attack  against  the  Con- 
stitution on  the  language  in  which  it  is  defined.  It  has  been 
urged  and  echoed  that  the  power  "  to  lay  and  collect  taxes, 
duties,  imposts  and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts,  and  provide  for 
the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  of  the  United  States," 
amounts  to  an  imHmited  commission  to  exercise  every  power 
which  may  be  alleged  to  be  necessary  for  the  common  defense  or 
general  welfare.  No  stronger  proof  could  be  given  of  the  distress 
under  which  these  writers  labor  for  objections,  than  their  stoop- 
ing to  such  a  misconstruction. 

Had  no  other  enumeration  or  definition  of  the  powers  of  the 
Congress  been  foimd  in  the  Constitution  than  the  general  expres- 
sions just  cited,  the  authors  of  the  objection  might  have  had 
some  color  for  it;  though  it  would  have  been  dijOScult  to  find 
a  reason  for  so  awkward  a  form  of  describing  an  authority  to 
legislate  in  all  possible  cases.  A  power  to  destroy  the  freedom 
of  the  press,  the  trial  by  jury,  or  even  to  regulate  the  course  of 
descents,  or  the  forms  of  conveyances,  must  be  very  singularly 
expressed  by  the  terms  "  to  raise  money  for  the  general  welfare."" 

But  what  color  can  the  objection  have  when  a  specification 
of  the  objects  alluded  to  by  these  general  terms  immediately 
follows,  and  is  not  even  separated  by  a  longer  pause  than  a  semi- 
colon ?  If  the  different  parts  of  the  same  instrument  ought  to  be 
so  expounded,  as  to  give  meaning  to  every  part  which  will  bear 
it,  shall  one  part  of  the  same  sentence  be  excluded  altogether 


THE  FEDERALIST  143 

from  a  share  in  the  meaning;  and  shall  the  more  doubtful 
and  indefinite  terms  be  retained  in  their  full  extent,  and  the 
clear  and  precise  expressions  be  denied  any  signification  what- 
soever ?  For  what  purpose  could  the  enumeration  of  particular 
powers  be  inserted,  if  these  and  all  others  were  meant  to  be 
included  in  the  preceding  general  power  ?  Nothing  is  more 
natural  or  common  than  first  to  use  a  general  phrase,  and  then 
to  explain  and  qualify  it  by  a  recital  of  particulars.  But  the  idea 
of  an  enumeration  of  particulars  which  neither  explain  nor 
qualify  the  general  meaning,  and  can  have  no  other  effect  than 
to  confound  and  mislead,  is  an  absurdity,  which,  as  we  are 
reduced  to  the  dilemma  of  charging  either  on  the  authors  of  the 
objection  or  on  the  authors  of  the  Constitution,  we  must  take 
the  Hberty  of  supposing,  had  not  its  origin  with  the  latter. 

The  objection  here  is  the  more  extraordinary,  as  it  appears 
that  the  language  used  by  the  Convention  is  a  copy  from  the 
Articles  of  Confederation.  The  objects  of  the  Union  among  the 
states,  as  described  in  article  third,  are,  "  their  common  defence, 
security  of  their  liberties,  and  mutual  and  general  welfare." 
The  terms  of  article  eighth  are  still  more  identical:  "  All  charges 
of  war,  and  all  other  expenses,  that  shall  be  incurred  for  the 
common  defence  or  general  welfare,  and  allowed  by  the  United 
States  in  Congress  shall  be  defrayed  out  of  a  common  treasury," 
etc.  A  similar  language  again  occurs  in  article  ninth.  Construe 
either  of  these  articles  by  the  rules  which  would  justify  the  con- 
struction put  on  the  new  Constitution,  and  they  vest  in  the 
existing  Congress  a  power  to  legislate  in  all  cases  whatsoever. 
But  what  would  have  been  thought  of  that  assembly,  if,  attach- 
ing themselves  to  these  general  expressions,  and  disregarding 
the  specifications  which  ascertain  and  limit  their  import,  they 
had  exercised  an  unlimited  power  of  providing  for  the  common 
defense  and  general  welfare  ?  I  appeal  to  the  objectors  them- 
selves, whether  they  would  in  that  case  have  employed  the  same 
reasoning  in  justification  of  Congress  as  they  now  make  use  of 
against  the  Convention.  How  diflicult  it  is  for  error  to  escape 
its  own  condenmation !  Publius. 


144  THE  FEDERALIST 

(b)  DIPLOMATIC  AND   COMMERCIAL  POWERS 
The  same  View  continued  i 

The  second  class  of  powers,  lodged  in  the  general  government, 
consists  of  those  which  regulate  the  intercourse  with  foreign 
nations,  to  wit:  to  make  treaties;  to  send  and  receive  ambas- 
sadors, other  public  ministers,  and  consuls;  to  define  and  punish 
piracies  and  felonies  committed  on  the  high  seas,  and  offenses 
against  the  law  of  nations;  to  regulate  foreign  commerce,  includ- 
ing a  power  to  prohibit,  after  the  year  1808,  the  importation  of 
slaves,  and  to  lay  an  intermediate  duty  of  ten  dollars  per  head, 
as  a  discouragement  to  such  importations. 

This  class  of  powers  forms  an  obvious  and  essential  branch 
of  the  federal  administration.  If  we  are  to  be  one  nation  in  any 
respect,  it  clearly  ought  to  be  in  respect  to  other  nations. 

The  powers  to  make  treaties  and  to  send  and  receive  ambas- 
sadors speak  their  own  propriety.  Both  of  them  are  comprised 
in  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  with  this  difference  only,  that 
the  former  is  disembarrassed,  by  the  plan  of  the  Convention,  of  an 
exception,  under  which  treaties  might  be  substantially  frustrated 
by  regulations  of  the  states;  and  that  a  power  of  appointing 
and  receiving  "  other  pubHc  ministers  and  consuls,"  is  expressly 
and  very  properly  added  to  the  former  provision  concerning 
ambassadors.  The  term  ambassador,  if  taken  strictly,  as  seems 
to  be  required  by  the  second  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation, 
comprehends  the  highest  grade  only  of  public  ministers,  and 
excludes  the  grades  which  the  United  States  will  be  most  likely 
to  prefer,  where  foreign  embassies  may  be  necessary.  And 
under  no  latitude  of  construction  will  the  term  comprehend 
consuls.  Yet  it  has  been  found  expedient,  and  has  been  the 
practice  of  Congress,  to  employ  the  inferior  grades  of  public 
ministers,  and  to  send  and  receive  consuls. 

It  is  true  that  where  treaties  of  commerce  stipulate  for  the 
mutual  appointment  of  consuls,  whose  functions  are  connected 
with  commerce,  the  admission  of  foreign  consuls  may  fall  within 

»  No.  XLII  (XLI).     Madison.     New  York  Packet,  January  22,  1788. 


THE  FEDERALIST  145 

the  power  of  making  commercial  treaties;  and  that  where  no 
such  treaties  exist,  the  mission  of  American  consuls  into  foreign 
countries  may  perhaps  be  covered  under  the  authority,  given  by 
the  ninth  article  of  the  Confederation,  to  appoint  all  such  civil 
officers  as  may  be  necessary  for  managing  the  general  affairs  of 
the  United  States.  But  the  admission  of  consuls  into  the  United 
States,  where  no  previous  treaty  has  stipulated  it,  seems  to  have 
been  nowhere  provided  for.  A  supply  of  the  omission  is  one  of 
the  lesser  instances  in  which  the  Convention  have  improved  on 
the  model  before  them.  But  the  most  minute  provisions  become 
important  when  they  tend  to  obviate  the  necessity  or  the  pretext 
for  gradual  and  unobserved  usurpations  of  power.  A  list  of  the 
cases  in  which  Congress  have  been  betrayed,  or  forced  by  the 
defects  of  the  Confederation,  into  violations  of  their  chartered 
authorities,  would  not  a  httle  surprise  those  who  have  paid  no 
attention  to  the  subject;  and  would  be  no  inconsiderable  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  the  new  Constitution,  which  seems  to  have 
provided  no  less  studiously  for  the  lesser,  than  the  more  obvious 
and  striking  defects  of  the  old. 

The  power  to  define  and  punish  piracies  and  felonies  com- 
mitted on  the  high  seas,  and  offenses  against  the  law  of  nations, 
belongs  with  equal  propriety  to  the  general  government,  and  is 
a  still  greater  improvement  on  the  Articles  of  Confederation. 
These  articles  contain  no  provision  for  the  case  of  offenses  against 
the  law  of  nations,  and  consequently  leave  it  in  the  power  of 
any  indiscreet  member  to  embroil  the  Confederacy  with  foreign 
nations.  The  provision  of  the  federal  articles  on  the  subject  of 
piracies  and  felonies  extends  no  further  than  to  the  estabhsh- 
ment  of  courts  for  the  trial  of  these  offenses.  The  definition  of 
piracies  might,  perhaps,  without  inconveniency,  be  left  to  the  law 
of  nations;  though  a  legislative  definition  of  them  is  found  in 
most  municipal  codes.  A  definition  of  felonies  on  the  high  seas 
is  evidently  requisite.  Felony  is  a  term  of  loose  signification, 
even  in  the  common  law  of  England,  and  of  various  import  in 
the  statute  law  of  that  kingdom.  But  neither  the  common  nor 
the  statute  law  of  that,  or  of  any  other  nation,  ought  to  be  a 


146  THE  FEDERALIST 

standard  for  the  proceedings  of  this,  unless  previously  made  its 
own  by  legislative  adoption.  The  meaning  of  the  term,  as 
defined  in  the  codes  of  the  several  states,  would  be  as  imprac- 
ticable as  the  former  would  be  a  dishonorable  and  illegitimate 
guide.  It  is  not  precisely  the  same  in  any  two  of  the  states, 
and  varies  in  each  with  every  revision  of  its  criminal  laws.  For 
the  sake  of  certainty  and  uniformity,  therefore,  the  power  of 
defining  felonies  in  this  case  was  in  every  respect  necessary  and 
proper. 

The  regulation  of  foreign  commerce,  having  fallen  within 
several  views  which  have  been  taken  of  this  subject,  has  been 
too  fully  discussed  to  need  additional  proofs  here  of  its  being 
properly  submitted  to  the  federal  administration. 

It  were  doubtless  to  be  wished  that  the  power  of  prohibiting 
the  importation  of  slaves  had  not  been  postponed  until  the 
year  1808,  or  rather  that  it  had  been  suffered  to  have  immediate 
operation.  But  it  is  not  difficult  to  account,  either  for  this 
restriction  on  the  general  government,  or  for  the  manner  in 
which  the  whole  clause  is  expressed.  It  ought  to  be  considered 
as  a  great  point  gained  in  favor  of  humanity,  that  a  period 
of  twenty  years  may  terminate  forever,  within  these  states,  a 
traffic  which  has  so  long  and  so  loudly  upbraided  the  barbarism 
of  modern  policy;  that  within  that  period  it  will  receive  a  con- 
siderable discouragement  from  the  federal  government,  and  may 
be  totally  abolished  by  a  concurrence  of  the  few  states  which 
continue  the  unnatural  traffic  in  the  prohibitory  example  which 
has  been  given  by  so  great  a  majority  of  the  Union.  Happy 
would  it  be  for  the  unfortunate  Africans,  if  an  equal  prospect 
lay  before  them  of  being  redeemed  from  the  oppressions  of  their 
European  brethren! 

Attempts  have  been  made  to  pervert  this  clause  into  an  objec- 
tion against  the  Constitution,  by  representing  it  on  one  side  as 
a  criminal  toleration  of  an  ilUcit  practice,  and  on  another  as 
calculated  to  prevent  voluntary  and  beneficial  emigrations  from 
Europe  to  America.      I  mention  these  misconstructions,  not 


THE  FEDERALIST  147 

with  a  view  to  give  them  an  answer,  for  they  deserve  none,  but 
as  specimens  of  the  manner  and  spirit  in  which  some  have 
thought  fit  to  conduct  their  opposition  to  the  proposed  govern- 
ment. 

The  powers  included  in  the  third  class  are  those  which  provide 
for  the  harmony  and  proper  intercourse  among  the  states. 

Under  this  head  might  be  included  the  particular  restraints 
imposed  on  the  authority  of  the  states,  and  certain  powers  of  the 
judicial  department;  but  the  former  are  reserved  for  a  distinct 
class,  and  the  latter  will  be  particularly  examined  when  we 
arrive  at  the  structure  and  organization  of  the  government.  I 
shall  confine  myself  to  a  cursory  review  of  the  remaining  powers 
comprehended  under  this  third  description,  to  wit:  to  regulate  | 
commerce  among  the  several  states  and  the  Indian  tribes;  to  - 
coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof,  and  of  foreign  coin;  to 
provide  for  the  pimishment  of  coimterfeiting  the  current  coin 
and  securities  of  the  United  States;  to  fix  the  standard  of  weights 
and  measures;  to  establish  a  uniform  rule  of  naturalization,  and 
uniform  laws  of  bankruptcy;  to  prescribe  the  manner  in  which 
the  pubKc  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  each  state 
shall  be  proved,  and  the  effect  they  shall  have  in  other  states; 
and  to  establish  post-offices  and  post-roads. 

The  defect  of  power  in  the  existing  Confederacy  to  regulate 
the  commerce  between  its  several  members  is  in  the  number  of 
those  which  have  been  clearly  pointed  out  by  experience.  To 
the  proofs  and  remarks  which  former  papers  have  brought  into 
view  on  this  subject,  it  may  be  added  that,  without  this  supple- 
mental provision,  the  great  and  essential  power  of  regulating 
foreign  commerce  would  have  been  incomplete  and  ineffectual. 
A  very  material  object  of  this  power  was  the  relief  of  the  states 
which  import  and  export  through  other  states  from  the  im- 
proper contributions  levied  on  them  by  the  latter.  Were  these 
at  liberty  to  regulate  the  trade  between  state  and  state,  it  must 
be  foreseen  that  ways  would  be  found  out  to  load  the  articles 
of  import  and  export,  during  the  passage  through  their  juris- 


148  THE  FEDERALIST 

diction,  with  duties  which  would  fall  on  the  makers  of  the  latter 
and  the  consumers  of  the  former.  We  may  be  assured  by  past 
experience  that  such  a  practice  would  be  introduced  by  future 
contrivances;  and  both  by  that  and  a  common  knowledge  of 
human  affairs,  that  it  would  nourish  unceasing  animosities  and 
not  improbably  terminate  in  serious  interruptions  of  the  pubhc 
tranquilUty.  To  those  who  do  not  view  the  question  through  the 
medium  of  passion  or  of  interest,  the  desire  of  the  commercial 
states  to  collect,  in  any  form,  an  indirect  revenue  from  their 
uncommercial  neighbors,  must  appear  not  less  impolitic  than  it 
is  unfair;  since  it  would  stimulate  the  injured  party,  by  resent- 
ment as  well  as  interest,  to  resort  to  less  convenient  channels  for 
their  foreign  trade.  But  the  mild  voice  of  reason,  pleading  the 
cause  of  an  enlarged  and  permanent  interest,  is  but  too  often 
drowned,  before  public  bodies  as  well  as  individuals,  by  the 
clamors  of  an  impatient  avidity  for  immediate  and  immoderate 
gain. 

The  necessity  of  a  superintending  authority  over  the  reciprocal 
trade  of  confederated  states  has  been  illustrated  by  other  ex- 
amples as  well  as  our  own.  In  Switzerland,  where  the  union 
is  so  very  slight,  each  canton  is  obliged  to  allow  to  merchandises 
a  passage  through  its  jurisdiction  into  other  cantons,  without  an 
augmentation  of  the  tolls.  In  Germany  it  is  a  law  of  the  empire 
that  the  princes  and  states  shall  not  lay  tolls  or  customs  on 
bridges,  rivers,  or  passages,  without  the  consent  of  the  emperor 
and  diet;  though  it  appears  from  a  quotation  in  an  antece- 
dent paper  that  the  practice  in  this,  as  in  many  other  instances 
in  that  confederacy,  has  not  followed  the  law,  and  has  produced 
there  the  mischiefs  which  have  been  foreseen  here.  Among  the 
restraints  imposed  by  the  union  of  the  Netherlands  on  its 
members,  one  is,  that  they  shall  not  establish  imposts  disad- 
vantageous to  their  neighbors,  without  the  general  permission. 

The  regulation  of  commerce  with  the  Indian  tribes  is  very 
properly  unfettered  from  two  limitations  in  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation, which  render  the  provision  obscure  and  contradictory. 


THE  FEDERALIST  149 

The  power  is  there  restrained  to  Indians,  not  members  of  any 
of  the  states,  and  is  not  to  violate  or  infringe  the  legislative  right 
of  any  state  within  its  own  limits.  What  description  of  Indians 
are  to  be  deemed  members  of  a  state  is  not  yet  settled,  and  has 
been  a  question  of  frequent  perplexity  and  contention  in  the 
federal  councils.  And  how  the  trade  with  Indians,  though  not 
members  of  a  state,  yet  residing  within  its  legislative  juris- 
diction, can  be  regulated  by  an  external  authority,  without  so 
far  intruding  on  the  internal  rights  of  legislation,  is  absolutely 
incomprehensible.  This  is  not  the  only  case  in  which  the  Arti- 
cles of  Confederation  have  inconsiderately  endeavored  to  ac- 
compHsh  impossibihties;  to  reconcile  a  partial  sovereignty  in 
the  Union  with  complete  sovereignty  in  the  states;  to  subvert 
a  mathematical  axiom  by  taking  away  a  part,  and  letting  the 
whole  remain. 

All  that  need  be  remarked  on  the  power  to  coin  money,  regu- 
late the  value  thereof,  and  of  foreign  coin,  is,  that  by  providing 
for  this  last  case,  the  Constitution  has  supplied  a  material 
omission  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  The  authority  of  the 
existing  Congress  is  restrained  to  the  regulation  of  coin  struck 
by  their  own  authority,  or  that  of  the  respective  states.  It 
must  be  seen  at  once  that  the  proposed  imiformity  in  the  valiie 
of  the  current  coin  might  be  destroyed  by  subjecting  that  of 
foreign  coin  to  the  different  regulations  of  the  different  states. 

The  pimishment  of  counterfeiting  the  public  securities,  as 
well  as  of  the  current  coin,  is  submitted  of  course  to  that  author- 
ity which  is  to  secure  the  value  of  both. 

The  regulation  of  weights  and  measures  is  transferred  from 
the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  is  founded  on  like  considera- 
tions with  the  preceding  power  of  regulating  coin. 

The  dissimilarity  in  the  rules  of  naturalization  has  long  been 
remarked  as  a  fault  in  our  system,  and  as  laying  a  foundation 
for  intricate  and  delicate  questions.  In  the  fourth  article  of 
the  Confederation  it  is  declared  *'  that  the  free  inhabitants  of 
each  of  these  states,  paupers,  vagabonds,  and  fugitives  from 


150  THE  FEDERALIST 

justice  excepted,  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties of  free  citizens,  in  the  several  states,  and  the  people  of  each 
state  shall,  in  every  other,  enjoy  all  the  privileges  of  trade  and 
commerce,"  etc.  There  is  a  confusion  of  language  here  which 
is  remarkable.  Why  the  terms  free  inhabitants  are  used  in  one 
part  of  the  article,  free  citizens  in  another,  and  people  in  another, 
or  what  was  meant  by  superadding  to  "  all  privileges  and 
immimities  of  free  citizens,"  "  all  the  privileges  of  trade  and 
commerce,"  cannot  easily  be  determined.  It  seems  to  be  a 
construction  scarcely  avoidable,  however,  that  those  who  come 
under  the  denomination  of  free  inhabitants  of  a  state,  although 
not  citizens  of  such  state,  are  entitled,  in  every  other  state,  to 
all  the  privileges  oifree  citizens  of  the  latter;  that  is,  to  greater 
privileges  than  they  may  be  entitled  to  in  their  own  state;  so 
that  it  may  be  in  the  power  of  a  particular  state,  or  rather  every 
state  is  laid  imder  a  necessity,  not  only  to  confer  the  rights  of 
citizenship  in  other  states  upon  any  whom  it  may  admit  to  such 
rights  within  itself,  but  upon  any  whom  it  may  allow  to  become 
inhabitants  within  its  jurisdiction.  But  were  an  exposition 
of  the  term  "  inhabitants  "  to  be  admitted  which  would  confine 
the  stipulated  privileges  to  citizens  alone,  the  difficulty  is  dimin- 
ished only,  not  removed.  The  very  improper  power  would 
still  be  retained  by  each  state  of  naturalizing  aliens  in  every 
other  state.  In  one  state  residence  for  a  short  term  confers 
all  the  rights  of  citizenship;  in  another,  qualifications  of  greater 
importance  are  required.  An  alien,  therefore,  legally  incapaci- 
tated for  certain  rights  in  the  latter,  may,  by  previous  resi- 
dence only  in  the  former,  elude  his  incapacity;  and  thus  the 
law  of  one  state  be  preposterously  rendered  paramoimt  to  the 
law  of  another,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  other.  We  owe  it 
to  mere  casualty  that  very  serious  embarrassments  on  this 
subject  have  been  hitherto  escaped.  By  the  laws  of  several 
states,  certain  descriptions  of  aliens,  who  had  rendered  them- 
selves obnoxious,  were  laid  under  interdicts  inconsistent  not 
only  with  the  rights  of  citizenship  but  with  the  privileges  of 


THE  FEDERALIST  151 

residence.  What  would  have  been  the  consequence  if  such 
persons,  by  residence  or  otherwise,  had  acquired  the  character 
of  citizens  under  the  laws  of  another  state,  and  then  asserted 
their  rights  as  such,  both  to  residence  and  citizenship,  within 
the  state  proscribing  them  ?  Whatever  the  legal  consequences 
might  have  been,  other  consequences  would  probably  have 
resulted  of  too  serious  a  nature  not  to  be  provided  against. 
The  new  Constitution  has  accordingly,  with  great  propriety, 
made  provision  against  them,  and  all  others  proceeding  from 
the  defect  of  the  Confederation  on  this  head,  by  authorizing  the 
general  government  to  establish  an  uniform  rule  of  naturalization 
throughout  the  United  States. 

The  power  of  estabUshing  imiform  laws  of  bankruptcy  is  so 
intimately  connected  with  the  regulation  of  commerce,  and  will 
prevent  so  many  frauds  where  the  parties  or  their  property  may 
lie  or  be  removed  into  different  states,  that  the  expediency  of 
it  seems  not  Ukely  to  be  drawn  into  question. 

The  power  of  prescribing  by  general  laws  the  manner  in 
which  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  each 
state  shall  be  proved,  and  the  effect  they  shall  have  in  other 
states,  is  an  evident  and  valuable  improvement  on  the  clause 
relating  to  this  subject  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  The 
meaning  of  the  latter  is  extremely  indeterminate,  and  can  be  of 
little  importance  imder  any  interpretation  which  it  will  bear. 
The  power  here  established  may  be  rendered  a  very  convenient 
instrument  of  justice,  and  be  particularly  beneficial  on  the 
borders  of  contiguous  states,  where  the  effects  liable  to  justice 
may  be  suddenly  and  secretly  translated,  in  any  stage  of  the 
process,  within  a  foreign  jurisdiction. 

The  power  of  establishing  post-roads  must,  in  every  view, 
be  a  harmless  power,  and  may  perhaps,  by  judicious  manage- 
ment, become  productive  of  great  public  conveniency.  Nothing 
which  tends  to  facilitate  the  intercourse  between  the  states  can 
be  deemed  unworthy  of  the  public  care.  Publius. 


152  THE  FEDERALIST 

(c)   OTHER  POWERS 

The  same  View  continued 


^' 


The  fourth  class  comprises  the  following  miscellaneous  powers: 

1.  A  power  "  to  promote  the  progress  of  science  and  useful 
arts,  by  securing,  for  a  limited  time,  to  authors  and  inventors, 
the  exclusive  right  to  their  respective  writings  and  discoveries." 

The  utility  of  this  power  will  scarcely  be  questioned.  The 
copyright  of  authors  has  been  solemnly  adjudged,  in  Great 
Britain,  to  be  a  right  at  common  law.  The  right  to  useful 
inventions  seems  with  equal  reason  to  belong  to  the  inventors. 
The  pubHc  good  fully  coincides  in  both  cases  with  the  claims 
of  individuals.  The  states  cannot  separately  make  effectual 
provision  for  either  of  the  cases,  and  most  of  them  have  antici- 
pated the  decision  of  this  point,  by  laws  passed  at  the  instance 
of  Congress. 

2.  "To  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever, 
over  such  district  (not  exceeding  ten  miles  square)  as  may  by 
cession  of  particular  states,  and  the  acceptance  of  Congress, 
become  the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  United  States;  and 
to  exercise  like  authority  over  all  places  purchased  by  the  con- 
sent of  the  legislature  of  the  states  in  which  the  same  shall 
be,  for  the  erection  of  forts,  magazines,  arsenals,  dockyards, 
and  other  needful  buildings." 

The  indispensable  necessity  of  complete  authority  at  the 
seat  of  government  carries  its  own  evidence  with  it.  It  is  a 
power  exercised  by  every  legislature  of  the  Union,  I  might  say 
of  the  world,  by  virtue  of  its  general  supremacy.  Without  it, 
not  only  the  public  authority  might  be  insulted  and  its  proceed- 
ings be  interrupted  with  impunity,  but  a  dependence  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  general  government  on  the  state  comprehending 
the  seat  of  the  government,  for  protection  in  the  exercise  of  their 
duty,  might  bring  on  the  national  councils  an  imputation  of  awe 
or  influence,  equally  dishonorable  to  the  government  and  dis- 
satisfactory to  the  other  members  of  the  Confederacy.     This 

»  No.  XLIII  (XLII).     Madison.     Independent  Journal,  January  23,  1788. 


THE  FEDERALIST  153 

consideration  has  the  more  weight,  as  the  gradual  accumulation 
of  public  improvements  at  the  stationary  residence  of  the  govern- 
ment would  be  both  too  great  a  public  pledge  to  be  left  in  the 
hands  of  a  single  state,  and  would  create  so  many  obstacles  to 
a  removal  of  the  government  as  still  further  to  abridge  its 
necessary  independence.  The  extent  of  this  federal  district  is 
sufficiently  circumscribed  to  satisfy  every  jealousy  of  an  oppo- 
site nature.  And  as  it  is  to  be  appropriated  to  this  use  with  the 
consent  of  the  state  ceding  it;  as  the  state  will  no  doul^t  pro- 
vide in  the  compact  for  the  rights  and  the  consent  of  the  citizens 
inhabiting  it;  as  the  inhabitants  will  find  sufficient  inducements 
of  interest  to  become  willing  parties  to  the  cession ;  as  they  will 
have  had  their  voice  in  the  election  of  the  government  which  is 
to  exercise  authority  over  them;  as  a  municipal  legislature  for 
local  purposes,  derived  from  their  own  suffrages,  will  of  course 
be  allowed  them;  and  as  the  authority  of  the  legislature  of  the 
state,  and  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  part  of  it,  to  concur 
in  the  cession,  will  be  derived  from  the  whole  people  of  the 
state,  in  their  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  every  imaginable 
objection  seems  to  be  obviated. 

The  necessity  of  a  like  authority  over  forts,  magazines,  etc., 
estabhshed  by  the  general  government,  is  not  less  evident. 
The  public  money  expended  on  such  places,  and  the  pubhc 
property  deposited  in  them,  require  that  they  should  be  exempt 
from  the  authority  of  the  particular  state.  Nor  would  it  be 
proper  for  the  places  on  which  the  security  of  the  entire  Union 
may  depend  to  be  in  any  degree  dependent  on  a  particular 
member  of  it.  All  objections  and  scruples  are  here  also  obviated, 
by  requiring  the  concurrence  of  the  states  concerned  in  every 
such  establishment. 

3.  "To  declare  the  pimishment  of  treason,  but  no  attainder 
of  treason  shall  work  corruption  of  blood,  or  forfeiture,  except 
during  the  life  of  the  person  attainted." 

As  treason  may  be  committed  against  the  United  States,  the 
authority  of  the  United  States  ought  to  be  enabled  to  punish  it. 
But  as  new-fangled  and  artificial  treasons  have  been  the  great 


154  THE  FEDERALIST 

engines  by  which  violent  factions,  the  natural  ofifspring  of  free 
governments,  have  usually  wreaked  their  alternate  malignity 
on  each  other,  the  Convention  have,  with  great  judgment, 
opposed  a  barrier  to  this  pecuHar  danger  by  inserting  a  con- 
stitutional definition  of  the  crime,  fixing  the  proof  necessary 
\  for  conviction  of  it,,  and  restraining  the  Congress,  even  in  pimish- 
"^  .  ing  it,  from  extending  the  consequences  of  guilt  beyond  the 
person  of  its  author. 

4.  "  To  admit  new  states  into  the  Union;  but  no  new  state 
shall  be  formed  or  erected  within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  other 
state;  nor  any  state  be  formed  by  the  junction  of  two  or  more 
states,  or  parts  of  states,  without  the  consent  of  the  legislatures 

I    of  the  states  concerned,  as  well  as  of  the  Congress." 

In  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  no  provision  is  found  on  this 
important  subject.  Canada  was  to  be  admitted  of  right,  on  her 
joining  in  the  measures  of  the  United  States;  and  the  other 
colonies,  by  which  were  evidently  meant  the  other  British 
colonies,  at  the  discretion  of  nine  states.  The  eventual  estab- 
lishment of  new  states  seems  to  have  been  overlooked  by  the 
compilers  of  that  instrument.  We  have  seen  the  inconvenience 
of  this  omission,  and  the  assumption  of  power  into  which  Con- 
gress have  been  led  by  it.  With  great  propriety,  therefore,  has 
the  new  system  suppHed  the  defect.  The  general  precaution, 
I  that  no  new  states  shall  be  formed  without  the  concurrence  of 
I  the  federal  authority,  and  that  of  the  states  concerned,  is  con- 
sonant to  the  principles  which  ought  to  govern  such  transactions. 
The  particular  precaution  against  the  erection  of  new  states,  by 
the  partition  of  a  state  without  its  consent,  quiets  the  jealousy 
of  the  larger  states;  as  that  of  the  smaller  is  quieted  by  a  like 
precaution,  against  a  junction  of  states  without  their  consent. 

5.  "  To  dispose  of  and  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations 
respecting  the  territory  or  other  property  belonging  to  the 
United  States,  with  a  proviso  that  nothing  in  the  Constitution 
shall  be  so  construed  as  to  prejudice  any  claims  of  the  United 
states,  as  of  any  particular  state." 

This  is  a  power  of  very  great  importance,  and  required  by 


THE  FEDERALIST  155 

considerations  similar  to  those  which  show  the  propriety  of  the 
former.  The  proviso  annexed  is  proper  in  itself,  and  was  pro- 
bably rendered  absolutely  necessary  by  jealousies  and  questions 
concerning  the  Western  territory  sufficiently  known  to  the  pubhc. 

6.  "  To  guarantee  to  every  state  in  the  Union  a  republican 
form  of  government;  to  protect  each  of  them  against  invasion; 
and  on  appHcation  of  the  legislature,  or  of  the  executive  (when 
the  legislature  cannot  be  convened)  against  domestic  violence." 

In  a  confederacy  founded  on  republican  principles,  and  com- 
posed of  republican  members,  the  superintending  government 
ought  clearly  to  possess  authority  to  defend  the  system  against 
aristocratic  or  monarchical  innovations.  The  more  intimate 
the  nature  of  such  a  imion  may  be,  the  greater  interest  have  the 
members  in  the  political  institutions  of  each  other;  and  the 
greater  right  to  insist  that  the  forms  of  government  under  which 
the  compact  was  entered  into  should  be  substantially  maintained. 
But  a  right  implies  a  remedy;  and  where  else  could  the  remedy 
be  deposited  than  where  it  is  deposited  by  the  Constitution? 
Governments  of  dissimilar  principles  and  forms  have  been  found 
less  adapted  to  a  federal  coalition  of  any  sort  than  those  of  a 
kindred  nature.  *'  As  the  confederate  republic  of  Germany," 
says  Montesquieu,  "  consists  of  free  cities  and  petty  states,  sub- 
ject to  different  princes,  experience  shows  us  that  it  is  more 
imperfect  than  that  of  Holland  and  Switzerland."  "  Greece 
was  undone,"  he  adds,  "  as  soon  as  the  king  of  Macedon  obtained 
a  seat  among  the  Amphictyons."  In  the  latter  case,  no  doubt, 
the  disproportionate  force,  as  well  as  the  monarchical  form,  of 
the  new  confederate,  had  its  share  of  influence  on  the  events. 
It  may  possibly  be  asked  what  need  there  could  be  of  such  a 
precaution,  and  whether  it  may  not  become  a  pretext  for  altera- 
tions in  the  state  governments,  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
states  themselves.  These  questions  admit  of  ready  answers. 
If  the  interposition  of  the  general  government  should  not  be 
needed,  the  provision  for  such  an  event  will  be  a  harmless  super- 
fluity only  in  the  Constitution.  But  who  can  say  what  experi- 
ments may  be  produced  by  the  caprice  of  particular  states,  by 


156  THE  FEDERALIST 

the  ambition  of  enterprising  leaders,  or  by  the  intrigues  and 
influence  of  foreign  powers  ?  To  the  second  question  it  may  be 
answered,  that  if  the  general  government  should  interpose  by 
virtue  of  this  constitutional  authority,  it  will  be,  of  course, 
bound  to  pursue  the  authority.  But  the  authority  extends  no 
farther  than  to  a  guarantee  of  a  republican  form  of  government, 
which  supposes  a  preexisting  government  of  the  form  which  is 
to  be  guaranteed.  As  long,  therefore,  as  the  existing  republican 
forms  are  continued  by  the  states,  they  are  guaranteed  by  the 
federal  Constitution.  Whenever  the  states  may  choose  to  sub- 
stitute other  repubHcan  forms,  they  have  a  right  to  do  so,  and 
to  claim  the  federal  guarantee  for  the  latter.  The  only  restric- 
tion imposed  on  them  is,  that  they  shall  not  exchange  republican^; 
for  anti-republican  constitutions:  a  restriction  which,  it  is* 
presumed,  will  hardly  be  considered  as  a  grievance. 
t  A  protection  against  invasion  is  due  from  every  society  to  the 
f  parts  composing  it.  The  latitude  of  the  expression  here  used 
seems  to  secure  each  state,  not  only  against  foreign  hostility, 
but  against  ambitious  or  vindictive  enterprises  of  its  more 
powerful  neighbors.  The  history,  both  of  ancient  and  modem 
confederacies,  proves  that  the  weaker  members  of  the  union 
ought  not  to  be  insensible  to  the  poHcy  of  this  article. 
I  Protection  against  domestic  violence  is  added  with  equal  pro- 
I  priety.  It  has  been  remarked  that  even  among  the  Swiss 
cantons,  which,  properly  speaking,  are  not  under  one  govern- 
ment, provision  is  made  for  this  object;  and  the  history  of  that 
league  informs  us  that  mutual  aid  is  frequently  claimed  and 
afforded;  and  as  well  by  the  most  democratic  as  the  other 
cantons.  A  recent  and  well-known  event  among  ourselves  has 
warned  us  to  be  prepared  for  emergencies  of  a  like  nature. 

At  first  view,  it  might  seem  not  to  square  with  the  republican 
theory,  to  suppose  either  that  a  majority  have  not  the  right,  or 
that  a  minority  will  have  the  force,  to  subvert  a  government; 
and  consequently  that  the  federal  interposition  can  never  be 
required  but  when  it  would  be  improper.  But  theoretic  reason- 
ing, in  this  as  in  most  other  cases,  must  be  qualified  by  the 


THE  FEDERALIST  157 

lessons  of  practice.  Why  may  not  illicit  combinations,  for 
purposes  of  violence,  be  formed  as  well  by  a  majority  of  a  state, 
especially  a  small  state,  as  by  a  majority  of  a  county,  or  a  dis- 
trict of  the  same  state;  and  if  the  authority  of  the  state  ought, 
in  the  latter  case,  to  protect  the  local  magistracy,  ought  not  the 
federal  authority,  in  the  former,  to  support  the  state  authority  ? 
Besides,  there  are  certain  parts  of  the  state  constitutions  which 
are  so  interwoven  with  the  federal  Constitution,  that  a  violent 
blow  cannot  be  given  to  the  one  without  communicating  the 
wound  to  the  other.  Insurrections  in  a  state  will  rarely  induce 
a  federal  interposition,  imless  the  number  concerned  in  them  bear 
some  proportion  to  the  friends  of  government.  It  will  be  much 
better  that  the  violence  in  such  cases  should  be  repressed  by  the 
superintending  power  than  that  the  majority  should  be  left  to 
maintain  their  cause  by  a  bloody  and  obstinate  contest.  The 
existence  of  a  right  to  interpose  will  generally  prevent  the 
necessity  of  exerting  it. 

Is  it  true  that  force  and  right  are  necessarily  on  the  same  side 
in  republican  governments  ?  May  not  the  minor  party  possess 
such  a  superiority  of  pecuniary  resources,  of  military  talents  and 
experience,  or  of  secret  succors  from  foreign  powers,  as  will 
render  it  superior  also  in  an  appeal  to  the  sword  ?  May  not  a 
more  compact  and  advantageous  position  turn  the  scale  on  the 
same  side,  against  a  superior  number,  so  situated  as  to  be  less 
capable  of  a  prompt  and  collected  exertion  of  its  strength  ? 
Nothing  can  be  more  chimerical  than  to  imagine  that  in  a  trial 
of  actual  force,  victory  may  be  calculated  by  the  rules  which  pre- 
vail in  a  census  of  the  inhabitants,  or  which  determine  the  event 
of  an  election !  May  it  not  happen,  in  fine,  that  the  minority  of 
CITIZENS  may  become  a  majority  of  persons,  by  the  accession  of 
aHen  residents,  of  a  casual  concourse  of  adventurers,  or  of  those 
whom  the  constitution  of  the  state  has  not  admitted  to  the 
rights  of  suffrage  ?  I  take  no  notice  of  an  unhappy  species  of 
population  abounding  in  some  of  the  states,  who,  during  the 
calm  of  regular  government,  are  svink  below  the  level  of  men;  but 
who,  in  the  tempestuous  scenes  of  civil  violence,  may  emerge  into 


IS8  THE  FEDERALIST 

the  human  character,  and  give  a  superiority  of  strength  to  any 
party  with  which  they  may  associate  themselves. 

In  cases  where  it  may  be  doubtful  on  which  side  justice  lies, 
what  better  umpires  could  be  desired  by  two  violent  factions, 
flying  to  arms  and  tearing  a  state  to  pieces,  than  the  repre- 
sentatives of  confederate  states  not  heated  by  the  local  flame  ? 
To  the  impartiality  of  judges  they  would  unite  the  affection  of 
friends.  Happy  would  it  be  if  such  a  remedy  for  its  infirmities 
could  be  enjoyed  by  all  free  governments;  if  a  project  equally 
effectual  could  be  established  for  the  universal  peace  of  mankind! 

Should  it  be  asked,  what  is  to  be  the  redress  for  an  insurrection 
pervading  all  the  states,  and  comprising  a  superiority  of  the 
entire  force,  though  not  a  constitutional  right,  the  answer  must 
be,  that  such  a  case,  as  it  would  be  without  the  compass  of 
human  remedies,  so  it  is  fortunately  not  within  the  compass  of 
human  probability;  and  that  it  is  a  sufficient  recommendation 
of  the  federal  Constitution  that  it  diminishes  the  risk  of  a 
calamity  for  which  no  possible  constitution  can  provide  a  cure. 

Among  the  advantages  of  a  confederate  republic  enumerated 
by  Montesquieu,  an  important  one  is,  "  that  should  a  popular 
insurrection  happen  in  one  of  the  states,  the  others  are  able  to 
quell  it.  Should  abuses  creep  into  one  part,  they  are  reformed 
by  those  that  remain  soimd." 

7.  "To  consider  all  debts  contracted  and  engagements 
entered  into,  before  the  adoption  of  this  Constitution,  as  being 
no  less  valid  against  the  United  States  imder  this  Constitution, 
than  imder  the  Confederation." 

This  can  only  be  considered  as  a  declaratory  proposition; 
and  may  have  been  inserted,  among  other  reasons,  for  the 
satisfaction  of  the  foreign  creditors  of  the  United  States,  who 
cannot  be  strangers  to  the  pretended  doctrine  that  a  change 
in  the  political  form  of  civil  society  has  the  magical  effect  of 
dissolving  its  moral  obligations. 

Among  the  lesser  criticisms  which  have  been  exercised  on 
the  Constitution,  it  has  been  remarked  that  the  validity  of 
engagements  ought  to  have  been  asserted  in  favor  of  the  United 


THE  FEDERALIST  159 

States,  as  well  as  against  them;  and  in  the  spirit  which  usually 
characterizes  little  critics,  the  omission  has  been  transformed 
and  magnified  into  a  plot  against  the  national  rights.  The 
authors  of  this  discovery  may  be  told,  what  few  others  need 
to  be  informed  of,  that  as  engagements  are  in  their  nature  reci- 
procal, an  assertion  of  their  validity  on  one  side  necessarily 
involves  a  validity  on  the  other  side;  and  that  as  the  article  is 
merely  declaratory,  the  establishment  of  the  principle  in  one 
case  is  sufficient  for  every  case.  They  may  be  further  told  that 
every  constitution  must  limit  its  precautions  to  dangers  that  are 
not  altogether  imaginary;  and  that  no  real  danger  can  exist 
that  the  government  would  dare,  with,  or  even  without,  this 
constitutional  declaration  before  it,  to  remit  the  debts  justly 
due  to  the  public,  on  the  pretext  here  condemned. 

8.  "To  provide  for  amendments  to  be  ratified  by  three  fourths 
of  the  states,  under  two  exceptions  only." 

That  useful  alterations  will  be  suggested  by  experience  could 
not  but  be  foreseen.  It  was  requisite,  therefore,  that  a  mode 
for  introducing  them  should  be  provided.  The  mode  preferred 
by  the  Convention  seems  to  be  stamped  with  every  mark  of 
propriety.  It  guards  equally  against  that  extreme  facility 
which  would  render  the  Constitution  too  mutable,  and  that* 
extreme  difficulty  which  might  perpetuate  its  discovered  faults.! 
It,  moreover,  equally  enables  the  general  and  the  state  govern- 
ments to  originate  the  amendment  of  errors,  as  they  may  be 
pointed  out  by  the  experience  on  one  side  or  on  the  other.  The 
exception  in  favor  of  the  equality  of  suffrage  in  the  Senate 
was  probably  meant  as  a  palladium  to  the  residuary  sovereignty 
of  the  states,  imphed  and  secured  by  that  principle  of  repre- 
sentation in  one  branch  of  the  legislature,  and  was  probably 
insisted  on  by  the  states  particularly  attached  to  that  equality. 
The  other  exception  must  have  been  admitted  on  the  same 
considerations  which  produced  the  privilege  defended  by  it. 

9.  "  The  ratification  of  the  conventions  of  nine  states  shall 
be  sufficient  for  the  estabhshment  of  this  Constitution  between 
the  states  ratifying  the  same." 


i6o  THE  FEDERALIST 

This  article  speaks  for  itself.  The  express  authority  of  the 
people  alone  could  give  due  validity  to  the  Constitution.  To 
have  required  the  unanimous  ratification  of  the  thirteen  States 
would  have  subjected  the  essential  interests  of  the  whole  to  the 
caprice  or  corruption  of  a  single  member.  It  would  have  marked 
a  want  of  foresight  in  the  Convention  which  our  own  experience 
would  have  rendered  inexcusable. 

Two  questions  of  a  very  delicate  nature  present  themselves 
on  this  occasion:  i.  On  what  principle  the  Confederation, 
which  stands  in  the  solemn  form  of  a  compact  among  the  states, 
can  be  superseded  without  the  unanimous  consent  of  the  parties 
to  it  ?  2.  What  relation  is  to  subsist  between  the  nine  or  more 
states  ratifying  the  Constitution,  and  the  remaining  few  who 
do  not  become  parties  to  it  ? 

The  first  question  is  answered  at  once  by  recurring  to  the 
absolute  necessity  of  the  case;  to  the  great  principle  of  self- 
preservation  ;  to  the  transcendent  law  of  nature  and  of  nature's 
God,  which  declares  that  the  safety  and  happiness  of  society 
are  the  objects  at  which  all  political  institutions  aim,  and  to 
which  all  such  institutions  must  be  sacrificed.  Perhaps,  also, 
an  answer  may  be  found  without  searching  beyond  the  principles 
of  the  compact  itself.  It  has  been  heretofore  noted  among  the 
defects  of  the  Confederation  that  in  many  of  the  states  it  had 
received  no  higher  sanction  than  a  mere  legislative  ratification. 
The  principle  of  reciprocality  seems  to  require  that  its  obHgation 
on  the  other  states  should  be  reduced  to  the  same  standard. 
A  compact  between  independent  sovereigns,  founded  on  acts 
of  legislative  authority,  can  pretend  to  no  higher  validity 
than  a  league  or  treaty  between  the  parties.  It  is  an  estabKshed 
doctrine  on  the  subject  of  treaties,  that  all  the  articles  are 
mutually  conditions  of  each  other;  that  a  breach  of  any  one 
article  is  a  breach  of  the  whole  treaty;  and  that  a  breach, 
committed  by  either  of  the  parties,  absolves  the  others,  and 
authorizes  them,  if  they  please,  to  pronounce  the  compact 
violated  and  void.  Should  it  unhappily  be  necessary  to  appeal 
to  these  delicate  truths  for  a  justification  for  dispensing  with 


THE  FEDERALIST  i6i 

the  consent  of  particular  states  to  a  dissolution  of  the  federal 
pact,  will  not  the  complaining  parties  find  it  a  difficult  task  to 
answer  the  multiplied  and  important  infractions  with  which 
they  may  be  confronted  ?  The  time  has  been  when  it  was 
incumbent  on  us  all  to  veil  the  ideas  which  this  paragraph 
exhibits.  The  scene  is  now  changed,  and  with  it  the  part  which 
the  same  motives  dictate. 

The  second  question  is  not  less  delicate;  and  the  flattering 
prospect  of  its  being  merely  hypothetical  forbids  an  overcurious 
discussion  of  it.  It  is  one  of  those  cases  which  must  be  left  to 
provide  for  itself.  In  general,  it  may  be  observed,  that  although 
no  poHtical  relation  can  subsist  between  the  assenting  and 
dissenting  states,  yet  the  moral  relations  will  remain  uncanceled. 
The  claims  of  justice,  both  on  one  side  and  on  the  other,  will  be 
in  force,  and  must  be  fulfilled;  the  rights  of  humanity  must  in 
all  cases  be  duly  and  mutually  respected;  whilst  considerations 
of  a  common  interest,  and,  above  all,  the  remembrance  of  the 
endearing  scenes  which  are  past,  and  the  anticipation  of  a  speedy 
triumph  over  the  obstacles  to  reunion,  will,  it  is  hoped,  not  urge 
in  vain  moderation  on  one  side,  and  prudence  on  the  other. 

PUBLIUS. 

The  same  View  continued  and  concluded  ^ 

A  fifth  class  of  provisions  in  favor  of  the  federal  authority 
consists  of  the  following  restrictions  on  the  authority  of  the 
several  states: 

I.  "  No  state  shall  enter  into  any  treaty,  alliance  or  con- 
federation, grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  coin  money, 
emit  bills  of  credit,  make  anything  but  gold  and  silver  a  legal 
tender  in  payment  of  debt,  pass  any  bill  of  attajflider,  ex  post 
facto  law,  or  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts,  or  grant 
any  title  of  nobility." 

The  prohibition  against  treaties,  alhances,  and  confederations 
makes  a  part  of  the  existing  articles  of  union;  and  for  reasons 
which  need  no  explanation  is  copied  into  the  new  Constitution. 

J  No.  XLIV  (XLIII).     Madison.     New  York  Packet,  January  25,  1788. 


i62  THE  FEDERALIST 

The  prohibition  of  letters  of  marque  is  another  part  of  the  old 
system,  but  is  somewhat  extended  in  the  new.  According  to 
the  former,  letters  of  marque  could  be  granted  by  the  states 
after  a  declaration  of  war;  according  to  the  latter,  these  licenses 
must  be  obtained,  as  well  during  war  as  previous  to  its  declara- 
tion, from  the  government  of  the  United  States.  This  alteration 
is  fully  justified  by  the  advantage  of  uniformity  in  all  points 
which  relate  to  foreign  powers,  and  of  immediate  responsibility 
to  the  nation  in  all  those  for  whose  conduct  the  nation  itself  is 
to  be  responsible. 

The  right  of  coining  money,  which  is  here  taken  from  the 
states,  was  left  in  their  hands  by  the  Confederation,  as  a  con- 
current right  with  that  of  Congress,  under  an  exception  in  favor 
of  the  exclusive  right  of  Congress  to  regulate  the  alloy  and 
value.  In  this  instance,  also,  the  new  provision  is  an  improve- 
ment on  the  old.  Whilst  the  alloy  and  value  depended  on  the 
general  authority,  a  right  of  coinage  in  the  particular  states 
could  have  no  other  effect  than  to  multiply  expensive  mints  and 
diversify  the  forms  and  weights  of  the  circulating  pieces.  The 
latter  inconveniency  defeats  one  purpose  for  which  the  power 
was  originally  submitted  to  the  federal  head;  and  as  far  as  the 
former  might  prevent  an  inconvenient  remittance  of  gold  and 
silver  to  the  central  mint  for  recoinage,  the  end  can  be  as  well 
attained  by  local  mints  established  under  the  general  authority. 

The  extension  of  the  prohibition  to  bills  of  credit  must  give 
pleasure  to  every  citizen,  in  proportion  to  his  love  of  justice  and 
his  knowledge  of  the  true  springs  of  public  prosperity.  The 
loss  which  America  has  sustained  since  the  peace,  from  the 
pestilent  effects  of  paper  money  on  the  necessary  confidence 
between  man  and  man,  on  the  necessary  confidence  in  the  public 
councils,  on  the  industry  and  morals  of  the  people  and  on  the 
character  of  republican  government,  constitutes  an  enormous 
debt  against  the  states  chargeable  with  this  unadvised  measure, 
which  must  long  remain  unsatisfied;  or  rather  an  accumulation 
of  guilt,  which  can  be  expiated  no  otherwise  than  by  a  voluntary 
sacrifice  on  the  altar  of  justice  of  the  power  which  has  been 


THE  FEDERALIST  163 

the  instrument  of  it.  In  addition  to  these  persuasive  considera- 
tions, it  may  be  observed  that  the  same  reasons  which  show  the 
necessity  of  denying  to  the  states  the  power  of  regulating  coin, 
prove  with  equal  force  that  they  ought  not  to  be  at  hberty  to 
substitute  a  paper  medium  in  the  place  of  coin.  Had  every 
state  a  right  to  regulate  the  value  of  its  coin,  there  might  be  as 
many  different  currencies  as  states,  and  thus  the  intercourse 
among  them  would  be  impeded;  retrospective  alterations  in  its 
value  might  be  made,  and  thus  the  citizens  of  other  states  be 
injured,  and  animosities  be  kindled  among  the  states  them- 
selves. The  subjects  of  foreign  powers  might  suffer  from  the 
same  cause,  and  hence  the  Union  be  discredited  and  embroiled 
by  the  indiscretion  of  a  single  member.  No  one  of  these  mis- 
chiefs is  less  incident  to  a  power  in  the  states  to  emit  paper 
money  than  to  coin  gold  or  silver.  The  power  to  make  any- 
thing but  gold  and  silver  a  tender  in  payment  of  debts  is  with- 
drawn from  the  states,  on  the  same  principle  with  that  of  striking 
a  paper  currency. 

Bills  of  attainder,  ex  post  facto  laws,  and  laws  impairing  the 
obHgation  of  contracts,  are  contrary  to  the  first  principles  of 
the  social  compact  and  to  every  principle  of  soimd  legislation. 
The  two  former  are  expressly  prohibited  by  the  declarations 
prefixed  to  some  of  the  state  constitutions,  and  all  of  them  are 
prohibited  by  the  spirit  and  scope  of  these  fundamental  charters. 
Our  own  experience  has  taught  us,  nevertheless,  that  additional 
fences  against  these  dangers  ought  not  to  be  omitted.  Very 
properly,  therefore,  have  the  Convention  added  this  constitu- 
tional bulwark  in  favor  of  personal  security  and  private  rights; 
and  I  am  much  deceived  if  they  have  not,  in  so  doing,  as  faith- 
fully consulted  the  genuine  sentiments  as  the  imdoubted  inter- 
ests of  their  constituents.  The  sober  people  of  America  are 
weary  of  the  fluctuating  policy  which  has  directed  the  public 
councils.  They  have  seen  with  regret  and  with  indignation  that 
sudden  changes  and  legislative  interferences,  in  cases  affecting 
personal  rights,  become  jobs  in  the  hands  of  enterprising  and 
influential  speculators,  and  snares  to  the  more  industrious  and 


1 64  THE  FEDERALIST 

less  informed  part  of  the  community.  They  have  seen,  too> 
that  one  legislative  interference  is  but  the  first  link  of  a  long 
chain  of  repetitions,  every  subsequent  interference  being  natur- 
ally produced  by  the  effects  of  the  preceding.  They  very  rightly 
infer,  therefore,  that  some  thorough  reform  is  wanting,  which 
will  banish  speculations  on  public  measures,  inspire  a  general 
prudence  and  industry,  and  give  a  regular  course  to  the  busi- 
ness of  society.  The  prohibition  with  respect  to  titles  of  nobil- 
ity is  copied  from  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  needs  no 
comment. 

2.  "  No  state  shall,  without  the  consent  of  the  Congress,  lay 
any  imposts  or  duties  on  imports  or  exports,  except  what  may 
be  absolutely  necessary  for  executing  its  inspection  laws;  and 
the  net  proceeds  of  all  duties  and  imposts  laid  by  any  state  on 
imports  or  exports,  shall  be  for  the  use  of  the  treasury  of  the 
United  States;  and  all  such  laws  shall  be  subject  to  the  revision 
and  control  of  the  Congress.  No  state  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  Congress,  lay  any  duties  of  tonnage,  keep  troops,  or  ships 
of  war,  in  time  of  peace,  enter  into  any  agreement  or  compact 
with  another  state,  or  with  a  foreign  power,  or  engage  in  war, 
unless  actually  invaded,  or  in  such  imminent  danger  as  will  not 
admit  of  delay."  - 

The  restraint  on  the  power  of  the  states  over  imports  and 
exports  is  enforced  by  all  the  arguments  which  prove  the  neces- 
sity of  submitting  the  regulation  of  trade  to  the  federal  coimcils. 
It  is  needless,  therefore,  to  remark  farther  on  this  head,  than 
that  the  manner  in  which  the  restraint  is  qualified  seems  well 
calculated  at  once  to  secure  to  the  states  a  reasonable  discretion 
in  providing  for  the  conveniency  of  their  imports  and  exports, 
and  to  the  United  States  a  reasonable  check  against  the  abuse 
of  this  discretion.  The  remaining  particulars  of  this  clause  fall 
within  reasonings  which  are  either  so  obvious,  or  have  been  so 
fully  developed,  that  they  may  be  passed  over  without  remark. 

The  sixth  and  last  class  consists  of  the  several  powers  and 
provisions  by  which  efficacy  is  given  to  all  the  rest. 

I.  Of  these  the  first  is  the  power  "  to  make  all  laws"  which 


THE  FEDERALIST  165 

shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execution  the 
foregoing  powers,  and  all  other  powers  vested  by  this  Constitu- 
tion in  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  depart- 
ment or  ofl&cer  thereof." 

Few  parts  of  the  Constitution  have  been  assailed  with  more 
intemperance  than  this ;  yet  on  a  fair  investigation  of  it,  as  has 
been  elsewhere  shown,  no  part  can  appear  more  completely 
invulnerable.  Without  the  substance  of  this  power,  the  whole 
Constitution  would  be  a  dead  letter.  Those  who  object  to  the 
article,  therefore,  as  a  part  of  the  Constitution,  can  only  mean 
that  the  form  of  the  provision  is  improper.  But  have  they 
considered  whether  a  better  form  could  have  been  substituted  ? 

There  are  four  other  possible  methods  which  the  Convention 
might  have  taken  on  this  subject.  They  might  have  copied 
the  second  article  of  the  existing  Confederation,  which  would 
have  prohibited  the  exercise  of  any  power  not  expressly  dele- 
gated; they  might  have  attempted  a  positive  enumeration  of 
the  powers  comprehended  under  the  general  terms  "  necessary 
and  proper  ";  they  might  have  attempted  a  negative  enumer- 
ation of  them  by  specifying  the  powers  excepted  from  the 
general  definition;  they  might  have  been  altogether  silent  on 
the  subject,  leaving  these  necessary  and  proper  powers  to  con- 
struction and  inference. 

Had  the  Convention  taken  the  first  method  of  adopting  the 
second  article  of  Confederation,  it  is  evident  that  the  new  Con- 
gress would  be  continually  exposed,  as  their  predecessors  have 
been,  to  the  alternative  of  construing  the  term  "  expressly  " 
with  so  much  rigor  as  to  disarm  the  government  of  all  real 
authority  whatever,  or  with  so  much  latitude  as  to  destroy 
altogether  the  force  of  the  restriction.  It  would  be  easy  to 
show,  if  it  were  necessary,  that  no  important  power  delegated 
by  the  Articles  of  Confederation  has  been  or  can  be  executed  by 
Congress  without  recurring  more  or  less  to  the  doctrine  of 
construction  or  implication.  As  the  powers  delegated  under 
the  new  system  are  more  extensive,  the  government  which  is  to 


1 66  THE  FEDERALIST 

administer  it  would  find  itself  still  more  distressed  with  the 
alternative  of  betraying  the  public  interest  by  doing  nothing, 
or  of  violating  the  Constitution  by  exercising  powers  indispen- 
sably necessary  and  proper,  but,  at  the  same  time,  not  expressly 
granted. 

Had  the  Convention  attempted  a  positive  enumeration  of  the 
powers  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  their  other  powers 
into  effect,  the  attempt  would  have  involved  a  complete  digest 
of  laws  on  every  subject  to  which  the  Constitution  relates; 
accommodated  too,  not  only  to  the  existing  state  of  things,  but 
to  all  the  possible  changes  which  futurity  may  produce;  for  in 
every  new  application  of  a  general  power,  the  particular  powers, 
which  are  the  means  of  attaining  the  object  of  the  general  power, 
must  always  necessarily  vary  with  that  object,  and  be  often 
properly  varied  whilst  the  object  remains  the  same. 

Had  they  attempted  to  enumerate  the  particular  powers  or 
means  not  necessary  or  proper  for  carrying  the  general  powers 
into  execution,  the  task  would  have  been  no  less  chimerical; 
and  would  have  been  liable  to  this  further  objection,  that  every 
defect  in  the  enumeration  would  have  been  equivalent  to  a 
positive  grant  of  authority.  If,  to  avoid  this  consequence, 
they  had  attempted  a  partial  enumeration  of  the  exceptions, 
and  described  the  residue  by  the  general  terms,  not  necessary 
or  proper,  it  must  have  happened  that  the  enumeration  would 
comprehend  a  few  of  the  excepted  powers  only;  that  these 
would  be  such  as  would  be  least  likely  to  be  assumed  or  tole- 
rated, because  the  enumeration  would  of  course  select  such  as 
would  be  least  necessary  or  proper;  and  that  the  imnecessary 
and  improper  powers  included  in  the  residuum  would  be  less 
forcibly  excepted  than  if  no  partial  enumeration  had  been  made. 

Had  the  Constitution  been  silent  on  this  head,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  all  the  particular  powers  requisite  as  means  of 
executing  the  general  powers  would  have  resulted  to  the  govern- 
ment, by  imavoidable  implication.  No  axiom  is  more  clearly 
established  in  law,  or  in  reason,  than  that  wherever  the  end  is 


THE  FEDERALIST  167 

required,  the  means  are  authorized;  wherever  a  general  power 
to  do  a  thing  is  given,  every  particular  power  necessary  for 
doing  it  is  included.  Had  this  last  method,  therefore,  been 
pursued  by  the  Convention,  every  objection  now  urged  against 
their  plan  would  remain  in  all  its  plausibility;  and  the  real 
inconveniency  would  be  incurred  of  not  removing  a  pretext 
which  may  be  seized  on  critical  occasions  for  drawing  into 
question  the  essential  powers  of  the  Union. 

If  it  be  asked  what  is  to  be  the  consequence,  in  case  the  Con- 
gress shall  misconstrue  this  part  of  the  Constitution,  and  exercise 
powers  not  warranted  by  its  true  meaning,  I  answer,  the  same 
as  if  they  should  misconstrue  or  enlarge  any  other  power  vested 
in  them;  as  if  the  general  power  had  been  reduced  to  particulars, 
and  any  one  of  these  were  to  be  violated;  the  same,  in  short,  as 
if  the  state  legislatures  should  violate  their  respective  consti- 
tutional authorities.  In  the  first  instance,  the  success  of  the 
usurpation  will  depend  on  the  executive  and  judiciary  depart- 
ments, which  are  to  expound  and  give  effect  to  the  legislative 
acts;  and  in  the  last  resort  a  remedy  must  be  obtained  from  the 
people,  who  can,  by  the  election  of  more  faithful  representatives, 
annul  the  acts  of  the  usurpers.  The  truth  is  that  this  ultimate 
redress  may  be  more  confided  in  against  unconstitutional  acts 
of  the  federal  than  of  the  state  legislatures,  for  this  plain  reason, 
that  as  every  such  act  of  the  former  will  be  an  invasion  of  the 
rights  of  the  latter,  these  will  be  ever  ready  to  mark  the  inno- 
vation, to  sound  the  alarm  to  the  people,  and  to  exert  their  local 
influence  in  effecting  a  change  of  federal  representatives.  There 
being  no  such  intermediate  body  between  the  state  legislatures 
and  the  people  interested  in  watching  the  conduct  of  the  former, 
violations  of  the  state  constitutions  are  more  likely  to  remain 
unnoticed  and  unredressed. 

2.  "  This  Constitution,  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
which  shall  be  made  in  pursuance  thereof;  and  all  treaties  made, 
or  which  shall  be  made,  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States, 
shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land;   and  the  judges  in  every 


i68  THE  FEDERALIST 

state  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  thing  in  the  Constitution  or 
laws  of  any  state  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding." 

The  indiscreet  zeal  of  the  adversaries  to  the  Constitution  has 
betrayed  them  into  an  attack  on  this  part  of  it  also,  without 
which  it  would  have  been  evidently  and  radically  defective. 
To  be  fully  sensible  of  this,  we  need  only  suppose  for  a  moment 
that  the  supremacy  of  the  state  constitutions  had  been  left 
complete  by  a  saving  clause  in  their  favor. 

In  the  first  place,  as  these  constitutions  invest  the  state 
legislatures  with  absolute  sovereignty,  in  all  cases  not  excepted 
by  the  existing  Articles  of  Confederation,  all  the  authorities 
contained  in  the  proposed  Constitution,  so  far  as  they  exceed 
those  enumerated  in  the  Confederation,  would  have  been 
annulled,  and  the  new  Congress  would  have  been  reduced  to 
the  same  impotent  condition  with  their  predecessors. 

In  the  next  place,  as  the  constitutions  of  some  of  the  states 
do  not  even  expressly  and  fully  recognize  the  existing  powers 
of  the  Confederacy,  an  express  saving  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
former  would,  in  such  states,  have  brought  into  question  every 
power  contained  in  the  proposed  Constitution. 

In  the  third  place,  as  the  constitutions  of  the  states  differ 
much  from  each  other,  it  might  happen  that  a  treaty  or  national 
law,  of  great  and  equal  importance  to  the  states,  would  inter- 
fere with  some  and  not  with  other  constitutions,  and  would  con- 
sequently be  valid  in  some  of  the  states,  at  the  same  time  that 
it  would  have  no  effect  in  others. 

In  fine,  the  world  would  have  seen,  for  the  first  time,  a  system 
of  government  founded  on  an  inversion  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of  all  government;  it  would  have  seen  the  authority 
of  the  whole  society  everywhere  subordinate  to  the  authority 
of  the  parts;  it  would  have  seen  a  monster  in  which  the  head 
was  under  the  direction  of  the  members. 

3.  "  The  senators  and  representatives  before  mentioned,  and 
the  members  of  the  several  state  legislatures  and  all  executive 
and  judicial  officers,  both  of  the  United  States  and  of  the 


THE  FEDERALIST  169 

several  states,  shall  be  bound  by  oath  or  aflSLrmation  to  support 
this  Constitution." 

It  has  been  asked  why  it  was  thought  necessary  that  the  state 
magistracy  should  be  bound  to  support  the  federal  Constitution, 
and  unnecessary  that  a  Hke  oath  should  be  imposed  on  the 
officers  of  the  United  States,  in  favor  of  the  state  constitutions. 

Several  reasons  might  be  assigned  for  the  distinctions.  I 
content  myself  with  one  which  is  obvious  and  conclusive. 
The  members  of  the  federal  government  will  have  no  agency 
in  carrying  the  state  constitutions  into  effect.  The  members 
and  officers  of  the  state  governments,  on  the  contrary,  will  have 
an  essential  agency  in  giving  effect  to  the  federal  Constitution. 
The  election  of  the  President  and  Senate  will  depend,  in  all  cases, 
on  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states.  And  the  election  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  will  equally  depend  on  the  same 
authority  in  the  first  instance;  and  will,  probably,  forever  be 
conducted  by  the  officers,  and  according  to  the  laws,  of  the 
states. 

4.  Among  the  provisions  for  giving  efficacy  to  the  federal 
powers  might  be  added  those  which  belong  to  the  executive  and 
judiciary  departments;  but  as  these  are  reserved  for  particular 
examination  in  another  place,  I  pass  them  over  in  this. 

We  have  now  reviewed,  in  detail,  all  the  articles  composing 
the  sum  or  quantity  of  power  delegated  by  the  proposed  Con- 
stitution to  the  federal  government,  and  are  brought  to  this 
undeniable  conclusion,  that  no  part  of  the  power  is  unnecessary 
or  improper  for  accomplishing  the  necessary  objects  of  the 
Union.  The  question,  therefore,  whether  this  amount  of  power 
shall  be  granted  or  not,  resolves  itself  into  another  question, 
whether  or  not  a  government  commensurate  to  the  exigencies 
of  the  Union  shall  be  established;  or,  in  other  words,  whether 
the  Union  itself  shall  be  preserved.  Publius. 


I70  THE  FEDERALIST  /^ 

(d)   THE  POWERS  OF  THE  FEDERAL  AND  THE 
STATE   GOVERNMENTS   COMPARED 

A  FURTHER  Discussion  of  the  supposed  Danger  from  the 
Powers  of  the  Union,  to  the  State  Governments  ^ 

Having  shown  that  no  one  of  the  powers  transferred  to  the 
federal  government  is  unnecessary  or  improper,  the  next  ques- 
tion to  be  considered  is,  whether  the  whole  mass  of  them  will  be 
dangerous  to  the  portion  of  authority  left  in  the  several  states. 

The  adversaries  to  the  plan  of  the  Convention,  instead  of 
considering  in  the  first  place  what  degree  of  power  was  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  federal  government,  have 
exhausted  themselves  in  a  secondary  inquiry  into  the  possible 
consequences  of  the  proposed  degree  of  power  to  the  governments 
of  the  particular  states.  But  if  the  Union,  as  has  been  shown, 
be  essential  to  the  security  of  the  people  of  America  against 
foreign  danger;  if  it  be  essential  to  their  security  against  con- 
tentions and  wars  among  the  different  states;  if  it  be  essential 
to  guard  them  against  those  violent  and  oppressive  factions 
which  embitter  the  blessings  of  liberty,  and  against  those  miU- 
tary  estabHshments  which  must  gradually  poison  its  very  foun- 
tain; if,  in  a  word,  the  Union  be  essential  to  the  happiness  of  the 
people  of  America,  is  it  not  preposterous  to  urge  as  an  objection 
to  a  government,  without  which  the  objects  of  the  Union  cannot 
be  attained,  that  such  a  government  may  derogate  from  the 
importance  of  the  governments  of  the  individual  states  ?  Was, 
then,  the  American  Revolution  effected,  was  the  American 
Confederacy  formed,  was  the  precious  blood  of  thousands  spilt, 
and  the  hard-earned  substance  of  millions  lavished,  not  that 
the  people  of  America  should  enjoy  peace,  Hberty,  and  safety, 
but  that  the  governments  of  the  individual  states,  that  particular 
mimicipal  establishments,  might  enjoy  a  certain  extent  of  power, 
and  be  arrayed  with  certain  dignities  and  attributes  of  sover- 
eignty ?  We  have  heard  of  the  impious  doctrine  in  the  Old 
World,  that  the  people  were  made  for  kings,  not  kings  for  the 

»  No.  XLV  (XLIV).     Madison.     New  York  Packet,  January  25,  1788. 


THE  FEDERALIST  171 

\  people.  Is  the  same  doctrine  to  be  revived  in  the  New  in  another 
shape  —  that  the  solid  happiness  of  the  people  is  to  be  sacrificed 
to  the  views  of  political  institutions  of  a  different  form  ?  It  is 
too  early  for  politicians  to  presume  on  our  forgetting  that  the 
public  good,  the  real  welfare  of  the  great  body  of  the  people,  is 
the  supreme  object  to  be  pursued;  and  that  no  form  of  govern- 
ment whatever  has  any  other  value  than  as  it  may  be  fitted  for 
the  attainment  of  this  object.  Were  the  plan  of  the  Convention 
adverse  to  the  pubUc  happiness,  my  voice  would  be.  Reject  the 
plan.  Were  the  Union  itself  inconsistent  with  the  pubhc  happi- 
ness, it  would  be,  Abolish  the  Union.  In  like  manner,  as  far  as 
the  sovereignty  of  the  states  cannot  be  reconciled  to  the  happi- 
ness of  the  people,  the  voice  of  every  good  citizen  must  be.  Let 
the  former  be  sacrificed  to  the  latter.  How  far  the  sacrifice  is 
necessary,  has  been  shown.  How  far  the  unsacrificed  residue 
will  be  endangered,  is  the  question  before  us. 

Several  important  considerations  have  been  touched  in  the 
course  of  these  papers,  which  discountenance  the  supposition 
that  the  operation  of  the  federal  government  will  by  degrees 
prove  fatal  to  the  state  governments.  The  more  I  revolve  the 
subject,  the  more  fully  I  am  persuaded  that  the  balance  is  much 
more  likely  to  be  disturbed  by  the  preponderancy  of  the  last  than 
of  the  first  scale. 

We  have  seen,  in  all  the  examples  of  ancient  and  modern  con- 
federacies, the  strongest  tendency  continually  betraying  itself  in 
the  members  to  despoil  the  general  government  of  its  authorities 
with  a  very  ineffectual  capacity  in  the  latter  to  defend  itself 
against  the  encroachments.  Although,  in  most  of  these  ex- 
amples, the  system  has  been  so  dissimilar  from  that  under  con- 
sideration as  greatly  to  weaken  any  inference  concerning  the 
latter  from  the  fate  of  the  former,  yet,  as  the  states  will  retain, 
imder  the  proposed  Constitution,  a  very  extensive  portion  of 
active  sovereignty,  the  inference  ought  not  to  be  wholly  dis- 
regarded. In  the  Achaean  League  it  is  probable  that  the  federal 
head  had  a  degree  and  species  of  power  which  gave  it  a  con- 
siderable likeness  to  the  government  framed  by  the  Convention. 


172  THE  FEDERALIST 

The  Lycian  Confederacy,  as  far  as  its  principles  and  form  are 
transmitted,  must  have  borne  a  still  greater  analogy  to  it.  Yet 
history  does  not  inform  us  that  either  of  them  ever  degenerated, 
or  tended  to  degenerate,  into  one  consohdated  government.  On 
the  contrary,  we  know  that  the  ruin  of  one  of  them  proceeded 
from  the  incapacity  of  the  federal  authority  to  prevent  the  dis- 
sensions, and  finally  the  disxmion,  of  the  subordinate  authori- 
ties. These  cases  are  the  more  worthy  of  our  attention,  as  the 
external  causes  by  which  the  component  parts  were  pressed 
together  were  much  more  numerous  and  powerful  than  in  our 
case;  and  consequently  less  powerful  ligaments  within  would 
be  sufficient  to  bind  the  members  to  the  head,  and  to  each  other. 

In  the  feudal  system,  we  have  seen  a  similar  propensity 
exemplified.  Notwithstanding  the  want  of  proper  sympathy 
in  every  instance  between  the  local  sovereigns  and  the  people, 
and  the  sympathy  in  some  instances  between  the  general  sove- 
reign and  the  latter,  it  usually  happened  that  the  local  sove- 
reigns prevailed  in  the  rival  ship  for  encroachments.  Had  no 
external  dangers  enforced  internal  harmony  and  subordination, 
and,  particularly,  had  the  local  sovereigns  possessed  the  affec- 
tions of  the  people,  the  great  kingdoms  in  Europe  would  at  this 
time  consist  of  as  many  independent  princes  as  there  were 
formerly  feudatory  barons. 

The  state  governments  will  have  the  advantage  of  the  federal 
government,  whether  we  compare  them  in  respect  to  the  imme- 
diate dependence  of  the  one  on  the  other;  to  the  weight  of  per- 
sonal influence  which  each  side  will  possess;  to  the  powers 
respectively  vested  in  them;  to  the  predilection  and  probable 
support  of  the  people;  to  the  disposition  and  faculty  of  resisting 
and  frustrating  the  measures  of  each  other. 

The  state  governments  may  be  regarded  as  constituent  and 
essential  parts  of  the  federal  government,  whilst  the  latter  is 
nowise  essential  to  the  operation  or  organization  of  the  former. 
Without  the  intervention  of  the  state  legislatures,  the  President 
of  the  United  States  cannot  be  elected  at  all.  They  must  in  all 
cases  have  a  great  share  in  his  appointment,  and  will,  perhaps, 


THE  FEDERALIST  173 

in  most  cases,  of  themselves  determine  it.  The  Senate  will  be 
elected  absolutely  and  exclusively  by  the  state  legislatures. 
Even  the  House  of  Representatives,  though  drawn  immediately 
from  the  people,  will  be  chosen  very  much  under  the  influence  of 
that  class  of  men,  whose  influence  over  the  people  obtains  for 
themselves  an  election  into  the  state  legislatures.  Thus,  each 
of  the  principal  branches  of  the  federal  government  will  owe  its 
existence  more  or  less  to  the  favor  of  the  state  governments, 
and  must  consequently  feel  a  dependence,  which  is  much  more 
likely  to  beget  a  disposition  too  obsequious  than  too  overbear- 
ing towards  them.  On  the  other  side,  the  component  parts  of 
the  state  governments  wiU  in  no  instance  be  indebted  for  their 
appointment  to  the  direct  agency  of  the  federal  government, 
and  very  little,  if  at  all,  to  the  local  influence  of  its  members. 

The  number  of  individuals  employed  imder  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  will  be  much  smaller  than  the  number 
employed  under  the  particular  states.  There  will  conse- 
quently be  less  of  personal  influence  on  the  side  of  the  former 
than  of  the  latter.  The  members  of  the  legislative,  executive, 
and  judiciary  departments  of  thirteen  and  more  states,  the 
justices  of  peace,  officers  of  miHtia,  ministerial  officers  of  justice, 
with  all  the  county,  corporation,  and  town  officers,  for  three 
millions  and  more  of  people,  intermixed,  and  having  particular 
acquaintance  with  every  class  and  circle  of  people,  must  exceed, 
beyond  all  proportion,  both  in  number  and  influence,  those  of 
every  description  who  will  be  employed  in  the  administration 
of  the  federal  system.  Compare  the  members  of  the  three  great 
departments  of  the  thirteen  states,  excluding  from  the  judiciary 
department  the  justices  of  peace,  with  the  members  of  the  cor- 
responding departments  of  the  single  government  of  the  Union; 
compare  the  miHtia  officers  of  three  millions  of  people  with  the 
military  and  marine  officers  of  any  establishment  which  is 
within  the  compass  of  probability,  or,  I  may  add,  of  possibility, 
and  in  this  view  alone,  we  may  pronounce  the  advantage  of  the 
states  to  be  decisive.  If  the  federal  government  is  to  have 
collectors  of  revenue,  the  state  governments  will  have  theirs  also. 


174  THE  FEDERALIST 

And  as  those  of  the  former  will  be  principally  on  the  seacoast, 
and  not  very  numerous,  whilst  those  of  the  latter  will  be  spread 
over  the  face  of  the  country,  and  will  be  very  numerous,  the 
advantage  in  this  view  also  lies  on  the  same  side.  It  is  true 
that  the  Confederacy  is  to  possess,  and  may  exercise,  the  power 
of  collecting  internal  as  well  as  external  taxes  throughout  the 
states;  but  it  is  probable  that  this  power  will  not  be  resorted  to 
except  for  supplemental  purposes  of  revenue;  that  an  option 
will  then  be  given  to  the  states  to  supply  their  quotas  by  pre- 
vious collections  of  their  own ;  and  that  the  eventual  collection, 
under  the  immediate  authority  of  the  Union,  will  generally  be 
made  by  the  officers,  and  according  to  the  rules,  appointed  by  the 
several  states.  Indeed  it  is  extremely  probable  that  in  other 
instances,  particularly  in  the  organization  of  the  judicial  power, 
the  officers  of  the  states  will  be  clothed  with  the  correspondent 
authority  of  the  Union.  Should  it  happen,  however,  that  sepa- 
rate collectors  of  internal  revenue  should  be  appointed  under 
the  federal  government,  the  influence  of  the  whole  number 
would  not  bear  a  comparison  with  that  of  the  multitude  of  state 
officers  in  the  opposite  scale.  Within  every  district  to  which  a 
federal  collector  would  be  allotted,  there  would  not  be  less  than 
thirty  or  forty,  or  even  more,  officers  of  different  descriptions, 
and  many  of  them  persons  of  character  and  weight,  whose  in- 
fluence would  lie  on  the  side  of  the  state. 

The  powers  delegated  by  the  proposed  Constitution  to  the 
federal  government  are  few  and  defined.  Those  which  are  to 
remain  in  the  state  governments  are  numerous  and  indefinite. 
The  former  will  be  exercised  principally  on  external  objects,  as 
war,  peace,  negotiation,  and  foreign  commerce,  with  which  last 
the  power  of  taxation  will,  for  the  most  part,  be  connected.  The 
powers  reserved  to  the  several  states  will  extend  to  all  the  objects 
which,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  affairs,  concern  the  lives,  liber- 
ties, and  properties  of  the  people,  and  the  internal  order,  im- 
provement, and  prosperity  of  the  state. 

The  operations  of  the  federal  government  will  be  most  exten- 
sive and  important  in  times  of  war  and  danger;   those  of  the 


THE  FEDERALIST  175 

state  governments,  in  times  of  peace  and  security.  As  the 
former  periods  will  probably  bear  a  small  proportion  to  the  latter, 
the  state  governments  will  here  enjoy  another  advantage  over 
the  federal  government.  The  more  adequate,  indeed,  the 
federal  powers  may  be  rendered  to  the  national  defense,  the 
less  frequent  will  be  those  scenes  of  danger  which  might  favor 
their  ascendancy  over  the  governments  of  the  particular  states. 
If  the  new  Constitution  be  examined  with  accuracy  and  can- 
dor, it  will  be  found  that  the  change  which  it  proposes  consists 
much  less  in  the  addition  of  new  powers  to  the  Union,  than 
in  the  invigoration  of  its  original  powers.  The  regulation 
of  commerce,  it  is  true,  is  a  new  power;  but  that  seems  to  be  an 
addition  which  few  oppose,  and  from  which  no  apprehensions 
are  entertained.  The  powers  relating  to  war  and  peace,  armies 
and  fleets,  treaties  and  finance,  with  the  other  more  consider- 
able powers,  are  all  vested  in  the  existing  Congress  by  the  Articles 
of  Confederation.  The  proposed  change  does  not  enlarge  these 
powers;  it  only  substitutes  a  more  effectual  mode  of  administer- 
ing them.  The  change  relating  to  taxation  may  be  regarded  as 
the  most  important;  and  yet  the  present  Congress  have  as  com- 
plete authority  to  require  of  the  states  indefinite  supplies  of 
money  for  the  common  defense  and  general  welfare  as  the  future 
Congress  will  have  to  require  them  of  individual  citizens;  and 
the  latter  will  be  no  more  boimd  than  the  states  themselves  have 
been  to  pay  the  quotas  respectively  taxed  on  them.  Had  the 
states  complied  punctually  with  the  Articles  of  Confederation, 
or  could  their  comphance  have  been  enforced  by  as  peaceable 
means  as  may  be  used  with  success  towards  single  persons,  our 
past  experience  is  very  far  from  coimtenancing  an  opinion  that 
the  state  governments  would  have  lost  their  constitutional 
powers,  and  have  gradually  undergone  an  entire  consolidation. 
To  maintain  that  such  an  event  would  have  ensued,  would  be  to 
say  at  once  that  the  existence  of  the  state  governments  is  incom- 
patible with  any  system  whatever  that  accomplishes  the  essential 
purposes  of  the  Union.  Publius. 


176  THE  FEDERALIST 

The  Subject  of  the  Last  Paper  resumed;   with  an 

Examination  of  the  Comparative  Means  of  Influence  of  the 

Federal  and  State  Governments  ^ 

Resuming  the  subject  of  the  last  paper,  I  proceed  to  inquire 
whether  the  federal  government  or  the  state  governments  will 
have  the  advantage  with  regard  to  the  predilection  and  support 
of  the  people.  Notwithstanding  the  difierent  modes  in  which 
they  are  appointed,  we  must  consider  both  of  them  as  sub- 
stantially dependent  on  the  great  body  of  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  I  assume  this  position  here  as  it  respects  the 
first,  reserving  the  proofs  for  another  place.  The  federal  and 
state  governments  are  in  fact  but  different  agents  and  trustees 
of  the  people,  instituted  with  different  powers  and  designated 
for  different  purposes.  The  adversaries  of  the  Constitution  seem 
to  have  lost  sight  of  the  people  altogether  in  their  reasonings 
on  this  subject;  and  to  have  viewed  these  different  estabHsh- 
ments,  not  only  as  mutual  rivals  and  enemies,  but  as  uncon- 
trolled by  any  common  superior  in  their  efforts  to  usurp  the 
authorities  of  each  other.  These  gentlemen  must  here  be 
reminded  of  their  error.  They  must  be  told  that  the  ultimate 
authority,  wherever  the  derivative  may  be  found,  resides  in  the 
people  alone,  and  that  it  will  not  depend  merely  on  the  com- 
parative ambition  or  address  of  the  different  governments, 
whether  either,  or  which  of  them,  will  be  able  to  enlarge  its 
sphere  of  jurisdiction  at  the  expense  of  the  other.  Truth,  no  \ 
less  than  decency,  requires  that  the  event  in  every  case  shoidd 
be  supposed  to  depend  on  the  sentiments  and  sanction  of  their 
common  constituents. 

Many  considerations,  besides  those  suggested  on  a  former 
occasion,  seem  to  place  it  beyond  doubt  that  the  first  and  most 
natural  attachment  of  the  people  will  be  to  the  governments  of 
their  respective  states.  Into  the  administration  of  these  a 
greater  number  of  individuals  will  expect  to  rise.  From  the 
gift  of  these  a  greater  number  of  ofl&ces  and  emolimients  will 

»  No.  XLVI  (XLV).     Madison.     New  York  Packet,  January  39,  1788. 


THE  FEDERALIST  177 

flow.  By  the  superintending  care  of  these,  all  the  more  domes- 
tic and  personal  interests  of  the  people  will  be  regulated  and 
provided  for.  With  the  affairs  of  these,  the  people  will  be  more 
famiUarly  and  minutely  conversant.  And  with  the  members 
of  these  will  a  greater  proportion  of  the  people  have  the  ties  of 
personal  acquaintance  and  friendship,  and  of  family  and  party 
attachments;  on  the  side  of  these,  therefore,  the  popular  bias 
may  well  be  expected  most  strongly  to  incline. 

Experience  speaks  the  same  language  in  this  case.  The 
federal  administration,  though  hitherto  very  defective  in  com- 
parison with  what  may  be  hoped  under  a  better  system,  had, 
during  the  war,  and  particularly  whilst  the  independent  fund  of 
paper  emissions  was  in  credit,  an  activity  and  importance  as 
great  as  it  can  well  have  in  any  future  circumstances  whatever. 
It  was  engaged,  too,  in  a  course  of  measures  which  had  for  their 
object  the  protection  of  everything  that  was  dear,  and  the 
acquisition  of  everything  that  could  be  desirable  to  the  people 
at  large.  It  was,  nevertheless,  invariably  found,  after  the  tran- 
sient enthusiasm  for  the  early  congresses  was  over,  that  the 
attention  and  attachment  of  the  people  were  turned  anew  to 
their  own  particular  governments;  that  the  federal  coimcil  was 
at  no  time  the  idol  of  popular  favor;  and  that  opposition  to 
proposed  enlargements  of  its  powers  and  importance  was  the 
side  usually  taken  by  the  men  who  wished  to  build  their  poUtical 
consequence  on  the  prepossessions  of  their  fellow-citizens. 

If,  therefore,  as  has  been  elsewhere  remarked,  the  people 
should  in  future  become  more  partial  to  the  federal  than  to 
the  state  governments,  the  change  can  only  result  from  such 
manifest  and  irresistible  proofs  of  a  better  administration  as 
will  overcome  all  their  antecedent  propensities.  And  in  that 
case,  the  people  ought  not  surely  to  be  precluded  from  giving 
most  of  their  confidence  where  they  may  discover  it  to  be  most 
due;  but  even  in  that  case  the  state  governments  could  have 
little  to  apprehend,  because  it  is  only  within  a  certain  sphere 
that  the  federal  power  can,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  advan- 
tageously administered. 


f 


178  THE  FEDERALIST 

The  remaining  points  on  which  I  proposed  to  compare  the 
federal  and  state  governments,  are  the  disposition  and  the 
faculty  they  may  respectively  possess  to  resist  and  frustrate 
the  measures  of  each  other. 

It  has  been  already  proved  that  the  members  of  the  federal 
will  be  more  dependent  on  the  members  of  the  state  govern- 
ments than  the  latter  will  be  on  the  former.  It  has  appeared 
also  that  the  prepossessions  of  the  people,  on  whom  both  will 
depend,  will  be  more  on  the  side  of  the  state  governments  than 
of  the  federal  government.  So  far  as  the  disposition  of  each 
towards  the  other  may  be  influenced  by  these  causes,  the  state 
governments  must  clearly  have  the  advantage.  But  in  a  dis- 
tinct and  very  important  point  of  view,  the  advantage  will  Ue 
on  the  same  side.  The  prepossessions,  which  the  members 
themselves  will  carry  into  the  federal  government,  will  generally 
be  favorable  to  the  states;  whilst  it  will  rarely  happen  that 
the  members  of  the  state  governments  will  carry  into  the  public 
councils  a  bias  in  favor  of  the  general  government.  A  local 
spirit  will  infallibly  prevail  much  more  in  the  members  of  the 
Congress  than  a  national  spirit  will  prevail  in  the  legislatures  of 
the  particular  states.  Every  one  knows  that  a  great  proportion 
of  the  errors  committed  by  the  state  legislatures  proceeds  from 
the  disposition  of  the  members  to  sacrifice  the  comprehensive 
and  permanent  interests  of  the  state  to  the  particular  and  sepa- 
rate views  of  the  counties  or  districts  in  which  they  reside. 
And  if  they  do  not  sufiiciently  enlarge  their  policy  to  embrace 
the  collective  welfare  of  their  particular  state,  how  can  it  be 
imagined  that  they  will  make  the  aggregate  prosperity  of  the 
Union,  and  the  dignity  and  respectability  of  its  government, 
the  objects  of  their  affections  and  consultations  ?  For  the  same 
reason  that  the  members  of  the  state  legislatures  will  be  unlikely 
to  attach  themselves  sufficiently  to  national  objects,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  federal  legislature  will  be  Ukely  to  attach  themselves 
too  much  to  local  objects.  The  states  will  be  to  the  latter 
what  counties  and  towns  are  to  the  former.  Measures  will  too 
often  be  decided  according  to  their  probable  effect,  not  on  the 


THE  FEDERALIST  179 

national  prosperity  and  happiness,  but  on  the  prejudices,  inter- 
ests, and  pursuits  of  the  governments  and  people  of  the  indivi- 
dual states.  What  is  the  spirit  that  has  in  general  characterized 
the  proceedings  of  Congress  ?  A  perusal  of  their  journals,  as 
well  as  the  candid  acknowledgments  of  such  as  have  had  a  seat 
in  that  assembly,  will  inform  us  that  the  members  have  but  too 
frequently  displayed  the  character,  rather  of  partisans  of  their 
respective  states  than  of  impartial  guardians  of  a  common 
interest;  that  where  on  one  occasion  improper  sacrifices  have 
been  made  of  local  considerations,  to  the  aggrandizement  of  the 
federal  government,  the  great  interests  of  the  nation  have 
suffered  on  an  hundred,  from  an  undue  attention  to  the  local 
prejudices,  interests,  and  views  of  the  particular  states.  I 
mean  not  by  these  reflections  to  insinuate  that  the  new  federal 
government  will  not  embrace  a  more  enlarged  plan  of  poHcy  than 
the  existing  government  may  have  pursued,  much  less,  that  its 
views  will  be  as  confined  as  those  of  the  state  legislatures;  but 
only  that  it  will  partake  sufficiently  of  the  spirit  of  both  to  be 
disinclined  to  invade  the  rights  of  the  individual  states,  or  the 
prerogatives  of  their  governments.  The  motives  on  the  part  of 
the  state  governments,  to  augment  their  prerogatives  by  defal- 
cations from  the  federal  government,  will  be  overruled  by  no 
reciprocal  predispositions  in  the  members. 

Were  it  admitted,  however,  that  the  federal  government 
may  feel  an  equal  disposition  with  the  state  governments  to 
extend  its  power  beyond  the  due  limits,  the  latter  would  still 
have  the  advantage  in  the  means  of  defeating  such  encroach- 
ments. If  an  act  of  a  particular  state,  though  unfriendly  to  the 
national  government,  be  generally  popular  in  that  state,  and 
should  not  too  grossly  violate  the  oaths  of  the  state  officers,  it  is 
executed  immediately  and,  of  course,  by  means  on  the  spot  and 
depending  on  the  state  alone.  The  opposition  of  the  federal 
government,  or  the  interposition  of  federal  officers,  would  but 
inflame  the  zeal  of  all  parties  on  the  side  of  the  state,  and  the 
evil  could  not  be  prevented  or  repaired,  if  at  all,  without  the 
employment  of  means  which  must  always  be  resorted  to  with 


i8o  THE  FEDERALIST 

reluctance  and  difficulty.  On  the  other  hand,  should  an  unwar- 
rantable measure  of  the  federal  government  be  unpopular  in 
particular  states,  which  would  seldom  fail  to  be  the  case,  or  even 
a  warrantable  measure  be  so,  which  may  sometimes  be  the  case, 
the  means  of  opposition  to  it  are  powerful  and  at  hand.  The 
disquietude  of  the  people;  their  repugnance  and,  perhaps, 
refusal  to  cooperate  with  the  officers  of  the  Union;  the  frowns 
of  the  executive  magistracy  of  the  state;  the  embarrassments 
created  by  legislative  devices,  which  would  often  be  added  on 
such  occasions,  would  oppose,  in  any  state,  difficulties  not  to 
be  despised;  would  form,  in  a  large  state,  very  serious  impedi- 
ments; and  where  the  sentiments  of  several  adjoining  states 
happened  to  be  in  unison,  would  present  obstructions  which  the 
federal  government  would  hardly  be  willing  to  encoimter. 

But  ambitious  encroachments  of  the  federal  government,  on 
the  authority  of  the  state  governments,  would  not  excite  the 
opposition  of  a  single  state,  or  of  a  few  states  only.  They 
would  be  signals  of  general  alarm.  Every  government  would 
espouse  the  common  cause.  A  correspondence  would  be  opened. , 
Plans  of  resistance  would  be  concerted.  One  spirit  would 
animate  and  conduct  the  whole.  The  same  combination, 
in  short,  would  result  from  an  apprehension  of  the  federal,  as 
was  produced  by  the  dread  of  a  foreign  yoke;  and  unless  the 
projected  innovations  should  be  voluntarily  renounced,  the 
same  appeal  to  a  trial  of  force  would  be  made  in  the  one  case 
as  was  made  in  the  other.  But  what  degree  of  madness  could 
ever  drive  the  federal  government  to  such  an  extremity?  In 
the  contest  with  Great  Britain,  one  part  of  the  empire  was 
employed  against  the  other.  The  more  numerous  part  invaded 
the  rights  of  the  less  numerous  part.  The  attempt  was  unjust 
and  unwise;  but  it  was  not  in  speculation  absolutely  chimerical. 
But  what  would  be  the  contest  in  the  case  we  are  supposing  ? 
Who  would  be  the  parties  ?  A  few  representatives  of  the  people 
would  be  opposed  to  the  people  themselves;  or  rather  one  set 
of  representatives  would  be  contending  against  thirteen  sets  of 


THE  FEDERALIST  i8i 

representatives,  with  the  whole  body  of  their  common  con- 
stituents on  the  side  of  the  latter. 

The  only  refuge  left  for  those  who  prophesy  the  downfall  of 
the  state  governments  is  the  visionary  supposition  that  the 
federal  government  may  previously  accumulate  a  military  force 
for  the  projects  of  ambition.  The  reasonings  contained  in  these 
papers  must  have  been  employed  to  little  purpose  indeed,  if  it 
could  be  necessary  now  to  disprove  the  reahty  of  this  danger. 
That  the  people  and  the  states  should,  for  a  sufficient  period  of 
time,  elect  an  uninterrupted  succession  of  men  ready  to  betray 
both:  that  the  traitors  should,  throughout  this  period,  uni- 
formly and  systematically  pursue  some  fixed  plan  for  the  exten- 
sion of  the  military  establishment;  that  the  governments  and 
the  people  of  the  states  should  silently  and  patiently  behold  the 
gathering  storm,  and  continue  to  supply  the  materials,  until  it 
should  be  prepared  to  burst  on  their  own  heads,  must  appear  to 
every  one  more  like  the  incoherent  dreams  of  a  deUrious  jealousy, 
or  the  misjudged  exaggerations  of  a  counterfeit  zeal,  than  like 
the  sober  apprehensions  of  genuine  patriotism.  Extravagant 
as  the  supposition  is,  let  it  however  be  made.  Let  a  regular 
army,  fully  equal  to  the  resources  of  the  country,  be  formed; 
and  let  it  be  entirely  at  the  devotion  of  the  federal  government; 
still  it  would  not  be  going  too  far  to  say  that  the  state  govern- 
ments, with  the  people  on  their  side,  would  be  able  to  repel  the 
danger.  The  highest  number  to  which,  according  to  the  best 
computation,  a  standing  army  can  be  carried  in  any  country, 
does  not  exceed  one  hundreth  part  of  the  whole  number  of  souls, 
or  one  twenty-fifth  part  of  the  number  able  to  bear  arms.  This 
proportion  would  not  yield,  in  the  United  States,  an  army  of 
more  than  twenty-five  or  thirty  thousand  men.  To  these  would 
be  opposed  a  militia  amounting  to  near  half  a  milHon  of  citizens 
with  arms  in  their  hands,  oflicered  by  men  chosen  from  among 
themselves,  fighting  for  their  common  liberties,  and  imited  and 
conducted  by  governments  possessing  their  affections  and  con- 
fidence. It  may  well  be  doubted  whether  a  militia  thus  cir- 
cumstanced could  ever  be  conquered  by  such  a  proportion  of 


i82  THE  FEDERALIST 

regular  troops.  Those  who  are  best  acquainted  with  the  late 
successful  resistance  of  this  country  against  the  British  arms 
will  be  most  inclined  to  deny  the  possibility  of  it.  Besides  the 
advantage  of  being  armed,  which  the  Americans  possess  over 
the  people  of  almost  every  other  nation,  the  existence  of  sub- 
ordinate governments,  to  which  the  people  are  attached,  and 
by  which  the  miUtia  officers  are  appointed,  forms  a  barrier 
against  the  enterprises  of  ambition  more  insurmountable  than 
any  which  a  simple  government  of  any  form  can  admit  of. 
Notwithstanding  the  military  establishments  in  the  several 
kingdoms  of  Europe,  which  are  carried  as  far  as  the  public 
resources  will  bear,  the  governments  are  afraid  to  trust  the 
people  with  arms.  And  it  is  not  certain  that  with  this  aid 
alone  they  would  not  be  able  to  shake  off  their  yokes.  But 
were  the  people  to  possess  the  additional  advantages  of  local 
governments  chosen  by  themselves,  who  could  collect  the 
national  will  and  direct  the  national  force,  and  of  officers  ap- 
pointed out  of  the  militia,  by  these  governments,  and  attached 
both  to  them  and  to  the  militia,  it  may  be  affirmed  with  the 
greatest  assurance  that  the  throne  of  every  tyranny  in  Europe 
would  be  speedily  overturned  in  spite  of  the  legions  which  sur- 
round it.  Let  us  not  insult  the  free  and  gallant  citizens  of 
America  with  the  suspicion,  that  they  would  be  less  able  to 
defend  the  rights  of  which  they  would  be  in  actual  possession 
than  the  debased  subjects  of  arbitrary  power  would  be  to  rescue 
theirs  from  the  hands  of  their  oppressors.  Let  us  rather  no 
longer  insult  them  with  the  supposition  that  they  can  ever 
reduce  themselves  to  the  necessity  of  making  the  experiment, 
by  a  bhnd  and  tame  submission  to  the  long  train  of  insidious 
measures  which  must  precede  and  produce  it. 

The  argument  under  the  present  head  may  be  put  into  a  very 
concise  form,  which  appears  altogether  conclusive.  Either  the 
mode  in  which  the  federal  government  is  to  be  constructed  will 
render  it  sufficiently  dependent  on  the  people,  or  it  will  not. 
On  the  first  supposition,  it  will  be  restrained  by  that  depen- 
dence from  forming  schemes  obnoxious  to  their  constituents. 


THE  FEDERALIST  183 

On  the  other  supposition,  it  will  not  possess  the  confidence  of 
the  people,  and  its  schemes  of  usurpation  will  be  easily  defeated 
by  the  state  governments,  who  will  be  supported  by  the  people. 
On  summing  up  the  considerations  stated  in  this  and  the  last 
paper,  they  seem  to  amount  to  the  most  convincing  evidence, 
that  the  powers  proposed  to  be  lodged  in  the  federal  govern- 
ment are  as  little  formidable  to  those  reserved  to  the  individual 
states  as  they  are  indispensably  necessary  to  accomplish  the 
purposes  of  the  Union;  and  that  all  those  alarms  which  have 
been  sounded,  of  a  meditated  and  consequential  annihilation  of 
the  state  governments,  must,  on  the  most  favorable  interpre- 
tation, be  ascribed  to  the  chimerical  fears  of  the  authors  of  them. 

PUBLIUS. 


VII 

THE  SYSTEM  OF   CHECKS  AND  BALANCES 

(a)  AN  EXAMINATION  OF  MONTESQUIEU'S  DOCTRINE 

The  Meaning  of  the  Maxim,  which  requires  a  Separation  of 
THE  Departments  of  Power,  examined  and  ascertained  ^ 

Having  reviewed  the  general  form  of  the  proposed  government 
and  the  general  mass  of  power  allotted  to  it,  I  proceed  to  examine 
the  particular  structure  of  this  government,  and  the  distribution 
of  this  mass  of  power  among  its  constituent  parts. 

One  of  the  principal  objections  inculcated  by  the  more  respec- 
table adversaries  to  the  Constitution  is  its  supposed  violation  of 
the  poHtical  maxim,  that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary 
departments  ought  to  be  separate  and  distinct.  In  the  structure 
of  the  federal  government,  no  regard,  it  is  said,  seems  to  have 
been  paid  to  this  essential  precaution  in  favor  of  liberty.  The 
several  departments  of  power  are  distributed  and  blended  in 
such  a  manner  as  at  once  to  destroy  all  symmetry  and  beauty  of 
form,  and  to  expose  some  of  the  essential  parts  of  the  edifice  to 
the  danger  of  being  crushed  by  the  disproportionate  weight  of 
other  parts. 

No  poUtical  truth  is  certainly  of  greater  intrinsic  value,  or  is 
stamped  with  the  authority  of  more  enHghtened  patrons  of 
Uberty,  than  that  on  which  the  objection  is  founded.  The 
accumulation  of  all  powers,  legislative,  executive,  and  judi- 
ciary, in  the  same  hands,  whether  of  one,  a  few,  or  many,  and 
whether  hereditary,  self-appointed,  or  elective,  may  justly  be 
pronounced  the  very  definition  of  tyranny.  Were  the  federal 
Constitution,  therefore,  really  chargeable  with  this  accumula- 
tion of  power,  or  with  a  mixture  of  powers,  having  a  dangerous 
tendency  to  such  an  accumulation,  no  further  arguments  would 

«  No.  XLVII  (XLVI).     Madison.     Independent  Journal,  January  30,  1788. 
184 


THE  FEDERALIST  185 

be  necessary  to  inspire  a  universal  reprobation  of  the  system. 
I  persuade  myself,  however,  that  it  will  be  made  apparent  to 
every  one  that  the  charge  cannot  be  supported,  and  that  the 
maxim  on  which  it  reHes  has  been  totally  misconceived  and 
misappHed.  In  order  to  form  correct  ideas  on  this  important 
subject,  it  will  be  proper  to  investigate  the  sense  in  which  the 
preservation  of  liberty  requires  that  the  three  great  depart- 
ments of  power  should  be  separate  and  distinct. 

The  oracle  who  is  always  consulted  and  cited  on  this  subject 
is  the  celebrated  Montesquieu.  If  he  be  not  the  author  of  this 
invaluable  precept  in  the  science  of  politics,  he  has  the  merit  at 
least  of  displaying  and  recommending  it  most  effectually  to  the 
attention  of  mankind.  Let  us  endeavor,  in  the  first  place,  to 
ascertain  his  meaning  on  this  point. 

The  British  Constitution  was  to  Montesquieu  what  Homer 
has  been  to  the  didactic  writers  on  epic  poetry.  As  the  latter 
have  considered  the  work  of  the  immortal  bard  as  the  perfect 
model  from  which  the  principles  and  rule^  of  the  epic  art  were 
to  be  drawn,  and  by  which  all  similar  works  were  to  be  judged, 
so  this  great  political  critic  appears  to  have  viewed  the  Con- 
stitution of  England  as  the  standard,  or  to  use  his  own  expres- 
sion, as  the  mirror  of  political  liberty;  and  to  have  delivered, 
in  the  form  of  elementary  truths,  the  several  characteristic  prin- 
ciples of  that  particular  system.  That  we  may  be  sure,  then, 
not  to  mistake  his  meaning  in  this  case,  let  us  recur  to  the  source 
from  which  the  maxim  was  drawn. 

On  the  slightest  view  of  the  British  Constitution,  we  must 
perceive  that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judiciary  depart- 
ments are  by  no  means  totally  separate  and  distinct  from  each 
other.  The  executive  magistrate  forms  an  integral  part  of  the 
legislative  authority.  He  alone  has  the  prerogative  of  making 
treaties  with  foreign  sovereigns,  which,  when  made,  have, 
under  certain  limitations,  the  force  of  legislative  acts.  All  the 
members  of  the  judiciary  department  are  appointed  by  him, 
can  be  removed  by  him  on  the  address  of  the  two  Houses  of 
Parliament,  and  form,  when  he  pleases  to  consult  them,  one  of 


i86  THE  FEDERALIST 

his  constitutional  councils.  One  branch  of  the  legislative 
department  forms  also  a  great  constitutional  council  to  the 
executive  chief,  as,  on  another  hand,  it  is  the  sole  depositary  of 
judicial  power  in  cases  of  impeachment,  and  is  invested  with  the 
supreme  appellate  jurisdiction  in  all  other  cases.  The  judges, 
again,  are  so  far  connected  with  the  legislative  department  as 
often  to  attend  and  participate  in  its  deliberations,  though  not 
admitted  to  a  legislative  vote. 

From  these  facts,  by  which  Montesquieu  was  guided,  it  may 
clearly  be  inferred  that,  in  saying  "  There  can  be  no  liberty 
where  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  are  united  in  the 
same  person,  or  body  of  magistrates,"  or,  "  if  the  power  of 
judging  be  not  separated  from  the  legislative  and  executive 
powers,"  he  did  not  mean  that  these  departments  ought  to 
have  no  partial  agency  in,  or  no  control  over,  the  acts  of  each 
other.  His  meaning,  as  his  own  words  import,  and  still  more 
conclusively  as  illustrated  by  the  example  in  his  eye,  can  amount 
to  no  more  than  this,  that  where  the  whole  power  of  one  depart- 
ment is  exercised  by  the  same  hands  which  possess  the  whole 
power  of  another  department,  the  fundamental  principles  of  a 
free  constitution  are  subverted.  This  would  have  been  the  case 
in  the  constitution  examined  by  him,  if  the  king,  who  is  the  sole 
executive  magistrate,  had  possessed  also  the  complete  legislative 
power,  or  the  supreme  administration  of  justice;  or  if  the  entire 
legislative  body  had  possessed  the  supreme  judiciary,  or  the 
supreme  executive  authority.  This,  however,  is  not  among 
the  vices  of  that  constitution.  The  %iagistrate  in  whom  the 
whole  executive  power  resides  cannot  of  himself  make  a  law, 
though  he  can  put  a  negative  on  every  law;  nor  administer 
justice  in  person,  though  he  has  the  appointment  of  those  who 
do  administer  it.  The  judges  can  exercise  no  executive  preroga- 
tive, though  they  are  shoots  from  the  executive  stock;  nor  any 
legislative  function,  though  they  may  be  advised  with  by  the 
legislative  councils.  The  entire  legislature  can  perform  no 
judiciary  act,  though  by  the  joint  act  of  two  of  its  branches  the 
judges  may  be  removed  from  their  offices,  and  though  one  of  its 


THE  FEDERALIST  187 

branches  is  possessed  of  the  judicial  power  in  the  last  resort. 
The  entire  legislature,  again,  can  exercise  no  executive  preroga- 
tive, though  one  of  its  branches  constitutes  the  supreme  exec- 
utive magistracy,  and  another,  on  the  impeachment  of  a  third, 
can  try  and  condemn  all  the  subordinate  officers  in  the  executive 
department. 

The  reasons  on  which  Montesquieu  grounds  his  maxim  are  a 
further  demonstration  of  his  meaning.  "  When  the  legislative 
and  executive  powers  are  united  in  the  same  person  or  body," 
says  he,  "  there  can  be  no  liberty,  because  apprehensions  may 
arise  lest  the  same  monarch  or  senate  should  enact  tyrannical 
laws,  to  execute  them  in  a  tyrannical  manner."  Again:  "  Were 
the  power  of  judging  joined  with  the  legislative,  the  life  and 
liberty  of  the  subject  would  be  exposed  to  arbitrary  control, 
for  the  judge  would  then  be  the  legislator.  Were  it  joined  to  the 
executive  power,  the  judge  might  behave  with  all  the  violence 
of  an  oppressor.^'  Some  of  these  reasons  are  more  fully  explained 
in  other  passages;  but  briefly  stated  as  they  are  here,  they  suffi- 
ciently establish  the  meaning  which  we  have  put  on  this  cele- 
brated maxim  of  this  celebrated  author. 

If  we  look  into  the  constitutions  of  the  several  states,  we  find 
that,  notwithstanding  the  emphatical  and,  in  some  instances, 
the  unqualified  terms  in  which  this  axiom  has  been  laid  down, 
there  is  not  a  single  instance  in  which  the  several  departments 
of  power  have  been  kept  absolutely  separate  and  distinct.  New 
Hampshire,  whose  constitution  was  the  last  formed,  seems  to 
have  been  fully  aware  of  the  impossibiUty  and  inexpediency  of 
avoiding  any  mixture  whatever  of  these  departments,  and  has 
quahfied  the  doctrine  by  declaring  "  that  the  legislative,  execu- 
tive and  judiciary  powers  ought  to  be  kept  as  separate  from, 
and  independent  of  each  other  as  the  nature  of  a  free  government 
will  admit;  or  as  is  consistent  with  that  chain  of  connection,  that 
hinds  the  whole  fabric  of  the  constitution  in  one  indissoluble  bond 
of  unity  and  amity. '^  Her  constitution  accordingly  mixes  these 
departments  in  several  respects.  The  senate,  which  is  a  branch 
of  the  legislative  department,  is  also  a  judicial  tribunal  for  the 


l88  THE  FEDERALIST 

trial  of  impeachments.  The  president,  who  is  the  head  of  the 
executive  department,  is  the  presiding  member  also  of  the  senate, 
and,  besides  an  equal  vote  in  all  cases,  has  a  casting  vote  in 
case  of  a  tie.  The  executive  head  is  himself  eventually  elective 
every  year  by  the  legislative  department,  and  his  council  is 
every  year  chosen  by  and  from  the  members  of  the  same  depart- 
ment. Several  of  the  officers  of  state  are  also  appointed  by  the 
legislature,  and  the  members  of  the  judiciary  department  are 
appointed  by  the  executive  department. 

The  constitution  of  Massachusetts  has  observed  a  sufficient 
though  less  pointed  caution  in  expressing  this  fundamental 
article  of  liberty.  It  declares  "  that  the  legislative  department 
shall  never  exercise  the  executive  and  judicial  powers,  or  either 
of  them;  the  executive  shall  never  exercise  the  legislative  and 
judicial  powers,  or  either  of  them;  the  judicial  shall  never  exer- 
cise the  legislative  and  executive  powers,  or  either  of  them." 
This  declaration  corresponds  precisely  with  the  doctrine  of 
Montesquieu,  as  it  has  been  explained,  and  is  not  in  a  single 
point  violated  by  the  plan  of  the  Convention.  It  goes  no  farther 
than  to  prohibit  any  one  of  the  entire  departments  from  exercis- 
ing the  powers  of  another  department.  In  the  very  constitu- 
tion to  which  it  is  prefixed,  a  partial  mixture  of  powers  has  been 
admitted.  The  executive  magistrate  has  a  qualified  negative 
on  the  legislative  body,  and  the  senate,  which  is  a  part  of  the 
legislature,  is  a  court  of  impeachment  for  members  both  of  the 
executive  and  judiciary  departments.  The  members  of  the  judi- 
ciary department,  again,  are  appointable  by  the  executive 
department,  and  removable  by  the  same  authority  on  the 
address  of  the  two  legislative  branches.  Lastly,  a  number  of 
the  officers  of  government  are  annually  appointed  by  the  legis- 
lative department.  As  the  appointment  to  offices,  particularly 
executive  offices,  is  in  its  nature  an  executive  function,  the 
compilers  of  the  constitution  have,  in  this  last  point  at  least, 
violated  the  rule  estabHshed  by  themselves. 

I  pass  over  the  constitutions  of  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut, 
because  they  were  formed  prior  to  the  Revolution,  and  even 


THE  FEDERALIST  189 

before  the  principle  under  examination  had  become  an  object  of 
poKtical  attention. 

The  constitution  of  New  York  contains  no  declaration  on  this 
subject;  but  appears  very  clearly  to  have  been  framed  with  an 
eye  to  the  danger  of  improperly  blending  the  different  depart- 
ments. It  gives,  nevertheless,  to  the  executive  magistrate  a 
partial  control  over  the  legislative  department,  and,  what  is 
more,  gives  a  Uke  control  to  the  judiciary  department,  and 
even  blends  the  executive  and  judiciary  departments  in  the 
exercise  of  this  control.  In  its  council  of  appointment,  members 
of  the  legislative  are  associated  with  the  executive  authority  in 
the  appointment  of  officers,  both  executive  and  judiciary.  And 
its  court  for  the  trial  of  impeachments  and  correction  of  errors 
is  to  consist  of  one  branch  of  the  legislature  and  the  principal 
members  of  the  judiciary  department. 

The  constitution  of  New  Jersey  has  blended  the  different 
powers  of  government  more  than  any  of  the  preceding.  The 
governor,  who  is  the  executive  magistrate,  is  appointed  by  the 
legislature;  is  chancellor  and  ordinary  or  surrogate  of  the  state; 
is  a  member  of  the  supreme  court  of  appeals,  and  president, 
with  a  casting  vote,  of  one  of  the  legislative  branches.  The 
same  legislative  branch  acts  again  as  executive  council  of  the 
governor,  and  with  him  constitutes  the  court  of  appeals.  The 
members  of  the  judiciary  department  are  appointed  by  the 
legislative  department,  and  removable  by  one  branch  of  it  on 
the  impeachment  of  the  other. 

According  to  the  constitution  of  Pennsylvania,  the  president, 
who  is  head  of  the  executive  department,  is  annually  elected 
by  a  vote  in  which  the  legislative  department  predominates. 
In  conjunction  with  an  executive  council,  he  appoints  the 
members  of  the  judiciary  department,  and  forms  a  court  of 
impeachments  for  trial  of  all  officers,  judiciary  as  well  as  execu- 
tive. The  judges  of  the  supreme  court  and  justices  of  the 
peace  seem  also  to  be  removable  by  the  legislature;  and  the 
executive  power  of  pardoning  in  certain  cases,  to  be  referred  to 


IQO  THE  FEDERALIST 

the  same  department.  The  members  of  the  executive  coimcil 
are  made  ex-officio  justices  of  peace  throughout  the  state. 

In  Delaware,  the  chief  executive  magistrate  is  annually- 
elected  by  the  legislative  department.  The  speakers  of  the 
two  legislative  branches  are  vice-presidents  in  the  executive 
department.  The  executive  chief,  with  six  others,  appointed, 
three  by  each  of  the  legislative  branches,  constitute  the  supreme 
court  of  appeals;  he  is  joined  with  the  legislative  department 
in  the  appointment  of  the  other  judges.  Throughout  the  states, 
it  appears  that  the  members  of  the  legislature  may  at  the  same 
time  be  justices  of  the  peace;  in  this  state,  the  members  of  one 
branch  of  it  are  ex-officio  justices  of  the  peace,  as  are  also  the 
members  of  the  executive  council.  The  principal  officers  of  the 
executive  department  are  appointed  by  the  legislative;  and  one 
branch  of  the  latter  forms  a  court  of  impeachments.  All  officers 
may  be  removed  on  address  of  the  legislature. 

Maryland  has  adopted  the  maxim  in  the  most  unquaHfied 
terms;  declaring  that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial 
powers  of  government  ought  to  be  forever  separate  and  dis- 
tinct from  each  other.  Her  constitution,  notwithstanding, 
makes  the  executive  magistrate  appointable  by  the  legislative 
department,  and  the  members  of  the  judiciary  by  the  executive 
department. 

The  language  of  Virginia  is  still  more  pointed  on  this  subject. 
Her  constitution  declares,  "  that  the  legislative,  executive  and 
judiciary  departments,  shall  be  separate  and  distinct;  so  that 
neither  exercise  the  powers  properly  belonging  to  the  other;  nor 
shall  any  person  exercise  the  powers  of  more  than  one  of  them 
at  the  same  time  except  that  the  justices  of  county  courts  shall 
be  eUgible  to  either  house  of  assembly."  Yet  we  find  not  only 
this  express  exception,  with  respect  to  the  members  of  the 
inferior  courts,  but  that  the  chief  magistrate,  with  his  execu- 
tive coimcil,  are  appointable  by  the  legislature;  that  two  mem- 
bers of  the  latter  are  triennially  displaced  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
legislature;  and  that  all  the  principal  offices,  both  executive 
and  judiciary,   are   filled   by  the    same    department.       The 


THE  FEDERALIST  191 

executive  prerogative  of  pardoning,  also,  is  in  one  case 
vested  in  the  legislative  department. 

The  constitution  of  North  Carolina,  which  declares  "  that  the 
legislative,  executive  and  supreme  judicial  powers  of  govern- 
ment, ought  to  be  forever  separate  and  distinct  from  each 
other,''  refers,  at  the  same  time,  to  the  legislative  department, 
the  appointment  not  only  of  the  executive  chief,  but  all  the  prin- 
cipal officers  within  both  that  and  the  judiciary  department. 

In  South  Carolina,  the  constitution  makes  the  executive 
magistracy  eligible  by  the  legislative  department.  It  gives 
to  the  latter,  also,  the  appointment  of  the  members  of  the  judi- 
ciary department,  including  even  justices  of  the  peace  and 
sheriffs;  and  the  appointment  of  officers  in  the  executive  depart- 
ment down  to  captains  in  the  army  and  navy  of  the  state. 

In  the  constitution  of  Georgia,  where  it  is  declared  "that  the 
legislative,  executive  and  judiciary  departments  shall  be  sepa- 
rate and  distinct,  so  that  neither  exercise  the  powers  properly 
belonging  to  the  other,"  we  find  that  the  executive  department 
is  to  be  filled  by  appointments  of  the  legislature:  and  the  execu- 
tive prerogative  of  pardoning  to  be  finally  exercised  by  the  same 
authority.  Even  justices  of  the  peace  are  to  be  appointed  by 
the  legislature. 

In  citing  these  cases,  in  which  the  legislative,  executive,  and 
judiciary  departments  have  not  been  kept  totally  separate  and 
distinct,  I  wish  not  to  be  regarded  as  an  advocate  for  the  par- 
ticular organizations  of  the  several  state  governments.  I  am 
fully  aware  that  among  the  many  excellent  principles  which 
they  exemphfy,  they  carry  strong  marks  of  the  haste,  and  still 
stronger  of  the  inexperience,  imder  which  they  were  framed. 
lit  is  but  too  obvious  that  in  some  instances  the  fimdamental 

(principle  imder  consideration  has  been  violated  by  too  great  a 
mixture,  and  even  an  actual  consolidation,  of  the  different 
\  powers;  and  that  in  no  instance  has  a  competent  provision  been 

I  made  for  maintaining  in  practice  the  separation  delineated  on 
paper.  What  I  have  wished  to  evince  is,  that  the  charge 
brought   against   the  proposed  Constitution,   of   violating  a 


192  THE  FEDERALIST 

sacred  maxim  of  free  government,  is  warranted  neither  by  the 
real  meaning  annexed  to  that  maxim  by  its  author,  nor  by  the 
sense  in  which  it  has  hitherto  been  understood  in  America. 
This  interesting  subject  will  be  resumed  in  the  ensuing  paper. 

PUBLIUS. 

(6)  THE  OBJECTION  TO  A  COMPLETE  SEPARATION 
OF  POWERS 

The  same  Subject  continued,  with  a  View  to  the  Means  of 
GIVING  Efficiency  in  Practice  to  that  Maxima 

It  was  shown  in  the  last  paper  that  the  poHtical  apothegm 
there  examined  does  not  require  that  the  legislative,  executive, 
and  judiciary  departments  should  be  wholly  imconnected  with 
each  other.  I  shall  imdertake,  in  the  next  place,  to  show  that 
imless  these  departments  be  so  far  connected  and  blended  as  to 
give  to  each  a  constitutional  control  over  the  others,  the  degree 
of  separation  which  the  maxim  requires,  as  essential  to  a  free 
government,  can  never  in  practice  be  duly  maintained. 

It  is  agreed  on  all  sides  that  the  powers  properly  belonging 
to  one  of  the  departments  ought  not  to  be  directly  and  com- 
pletely administered  by  either  of  the  other  departments.  It 
is  equally  evident  that  neither  of  them  ought  to  possess,  directly 
or  indirectly,  an  overruling  influence  over  the  others,  in  the 
administration  of  their  respective  powers.  It  will  not  be  denied 
that  power  is  of  an  encroaching  natxire,  and  that  it  ought  to  be 
effectually  restrained  from  passing  the  limits  assigned  to  it. 
After  discriminating,  therefore,  in  theory,  the  several  classes  of 
power,  as  they  may  in  their  nature  be  legislative,  executive,  or 
judiciary,  the  next  and  most  difficult  task  is  to  provide  some 
practical  security  for  each,  against  the  invasion  of  the  others. 
What  this  security  ought  to  be  is  the  great  problem  to  be  solved. 

Will  it  be  sufficient  to  mark,  with  precision,  the  boundaries 
of  these  departments,  in  the  constitution  of  the  government, 
and  to  trust  to  these  parchment  barriers  against  the  encroaching 

»  No.  XLVm  (XLVU).     Madison.     New  York  Packet,  Februafy  i,  1788. 


THE  FEDERALIST  193 

spirit  of  power  ?  This  is  the  security  which  appears  to  have 
been  principally  relied  on  by  the  compilers  of  most  of  the  Ameri- 
can constitutions.  But  experience  assures  us  that  the  efficacy 
of  the  provision  has  been  greatly  overrated,  and  that  some 
more  adequate  defense  is  indispensably  necessary  for  the  more 
feeble,  against  the  more  powerful,  members  of  the  government. 
The  legislative  department  is  everywhere  extending  the  sphere 
of  its  activity,  and  drawing  all  power  into  its  impetuous  vortex. 

The  foimders  of  our  republics  have  so  much  merit  for  the 
wisdom  which  they  have  displayed  that  no  task  can  be  less 
pleasing  than  that  of  pointing  out  the  errors  into  which  they 
have  fallen.  A  respect  for  truth,  however,  obliges  us  to  remark 
that  they  seem  never  for  a  moment  to  have  turned  their  eyes 
from  the  danger  to  liberty  from  the  overgrown  and  all-grasping 
prerogative  of  an  hereditary  magistrate,  supported  and  fortified 
by  an  hereditary  branch  of  the  legislative  authority.  They 
seem  never  to  have  recollected  the  danger  from  legislative  usur- 
pations, which,  by  assembling  all  power  in  the  same  hands, 
must  lead  to  the  same  tyranny  as  is  threatened  by  executive 
usurpations. 

In  a  government  where  numerous  and  extensive  prerogatives 
are  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  hereditary  monarch,  the  executive 
department  is  very  justly  regarded  as  the  source  of  danger,  and 
watched  with  all  the  jealousy  which  a  zeal  for  liberty  ought  to 
inspire.  In  a  democracy,  where  a  multitude  of  people  exercise 
in  person  the  legislative  functions,  and  are  continually  exposed, 
by  their  incapacity  for  regular  deliberation  and  concerted  mea- 
sures, to  the  ambitious  intrigues  of  their  executive  magistrates, 
tyranny  may  well  be  apprehended,  on  some  favorable  emer- 
gency, to  start  up  in  the  same  quarter.  But  in  a  representative 
repubUc,  where  the  executive  magistracy  is  carefully  limited, 
both  in  the  extent  and  the  duration  of  its  power;  and  where  the 
legislative  power  is  exercised  by  an  assembly  which  is  inspired, 
by  a  supposed  influence  over  the  people,  with  an  intrepid  con- 
fidence in  its  own  strength;  which  is  sufficiently  numerous  to 
feel  all  the  passions  which  actuate  a  multitude,  yet  not  so 


194  THE  FEDERALIST 

numerous  as  to  be  incapable  of  pursuing  the  objects  of  its  pas- 
sions, by  means  which  reason  prescribes, — it  is  against  the  enter- 
prising ambition  of  this  department  that  the  people  ought  to 
indulge  all  their  jealousy  and  exhaust  all  their  precautions. 

The  legislative  department  derives  a  superiority  in  our  govern- 
ments from  other  circumstances.  Its  constitutional  powers 
being  at  once  more  extensive,  and  less  susceptible  of  precise 
limits,  it  can,  with  the  greater  facility,  mask,  under  complicated 
and  indirect  measures,  the  encroachments  which  it  makes  on 
the  coordinate  departments.  It  is  not  unfrequently  a  question 
of  real  nicety  in  legislative  bodies,  whether  the  operation  of  a 
particular  measure  will,  or  will  not,  extend  beyond  the  legisla- 
tive sphere.  On  the  other  side,  the  executive  power  being 
restrained  within  a  narrower  compass,  and  being  more  simple  in 
its  nature,  and  the  judiciary  being  described  by  landmarks  still 
less  imcertain,  projects  of  usurpation  by  either  of  these  depart- 
ments would  immediately  betray  and  defeat  themselves.  Nor 
is  this  all:  as  the  legislative  department  alone  has  access  to  the 
pockets  of  the  people,  and  has  in  some  constitutions  full  dis- 
cretion, and  in  all  a  prevaiUng  influence,  over  the  pecuniary 
rewards  of  those  who  fill  the  other  departments,  a  dependence 
is  thus  created  in  the  latter,  which  gives  still  greater  facility  to 
encroachments  of  the  former. 

I  have  appealed  to  our  own  experience  for  the  truth  of  what 
I  advance  on  this  subject.  Were  it  necessary  to  verify  this 
experience  by  particular  proofs,  they  might  be  multiplied  with- 
out end.  I  might  collect  vouchers  in  abundance  from  the  records 
and  archives  of  every  state  in  the  Union.  But  as  a  more  con- 
cise, and  at  the  same  time  equally  satisfactory,  evidence,  I  will 
refer  to  the  example  of  two  states,  attested  by  two  unexception- 
able authorities. 

The  first  example  is  that  of  Virginia,  a  state  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  has  expressly  declared  in  its  constitution  that  the 
three  great  departments  ought  not  to  be  intermixed.  The  au- 
thority in  support  of  it  is  Mr.  Jefferson,  who,  besides  his  other 
advantages  for  remarking  the  operation  of  the  government,  was 


THE  FEDERALIST  195 

himself  the  chief  magistrate  of  it.  In  order  to  convey  fully  the 
ideas  with  which  his  experience  had  impressed  him  on  this  sub- 
ject, it  will  be  necessary  to  quote  a  passage  of  some  length  from 
his  very  interesting  Notes  on  the  State  of  Virginia,  p.  195.  "All 
the  powers  of  government,  legislative,  executive  and  judiciary, 
result  to  the  legislative  body.  The  concentrating  these  in  the 
same  hands  is  precisely  the  definition  of  despotic  government. 
It  will  be  no  alleviation,  that  these  powers  will  be  exercised  by 
a  pluraHty  of  hands,  and  not  by  a  single  one.  One  hundred 
and  seventy-three  despots  would  surely  be  as  oppressive  as  one. 
Let  those  who  doubt  it  turn  their  eyes  on  the  republic  of  Venice. 
As  Uttle  will  it  avail  us  that  they  are  chosen  by  ourselves.  An 
elective  despotism  was  not  the  government  we  fought  for;  but 
one  which  should  not  only  be  founded  on  free  principles,  but  in 
which  the  powers  of  government  should  be  so  divided  and 
balanced  among  several  bodies  of  magistracy,  as  that  no  one 
could  transcend  their  legal  Hmits,  without  being  effectually 
checked  and  restrained  by  the  others.  For  this  reason,  that 
convention  which  passed  the  ordinance  of  government  laid 
its  foimdation  on  this  basis,  that  the  legislative,  executive  and 
judiciary  departments  should  be  separate  and  distinct,  so  that 
no  person  should  exercise  the  powers  of  more  than  one  of  them 
at  the  same  time.  But  no  harrier  was  provided  between  these 
several  powers.  The  judiciary  and  executive  members  were 
left  dependent  on  the  legislative  for  their  subsistence  in  office, 
and  some  of  them  for  their  continuance  in  it.  If,  therefore,  the 
legislature  assumes  executive  and  judiciary  powers,  no  opposi- 
tion is  likely  to  be  made;  nor,  if  made,  can  be  effectual;  because 
in  that  case  they  may  put  their  proceeding  into  the  form  of  an 
act  of  assembly,  which  will  render  them  obligatory  on  the  other 
branches.  They  have  accordingly,  in  many  instances,  decided 
rights  which  should  have  been  left  to  judiciary  controversy;  and 
the  direction  of  the  executive,  during  the  whole  time  of  their  session, 
is  becoming  habitual  and  familiar  J  ^ 

The  other  state  which  I  shall  have  for  an  example  is  Penn- 
sylvania*   and  the  other  authority,  the  Coimcil  of  Censors, 


196  THE  FEDERALIST 

which  assembled  in  the  years  1783  and  1784.  A  part  of  the 
duty  of  this  body,  as  marked  out  by  the  constitution,  was  "  to 
inquire  whether  the  constitution  had  been  preserved  inviolate 
in  every  part,  and  whether  the  legislative  and  executive  branches 
of  government  had  performed  their  duty  as  guardians  of  the 
people,  or  assumed  to  themselves,  or  exercised,  other  or  greater 
powers  than  they  are  entitled  to  by  the  constitution."  In  the 
execution  of  this  trust,  the  council  were  necessarily  led  to  a  com- 
parison of  both  the  legislative  and  executive  proceedings  with 
the  constitutional  powers  of  these  departments;  and  from  the 
facts  enumerated,  and  to  the  truth  of  most  of  which  both  sides 
in  the  council  subscribed,  it  appears  that  the  constitution  had 
been  flagrantly  violated  by  the  legislature  in  a  variety  of  im- 
portant instances. 

A  great  number  of  laws  had  been  passed,  violating,  without 
any  apparent  necessity,  the  rule  requiring  that  all  bills  of  a  pub- 
lic nature  shall  be  previously  printed  for  the  consideration  of 
the  people;  although  this  is  one  of  the  precautions  chiefly  relied 
on  by  the  constitution  against  improper  acts  of  the  legislature. 

The  constitutional  trial  by  jury  had  been  violated,  and  powers 
assumed  which  had  not  been  delegated  by  the  constitution. 

Executive  powers  had  been  usurped. 

The  salaries  of  the  judges,  which  the  constitution  expressly 
requires  to  be  fixed,  had  been  occasionally  varied;  and  cases 
belonging  to  the  judiciary  department  frequently  drawn  within 
legislative  cognizance  and  determination. 

Those  who  wish  to  see  the  several  particulars  falling  under 
each  of  these  heads  may  consult  the  journals  of  the  council, 
which  are  in  print.  Some  of  them,  it  will  be  found,  may  be 
imputable  to  pecuHar  circumstances  connected  with  the  war; 
but  the  greater  part  of  them  may  be  considered  as  the  sponta- 
neous shoots  of  an  ill-constituted  government. 

It  appears,  also,  that  the  executive  department  had  not  been 
innocent  of  frequent  breaches  of  the  constitution.  There  are 
three  observations,  however,  which  ought  to  be  made  on  this 
head:   first ,  a  great  proportion  of  the  instances  were  either 


THE  FEDERALIST  197 

immediately  produced  by  the  necessities  of  the  war,  or  recom- 
mended by  Congress  or  the  commander-in-chief;  second j  in  most 
of  the  other  instances,  they  conformed  either  to  the  declared 
or  the  known  sentiments  of  the  legislative  department;  third, 
the  executive  department  of  Pennsylvania  is  distinguished  from 
that  of  the  other  states  by  the  number  of  members  composing  it. 
In  this  respect  it  has  as  much  affinity  to  a  legislative  assembly 
as  to  an  executive  council.  And  being  at  once  exempt  from  the 
restraint  of  an  individual  responsibihty  for  the  acts  of  the  body, 
and  deriving  confidence  from  mutual  example  and  joint  influence, 
imauthorized  measures  would,  of  course,  be  more  freely  hazarded 
than  where  the  executive  department  is  administered  by  a  single 
hand,  or  by  a  few  hands. 

The  conclusion  which  I  am  warranted  in  drawing  from  these 
observations  is,  that  a  mere  demarcation  on  parchment  of  the 
constitutional  limits  of  the  several  departments  is  not  a  sufficient 
guard  against  those  encroachments  which  lead  to  a  tyrannical 
concentration  of  all  the  powers  of  government  in  the  same  hands. 

PUBLIUS. 

(c)  SEPARATION  OF  POWERS  NECESSARY  TO  PREVENT 
FREQUENT  CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENTS 

The  same  Subject  continued  with  the  same  View.* 

The  author  of  the  Notes  on  the  State  of  Virginia,  quoted  in  the 
last  paper,  has  subjoined  to  that  valuable  work,  the  draught 
of  a  constitution  which  had  been  prepared  in  order  to  be  laid 
before  a  convention  expected  to  be  called  in  1783,  by  the  legis- 
lature, for  the  establishment  of  a  constitution  for  that  common- 
wealth. The  plan,  like  everything  from  the  same  pen,  marks 
a  turn  of  thinking  original,  comprehensive,  and  accurate;  and 
is  the  more  worthy  of  attention,  as  it  equally  displays  a  fervent 
attachment  to  republican  government,  and  an  enlightened 
view  of  the  dangerous  propensities  against  which  it  ought  to  be 
guarded.     One  of  the  precautions  which  he  proposes,  and  on 

1  No.  XLIX  (XLVIII).    Madison  or  Hamilton.    Independent  Journal,  February  2, 1788. 


igS  THE  FEDERALIST 

which  he  appears  ultimately  to  rely  as  a  palladium  to  the  weaker 
departments  of  power,  against  the  invasions  of  the  stronger, 
is  perhaps  altogether  his  own,  and  as  it  immediately  relates  to 
the  subject  of  our  present  inquiry,  ought  not  to  be  overlooked. 

His  proposition  is,  "  that  whenever  any  two  of  the  three 
branches  of  government  shall  concur  in  opinion,  each  by  the 
voices  of  two  thirds  of  their  whole  number,  that  a  convention 
is  necessary  for  altering  the  constitution  or  correcting  breaches  of 
it,  a  convention  shall  be  called  for  the  purpose." 

As  the  people  are  the  only  legitimate  fountain  of  power,  and 
it  is  from  them  that  the  constitutional  charter,  under  which  the 
several  branches  of  government  hold  their  power,  is  derived,  it 
seems  strictly  consonant  to  the  republican  theory,  to  recur  to 
the  same  original  authority,  not  only  whenever  it  may  be  neces- 
sary to  enlarge,  diminish,  or  new-model  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment, but  also  whenever  any  one  of  the  departments  may 
coromit  encroachments  on  the  chartered  authorities  of  the 
others.  The  several  departments  being  perfectly  coordinate 
by  the  terms  of  their  common  commission,  neither  of  them,  it 
is  evident,  can  pretend  to  an  exclusive  or  superior  right  of  settling 
the  boundaries  between  their  respective  powers;  and  how  are  the 
encroachments  of  the  stronger  to  be  prevented,  or  the  wrongs 
of  the  weaker  to  be  redressed,  without  an  appeal  to  the  people 
themselves;  who,  as  the  grantors  of  the  commission,  can  alone 
declare  its  true  meaning  and  enforce  its  observance  ? 

There  is  certainly  great  force  in  this  reasoning,  and  it  must 
be  allowed  to  prove,  that  a  constitutional  road  to  the  decision 
of  the  people  ought  to  be  marked  out  and  kept  open,  for  certain 
great  and  extraordinary  occasions.  But  there  appear  to  be 
insuperable  objections  against  the  proposed  recurrence  to  the 
people,  as  a  provision  in  all  cases  for  keeping  the  several  depart- 
ments of  power  within  their  constitutional  limits. 

In  the  first  place,  the  provision  does  not  reach  the  case  of 
a  combination  of  two  of  the  departments  against  the  third. 
If  the  legislative  authority,  which  possesses  so  many  means  of 
operating  on  the  motives  of  the  other  departments,  should  be 


THE  FEDERALIST  199 

able  to  gain  to  its  interest  either  of  the  others,  or  even  one  third 
of  its  members,  the  remaining  department  could  derive  no  advan- 
tage from  this  remedial  provision.  I  do  not  dwell,  however,  on 
this  objection,  because  it  may  be  thought  to  lie  rather  against 
the  modification  of  the  principle  than  against  the  principle 
itself. 

In  the  next  place,  it  may  be  considered  as  an  objection  inher- 
ent in  the  principle,  that  as  every  appeal  to  the  people  would 
carry  an  implication  of  some  defect  in  the  government,  frequent 
appeals  would  in  great  measure  deprive  the  government  of  that 
veneration  which  time  bestows  on  everything,  and  without 
which  perhaps  the  wisest  and  freest  governments  would  not 
possess  the  requisite  stabihty.  If  it  be  true  that  all  govern- 
ments rest  on  opinion,  it  is  no  less  true  that  the  strength  of 
opinion  in  each  individual,  and  its  practical  influence  on  his 
conduct,  depend  much  on  the  number  which  he  supposes  to 
have  entertained  the  same  opinion.  The  reason  of  man,  Uke 
man  himself,  is  timid  and  cautious,  when  left  alone;  and  acquires 
firmness  and  confidence,  in  proportion  to  the  number  with  which 
it  is  associated.  When  the  examples  which  fortify  opinion  are 
ancient  as  well  as  numerous y  they  are  known  to  have  a  double 
effect.  In  a  nation  of  philosophers  this  consideration  ought 
to  be  disregarded.  A  reverence  for  the  laws  would  be  suffi- 
ciently inculcated  by  the  voice  of  an  enlightened  reason.  But 
a  nation  of  philosophers  is  as  little  to  be  expected  as  the  philo- 
sophical race  of  kings  wished  for  by  Plato.  And  in  every  other 
nation,  the  most  rational  government  will  not  find  it  a  super- 
fluous advantage  to  have  the  prejudices  of  the  community  on 
its  side. 

The  danger  of  disturbing  the  public  tranquillity  by  interesting 
too  strongly  the  pubHc  passions,  is  a  stiU  more  serious  objection 
against  a  frequent  reference  of  constitutional  questions  to  the 
decision  of  the  whole  society.  Notwithstanding  the  success 
which  has  attended  the  revisions  of  our  estabUshed  forms  of 
government,  and  which  does  so  much  honor  to  the  virtue  and 
intelligence  of  the  people  of  America,  it  must  be  confessed  that 


200  THE   FEDERALIST 

the  experiments  are  of  too  ticklish  a  nature  to  be  unnecessarily 
multiplied.  We  are  to  recollect  that  all  the  existing  constitu- 
tions were  formed  in  the  midst  of  a  danger  which  repressed  the 
passions  most  unfriendly  to  order  and  concord;  of  an  enthusi- 
astic confidence  of  the  people  in  their  patriotic  leaders,  which 
stifled  the  ordinary  diversity  of  opinions  on  great  national  ques- 
tions; of  a  universal  ardor  for  new  and  opposite  forms,  pro- 
duced by  a  universal  resentment  and  indignation  against  the 
ancient  government;  and  whilst  no  spirit  of  party  connected 
with  the  changes  to  be  made,  or  the  abuses  to  be  reformed,  could 
mingle  its  leaven  in  the  operation.  The  future  situations  in 
which  we  must  expect  to  be  usually  placed,  do  not  present  any 
equivalent  security  against  the  danger  which  is  apprehended. 

But  the  greatest  objection  of  all  is  that  the  decisions  which 
would  probably  result  from  such  appeals  would  not  answer  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  constitutional  equilibrium  of  the 
government.  We  have  seen  that  the  tendency  of  republican 
governments  is  to  an  aggrandizement  of  the  legislative  at  the 
expense  of  the  other  departments.  The  appeals  to  the  people, 
therefore,  would  usually  be  made  by  the  executive  and  judiciary 
departments.  But  whether  made  by  one  side  or  the  other, 
would  each  side  enjoy  equal  advantages  on  the  trial  ?  Let  us 
view  their  different  situations.  The  members  of  the  executive 
and  judiciary  departments  are  few  in  number,  and  can  be  person- 
ally known  to  a  small  part  only  of  the  people.  The  latter,  by 
the  mode  of  their  appointment,  as  well  as  by  the  nature  and 
permanency  of  it,  are  too  far  removed  from  the  people  to  share 
much  in  their  prepossessions.  The  former  are  generally  the 
objects  of  jealousy,  and  their  administration  is  always  liable  to 
be  discolored  and  rendered  unpopular.  The  members  of  the 
legislative  department,  on  the  other  hand,  are  numerous.  They 
are  distributed  and  dwell  among  the  people  at  large.  Their 
connections  of  blood,  of  friendship,  and  of  acquaintance  em- 
brace a  great  proportion  of  the  most  influential  part  of  the 
society.  The  nature  of  their  public  trust  implies  a  personal  in- 
fluence among  the  people,  and  that  they  are  more  immediately 


THE  FEDERALIST  201 

the  confidential  guardians  of  the  rights  and  Uberties  of  the 
people.  With  these  advantages,  it  can  hardly  be  supposed 
that  the  adverse  party  would  have  an  equal  chance  for  a 
favorable  issue. 

But  the  legislative  party  would  not  only  be  able  to  plead  their 
cause  most  successfully  with  the  people:  they  would  probably 
be  constituted  themselves  the  judges.  The  same  influence  which 
had  gained  them  an  election  into  the  legislature  would  gain  them 
a  seat  in  the  convention.  If  this  should  not  be  the  case  with  all, 
it  would  probably  be  the  case  with  many,  and  pretty  certainly 
with  those  leading  characters  on  whom  everything  depends  in 
such  bodies.  The  convention,  in  short,  would  be  composed 
chiefly  of  men  who  had  been,  who  actually  were,  or  who  expected 
to  be,  members  of  the  department  whose  conduct  was  arraigned. 
They  would  consequently  be  parties  to  the  very  question  to  be 
decided  by  them. 

It  might,  however,  sometimes  happen  that  appeals  would 
be  made  under  circumstances  less  adverse  to  the  executive  and 
judiciary  departments.  The  usurpations  of  the  legislature 
might  be  so  flagrant  and  so  sudden  as  to  admit  of  no  specious 
coloring.  A  strong  party  among  themselves  might  take  side 
with  the  other  branches.  The  executive  power  might  be  in  the 
hands  of  a  pecuUar  favorite  of  the  people.  In  such  a  posture 
of  things,  the  pubUc  decision  might  be  less  swayed  by  prepos- 
sessions in  favor  of  the  legislative  party.  But  still  it  could 
never  be  expected  to  turn  on  the  true  merits  of  the  question. 
It  would  inevitably  be  connected  with  the  spirit  of  preexisting 
parties,  or  of  parties  springing  out  of  the  question  itself.  It 
would  be  connected  with  persons  of  distinguished  character  and 
extensive  influence  in  the  community.  It  would  be  pronounced 
by  the  very  men  who  had  been  agents  in,  or  opponents  of,  the 
measures  to  which  the  decision  would  relate.  The  passions, 
therefore,  not  the  reason,  of  the  pubUc  would  sit  in  judgment. 
But  it  is  the  reason  of  the  pubUc  alone  that  ought  to  control 
and  regulate  the  government.  The  passions  ought  to  be  con- 
trolled and  regulated  by  the  government. 


202  THE  FEDERALIST 

We  found  in  the  last  paper  that  mere  declarations  in  the 
written  Constitution  are  not  sufficient  to  restrain  the  several 
departments  within  their  legal  limits.  It  appears  in  this,  that 
occasional  appeals  to  the  people  would  be  neither  a  proper  nor 
an  effectual  provision  for  that  purpose.  How  far  the  provisions 
of  a  different  nature  contained  in  the  plan  above  quoted  might 
be  adequate,  I  do  not  examine.  Some  of  them  are  unquestion- 
ably founded  on  sound  political  principles,  and  all  of  them  are 
framed  with  singular  ingenuity  and  precision. 

PUBLIUS. 


7  P 


USE 


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